Pleasure, Desire and Practical Reason

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (2):143-149 (2011)
Abstract
This paper examines the role of stability in the constitution of pleasure and desire, its relevance to the intimate ways the two are related and to their role in the constitution of practical reason
Keywords Pleasure  Desire  Reason  Stability
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References found in this work BETA
I. L. Humberstone (1990). Wanting, Getting, Having. Philosophical Papers 99 (August):99-118.
James Lenman (2009). Achieving Objectivity. Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1):293-304.

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