David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Mind and Language 21 (2):187-219 (2006)
We discuss in some length evidence from the cognitive science suggesting that the representations of objects based on spatiotemporal information and featural information retrieved bottomup from a visual scene precede representations of objects that include conceptual information. We argue that a distinction can be drawn between representations with conceptual and nonconceptual content. The distinction is based on perceptual mechanisms that retrieve information in conceptually unmediated ways. The representational contents of the states induced by these mechanisms that are available to a type of awareness called phenomenal awareness constitute the phenomenal content of experience. The phenomenal content of perception contains the existence of objects as separate things that persist in time and time, spatiotemporal information, and information regarding relative spatial relations, motion, surface properties, shape, size, orientation, color, and their functional properties
|Keywords||Content Experience Information Metaphysics Object Phenomena Representation|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Jack Lyons (2011). Circularity, Reliability, and the Cognitive Penetrability of Perception. Philosophical Issues 21 (1):289-311.
Dustin Stokes (2009). Aesthetics and Cognitive Science. Philosophy Compass 4 (5):715-733.
Michael Rescorla (2009). Cognitive Maps and the Language of Thought. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (2):377-407.
René Jagnow (2012). Representationalism and the Perspectival Character of Perceptual Experience. Philosophical Studies 157 (2):227-249.
Athanasios Raftopoulos (2009). Reference, Perception, and Attention. Philosophical Studies 144 (3):339 - 360.
Similar books and articles
John Dilworth (2005). The Double Content of Perception. Synthese 146 (3):225-243.
Vincent Muller (2006). Nonconceptual Demonstrative Reference. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):251-285.
John-Michael M. Kuczynski (2004). Some Arguments Against Intentionalism. Acta Analytica 19 (32):107-141.
Brad J. Thompson (2010). The Spatial Content of Experience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):146-184.
Uriah Kriegel (2004). Perceptual Experience, Conscious Content, and Nonconceptual Content. Essays in Philosophy 5 (1):1-14.
Tim Bayne (2009). Perception and the Reach of Phenomenal Content. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):385-404.
Fiona Macpherson (2000). Representational Theories of Phenomenal Character. Dissertation, University of Stirling
Athanassios Raftopoulos & Vincent C. Müller (2006). Nonconceptual Demonstrative Reference. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):251-285.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads88 ( #12,945 of 1,096,231 )
Recent downloads (6 months)9 ( #17,851 of 1,096,231 )
How can I increase my downloads?