David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Mind and Language 23 (5):499-517 (2008)
Abstract: Focusing on early child pretend play from the perspective of developmental psychology, this article puts forward and presents evidence for two claims. First, such play constitutes an area of remarkable individual intentionality of second-order intentionality (or 'theory of mind'): in pretence with others, young children grasp the basic intentional structure of pretending as a non-serious fictional form of action. Second, early social pretend play embodies shared or collective we-intentionality. Pretending with others is one of the ontogenetically primary instances of truly cooperative actions. And it is a, perhaps the, primordial form of cooperative action with rudimentary rule-governed, institutional structure: in joint pretence games, children are aware that objects collectively get assigned fictional status, 'count as' something, and that this creates a normative space of warranted moves in the game. Developmentally, pretend play might even be a cradle for institutional phenomena more generally.
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References found in this work BETA
Janet Wilde Astington (2001). The Paradox of Intention: Assessing Children's Metarepresentational Understanding. In Bertram Malle, L. J. Moses & Dare Baldwin (eds.), Intentions and Intentionality: Foundations of Social Cognition. Mit Press.
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Michael E. Bratman (1992). Shared Cooperative Activity. Philosophical Review 101 (2):327-341.
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Ori Friedman & Alan M. Leslie (2007). The Conceptual Underpinnings of Pretense: Pretending is Not 'Behaving-as-If'. Cognition 105 (1):103-124.
Citations of this work BETA
Olle Blomberg (2011). Socially Extended Intentions-in-Action. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):335-353.
Antonio Rizzo (2012). The Dual Nature of Tools and Their Makeover. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 35 (4):239-240.
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