Defending the Evidential Value of Epistemic Intuitions: A Reply to Stich

Do epistemic intuitions tell us anything about knowledge? Stich has argued that we respond to cases according to our contingent cultural programming, and not in a manner that tends to reveal anything significant about knowledge itself. I’ve argued that a cross-culturally universal capacity for mindreading produces the intuitive sense that the subject of a case has or lacks knowledge. This paper responds to Stich’s charge that mindreading is cross-culturally varied in a way that will strip epistemic intuitions of their evidential value. I argue that existing work on cross-cultural variation in mindreading favors my position over Stich’s.
Keywords epistemic intuitions  mindreading  disagreement  cross-cultural variation  universality  evidence  philosophical method
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/phpr.12008
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive Jennifer Nagel, Defending the Evidential Value of Epistemic Intuitions: A Reply to Stich
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

View all 18 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Finn Spicer (2010). Cultural Variations in Folk Epistemic Intuitions. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (4):515-529.
Jennifer Nagel (2007). Epistemic Intuitions. Philosophy Compass 2 (6):792–819.
Jennifer Zamzow & Shaun Nichols (2009). Variations in Ethical Intuitions. In Ernest Sosa & Enrique Villanueva (eds.), Metaethics. Wiley Periodicals, Inc. 368-388.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

598 ( #501 of 1,725,631 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

120 ( #4,285 of 1,725,631 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.