David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Issues 17 (1):217-244 (2007)
What are reasons? For example, if you’re aware that your secretary plans to expose you, and you resign to avoid a scandal, what is your reason for resigning? Is your reason the fact that your secretary plans to expose you? If so, what kinds of facts are eligible to be reasons? Can merely possible facts be reasons (for actual subjects)? Can merely apparent facts? Or are reasons rather attitudes? Are your reasons for resigning your belief that your secretary plans to expose you, and your desire to avoid a scandal? Or are reasons propositions? If so, which propositions? Only propositions that the subject believes and desires? Only propositions that are true? (On some views, those will be facts; on other views, not.).
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard K. Wettstein (eds.) (1989). Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press, Usa.
Russ Shafer-Landau (2003). Moral Realism: A Defence. Oxford University Press.
Jonathan Dancy (2000). Practical Reality. Oxford University Press.
Stephen R. Schiffer (2003). The Things We Mean. Oxford University Press.
Wilfrid Sellars (1963). Science, Perception, and Reality. New York, Humanities Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Kurt Sylvan (2016). Epistemic Reasons II: Basing. Philosophy Compass 11 (7):377-389.
Santiago Echeverri (2013). Is Perception a Source of Reasons? Theoria 79 (1):22-56.
Kevin Mulligan (2010). The Truth Predicate Vs the Truth Connective. On Taking Connectives Seriously. Dialectica 64 (4):565-584.
Giulia Felappi (2016). Why Fuss About These Quirks of the Vernacular? Propositional Attitude Sentences in Prior’s Nachlass. Synthese 193 (11):3521-3534.
Similar books and articles
Fred I. Dretske (1971). Reasons, Knowledge, and Probability. Philosophy of Science 38 (2):216-220.
Michael Smith (2009). Desires, Values, Reasons, and the Dualism of Practical Reason. Ratio 22 (1):98-125.
Chris Heathwood (2011). Desire-Based Theories of Reasons, Pleasure, and Welfare. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 6:79-106.
Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (2011). How to Be a Teleologist About Epistemic Reasons. In Asbjorn Steglich-Petersen & Andrew Reisner (eds.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press 13--33.
Hallvard Lillehammer (2010). Facts, Ends, and Normative Reasons. Journal of Ethics 14 (1):17 - 26.
Maria Alvarez (2009). How Many Kinds of Reasons? Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):181 – 193.
Stephen Darwall (2003). Desires, Reasons, and Causes. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):436–443.
John Turri (2009). The Ontology of Epistemic Reasons. Noûs 43 (3):490-512.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads100 ( #45,555 of 1,932,526 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #149,396 of 1,932,526 )
How can I increase my downloads?