Thought 1 (2):146-151 (2012)
|Abstract||“Double-halfers” think that throughout the Sleeping Beauty Problem, Beauty should keep her credence that a fair coin flip came up heads equal to 1/2. I introduce a new wrinkle to the problem that shows even double-halfers can't keep Beauty's credences equal to the objective chances for all coin-flip propositions. This leaves no way to deny that self-locating information generates an unexpected kind of inadmissible evidence|
|Keywords||self‐location credence Sleeping Beauty Problem chance Principal Principle|
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