Virtue epistemology: No new cures
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):397–410 (2004)
| Abstract | One version of virtue epistemology defines knowledge as belief whose truth arises from, or is explained by, the motives that produced it. This version is also intended to solve the Gettier problem, by shielding properly caused beliefs from double accidents. Unfortunately, there is no notion of "explains" or "arises from" which explains in the intended sense the truth of true beliefs. | |||||||||
| Keywords | belief, epistemology, gettier cases, motive, truth | |||||||||
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Nenad Miscevic (2007). Virtue -Based Epistemology and the Centrality of Truth (Towards a Strong Virtue-Epistemology). Acta Analytica 22 (3):239--266.
Jason S. Baehr (2006). Character in Epistemology. Philosophical Studies 128 (3):479--514.
Heather Battaly (2008). Virtue Epistemology. Philosophy Compass 3 (4):639-663.
Christoph Kelp (2011). In Defence of Virtue Epistemology. Synthese 179:409-33.
B. J. C. Madison (2011). Combating Anti Anti-Luck Epistemology. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):47-58.
Stephen Hetherington, Gettier Problems. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
John Turri (2012). Is Knowledge Justified True Belief? Synthese 184 (3):247-259.
Baron Reed (2005). Accidentally Factive Mental States. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):134 - 142.
Baron Reed (2005). Accidentally Factive Mental States. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):134–142.
Ernest Sosa (1993). Epistemology, Realism, and Truth: The First Philosophical Perspectives Lecture. Philosophical Perspectives 7 (1):1-16.
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