The phenomenal content of experience

Mind and Language 21 (2):187-219 (2006)
We discuss at some length evidence from the cognitive science suggesting that the representations of objects based on spatiotemporal information and featural information retrieved bottomup from a visual scene precede representations of objects that include conceptual information. We argue that a distinction can be drawn between representations with conceptual and nonconceptual content. The distinction is based on perceptual mechanisms that retrieve information in conceptually unmediated ways. The representational contents of the states induced by these mechanisms that are available to a type of awareness called phenomenal awareness constitute the phenomenal content of experience. The phenomenal content of perception contains the existence of objects as separate things that persist in time and time, spatiotemporal information, and information regarding relative spatial relations, motion, surface properties, shape, size, orientation, color, and their functional properties.
Keywords Content  nonconceptual content  phenomenal content  Object  object persistence  Representation
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DOI 10.1111/j.0268-1064.2006.00311.x
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PhilPapers Archive Athanassios Raftopoulos, The phenomenal content of experience
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Michael Rescorla (2009). Cognitive Maps and the Language of Thought. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (2):377-407.

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