Defending Lewis's local miracle compatibilism

Philosophical Studies 130 (2):337-349 (2006)
Helen Beebee has recently argued that David Lewis’s account of compatibilism, so-called local miracle compatibilism (LMC), allows for the possibility that agents in deterministic worlds have the ability to break or cause the breaking of a law of nature. Because Lewis’s LMC allows for this consequence, Beebee claims that LMC is untenable and subsequently that Lewis’s criticism of van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument for incompatibilism is substantially weakened. I review Beebee’s argument against Lewis’s thesis and argue that Beebee has not refuted LMC and concomitantly has not demonstrated that Lewis’s criticism of the Consequence Argument fails.
Keywords Agency  Compatibilism  Determinism  Law  Local  Metaphysics  Miracle  Beebee, Helen  Lewis, David K
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References found in this work BETA
Keith Lehrer (1980). Preferences, Conditionals and Freedom. In Peter van Inwagen (ed.), Time and Cause. D. Reidel. 187--201.

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