Is property dualism better off than substance dualism?

Philosophical Studies 164 (2):533-542 (2013)
Abstract
It is widely thought that mind–body substance dualism is implausible at best, though mere “property” dualism is defensible and even flourishing. This paper argues that substance dualism is no less plausible than property dualism and even has two advantages over it
Keywords Mind–body problem  Cartesian dualism  Substance dualism  Property dualism
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References found in this work BETA
George Bealer (1994). Mental Properties. Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):185-208.
George Bealer (1997). Self-Consciousness. Philosophical Review 106 (1):69-117.
Karen Bennett (2007). Mental Causation. Philosophy Compass 2 (2):316–337.

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Citations of this work BETA
William Lycan (2009). Giving Dualism its Due. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):551-563.
Similar books and articles
John A. Foster (1989). A Defense of Dualism. In J. Smythies & John Beloff (eds.), The Case for Dualism. University of Virginia Press.
Gordon Barnes (2001). Should Property-Dualists Be Substance-Hylomorphists? Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 75:285-299.
Penelope Mackie (2011). Property Dualism and Substance Dualism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (1pt1):181-199.
Dean Zimmerman (2010). From Property Dualism to Substance Dualism. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84 (1):119 - 150.
William Lycan (2009). Giving Dualism its Due. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):551-563.
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