The incorrigible social meaning of video game imagery

Ethics and Information Technology 13 (4):303-312 (2011)
Abstract
In this paper, I consider a particular amoralist challenge against those who would morally criticize our single-player video play, viz., “come on, it’s only a game!” The amoralist challenge with which I engage gains strength from two facts: the activities to which the amoralist lays claim are only those that do not involve interactions with other rational or sentient creatures, and the amoralist concedes that there may be extrinsic, consequentialist considerations that support legitimate moral criticisms. I argue that the amoralist is mistaken and that there are non-consequentialist resources for morally evaluating our single-player game play. On my view, some video games contain details that anyone who has a proper understanding of and is properly sensitive to features of a shared moral reality will see as having an incorrigible social meaning that targets groups of individuals, e.g., women and minorities. I offer arguments to support the claim that there are such incorrigible social meanings and that they constrain the imaginative world so that challenges like “it’s only a game” lose their credibility. I also argue that our responses to such meanings bear on evaluations of our character, and in light of this fact video game designers have a duty to understand and work against the meanings of such imagery
Keywords Aesthetics   Applied ethics   Ethics   Gender   Race   Video games   Virtual pedophilia
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    Robert Francis John Seddon (2013). Getting 'Virtual' Wrongs Right. Ethics and Information Technology 15 (1):1-11.
    Stephanie L. Patridge (2013). Pornography, Ethics, and Video Games. Ethics and Information Technology 15 (1):25-34.
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