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Profile: Andrew Naylor (Indiana University South Bend)
  1. Andrew Naylor (forthcoming). Justification and Forgetting. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    This paper sets forth a view about how epistemic justification figures in the ongoing justification of memory belief, a view that I call moderate justificational preservationism (MJP). MJP presupposes a notion of memorial justification. But it is not the traditional notion according to which something in the present—some memory impression, ostensible recollection, or memory experience—makes one’s belief that p prima facie justified. Instead, what makes one’s present belief that p prima facie justified, according to MJP, is that which provided one (...)
     
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  2. Andrew Naylor (2012). Belief From the Past. European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4):598-620.
    Abstract: A person who remembers having done something has a belief that she did it from having done it. To have a belief that one did something from having done it is to believe that one did the action on the (causal) basis of having done it, where this belief (in order for one to have it) need not be (causally) based even in part on any contributor to the belief other than doing the action. The notion of a contributor (...)
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  3. Andrew Naylor (2012). Review of Sven Bernecker, Memory: A Philosophical Study, Oxford University Press: New York, 2010. [REVIEW] Memory Stidoes 5 (2):240-242.
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  4. Andrew Naylor (2011). Remembering-That: Episodic Vs. Semantic. Philosophical Psychology 24 (3):317 - 322.
    In a paper ?The intentionality of memory,? Jordi Fernández (2006) proposes a way of distinguishing between episodic and semantic memory. I identify three difficulties with his proposal and provide a way of drawing the distinction that avoids these shortcomings.
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  5. Andrew Naylor (2008). Personal Identity Un-Locke-Ed. American Philosophical Quarterly 45 (4):407-416.
    The paper presents considerations that weigh against one or another version of the psychological continuity theory of personal identity over time. Such Locke-like theories frequently go wrong, it is argued, in not formulating precisely how the psychological states of an individual person are related diachronically, in failing to capture a truly appropriate causal connection between later and earlier psychological states, and in claiming support from particular cases. In addition, the paper offers examples and other considerations that support an alternative, biological (...)
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  6. Andrew Naylor (1986). Remembering Without Knowing — Not Without Justification. Philosophical Studies 49 (3):295 - 311.
    K. Lehrer and J. Richard’s analysis of remembering that p is shown to be deficient, particularly because it fails to treat factual memory as an epistemic concept. Adding a requirement concerning the subject’s past justification accommodates instances of factual memory without factual knowledge, helps explain the role of justification in remembering that p, and strengthens the analysis against certain counterexamples. The paper includes an assessment of A. Cusmariu;s definition of impure memory.
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  7. Andrew Naylor (1985). In Defense of a Nontraditional Theory of Memory. The Monist 62 (January):136-50.
    A theory of occurrent factual memory is sketched out. The theory represents an alterative to the traditional theory in John L. Pollock’s Knowledge and Justification, in that it analyzes occurrently remembering that p without employing the notion of ostensible recollection that p. The latter notion, it is argued, can be understood in terms of occurrently believing (or being inclined to believe) that p. In defending his theory against nontraditional alternatives, Pollock employs arguments that conflict with his own principle of implicit (...)
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  8. Andrew Naylor (1983). Justification in Memory Knowledge. Synthese 55 (2):269 - 286.
    The definition of memory knowledge that p put forward in this paper is nontraditional in that the justification for the belief that p which constitutes that knowledge is not located in any memory-impression or other present state of the subject. Rather it is the subject's actual past justification for p, or a proper part thereof, that justifies this present belief that p. It is argued (1) that the notion under definition is that of knowing straight from memory, (2) that an (...)
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  9. Andrew Naylor (1982). Defeasibility and Memory Knowledge. Mind 91 (July):432-437.
    This paper examines a leading traditional account of memory knowledge. (A “traditional” account of memory knowledge locates whatever positive justification there may be for the belief which constitutes that knowledge in a present memory-impression.) The paper (1) presents a pair of cases designed to show that Carl Ginet’s four-part defeasibility-type definition of memory knowledge that p is either too weak or too strong, and (2) suggests how these cases could be handled by one sort of non-traditional account.
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  10. Andrew Naylor (1973). On the Evidence of One's "Memories&Quot;. Analysis 33 (5):160 - 167.
    One difference between traditional and contemporary nontraditional theories of memory is that the former would affirm, whereas the latter would deny, that a person can be correctly described as having remembered that p solely in virtue of having knowledge the certainty of which is grounded upon the person’s present remembering. I argue that there cannot be such a case, and that what may appear to be such a case—as presented in Don Locke’s book Memory—can be explicated by a contemporary nontraditional (...)
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  11. Andrew Naylor (1971). B Remembers That P From Time T. Journal of Philosophy 68 (2):29-41.
    For cases in which to remember that p is to have (strict) nonbasic, unmixed memory knowledge that p; in which there is at most one prior time, t, from which one remembers; in which one knew at t that p; and in which there can arise a sensible question whether one remembers that p from t — a person, B, remembers that p from t if and only if: (1) There is a set of grounds a subset of which consists (...)
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  12. Andrew Naylor (1966). On Remembering an Unreal Past. Analysis 26 (March):122-128.
    Against Russell’s skeptical conjecture, that the world and its entire population came into existence five minutes ago, it is argued that any one of the following is logically incompatible with the conjunction of the other two: ostensible memories of certain events, records of such events, and the non-occurrence of these same events. This conclusion is reached through a critical examination of (1) the arguments advanced by Norman Malcolm in trying to show that Russell’s “hypothesis” does not express a logical possibility, (...)
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