Graduate studies at Western
Philosophical Studies 164 (2):533-542 (2013)
|Abstract||It is widely thought that mind–body substance dualism is implausible at best, though mere “property” dualism is defensible and even flourishing. This paper argues that substance dualism is no less plausible than property dualism and even has two advantages over it|
|Keywords||Mind–body problem Cartesian dualism Substance dualism Property dualism|
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