David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Mind and Language 21 (2):187-219 (2006)
We discuss in some length evidence from the cognitive science suggesting that the representations of objects based on spatiotemporal information and featural information retrieved bottomup from a visual scene precede representations of objects that include conceptual information. We argue that a distinction can be drawn between representations with conceptual and nonconceptual content. The distinction is based on perceptual mechanisms that retrieve information in conceptually unmediated ways. The representational contents of the states induced by these mechanisms that are available to a type of awareness called phenomenal awareness constitute the phenomenal content of experience. The phenomenal content of perception contains the existence of objects as separate things that persist in time and time, spatiotemporal information, and information regarding relative spatial relations, motion, surface properties, shape, size, orientation, color, and their functional properties
|Keywords||Content Experience Information Metaphysics Object Phenomena Representation|
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Citations of this work BETA
Jack Lyons (2011). Circularity, Reliability, and the Cognitive Penetrability of Perception. Philosophical Issues 21 (1):289-311.
Dustin Stokes (2009). Aesthetics and Cognitive Science. Philosophy Compass 4 (5):715-733.
Athanasios Raftopoulos (2011). Ambiguous Figures and Representationalism. Synthese 181 (3):489-514.
Athanasios Raftopoulos (2009). Reference, Perception, and Attention. Philosophical Studies 144 (3):339 - 360.
René Jagnow (2012). Representationalism and the Perspectival Character of Perceptual Experience. Philosophical Studies 157 (2):227-249.
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