Far more than a collection of interesting sayings, A Basic Confucius offers an essential guide to individual cultivation and philosophical contemplation which ...

The Dao De Jing (Tao Te Ching) by Laozi (Lao Tzu) is unquestionably the best known and most widely read of all classical Chinese philosophy texts. It has been adapted into all forms of modern media, including business, personal relationships, meditation, and sports. Rarely has a book been published containing the essential, unaltered text in an aesthetically minimalist format, preserving the essence of the original prose. Like the writings of Sunzi, Confucius, and Mencius, the work of Laozi also forms one (...) of the founding pillars of the Chinese artistic and literary canon. The Dao De Jing offers profound insight into classical Chinese philosophical thought, while providing practical, sensible advice for leading ones life in today's modern world. A Basic Dao joins the other titles in the Long River Press' Basic series, which highlights the best examples of ancient Chinese philosophy in their pure, unaltered forms. A Basic Dao takes some of the most popular quotations from Laozi and arranges them with historical anecdotes on the opposite page. The result is an ideal book for beginning or experienced philosophy students, philanthropists, and anyone with an interest in the philosophical and literary traditions of China. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉDans cet article, j'explore comment nous pouvons nous servir d'idées philosophiques provenant du Yogācāra chinois afin d’élargir le projet du féminisme bouddhiste. En me concentrant sur les écrits de Xuanzang (env. 602–664) et de son disciple Kuiji (632–682), j'examine comment la théorie de la conscience du Yogācāra peut être interprétée comme un récit genré de la non-dualité. Ainsi, le terme «dialectique du Yogācāra» serait employé afin de décrire cette théorie de la non-dualité qui souligne la fluidité et la transformabilité. (...) Je soutiens que les Yogācārins chinois ont développé la dialectique du genre, et qu'ils ont ainsi pu éroder subtilement le sexisme à l’époque prémoderne. (shrink)

In this essay, I investigate how Chinese Yogācāra scholars of the Tang dynasty explicated and supplemented the theory of apoha (exclusion) propounded by the Indian Buddhist epistemologist Dignāga, according to which a nominal word functions by excluding everything other than its own referent. I first present a brief exposition of the theory. Then, I show that although they had very limited access to Dignāga’s theory, Kuiji and Shentai provide constructive and significant explanations that supplement the theory. I also show (...) that the term zhequan has been construed in Chinese Buddhism in at least three different senses to mean: an expression that both excludes and signifies, an expression that merely excludes and does not signify, and a negative expression that merely excludes. The notion of apoha is related to the first two senses but not the third. (shrink)

We can find some of the works of Indian Buddhist philosophers that prove the authenticity of the Mahāyāna sutras within Sanskrit, Tibetan, and Chinese textual sources. *Jayasena’s critique of *Asvabhāva’s proof was first introduced in the commentaries of Kuiji. Numerous references to *Jayasena in Chinese Yogācāra scriptures indicate that he was regarded as a Yogācāra master. His revised proof was further revised by Xuanzang. According to Xuanzang’s biographies, *Jayasena was an Indian lay Buddhist scholar who had many non-Buddhist disciples. (...) It is, therefore, possible that he discussed the authenticity of the Mahāyāna sutras with his disciples. Following Kuiji’s introduction of *Jayasena’s proof in East Asia, this proof and Xuanzang’s critique have been widely discussed. Wonhyo, one of the most famous Silla Buddhist scholars, critiqued Xuanzang’s revision and published his revised formula. Zenju, a representative Yogācāra master of the Nara period, pointed out some logical problems to be seen in Wonhyo’s revision, but did not provide any alternative. Proof of the authenticity of the Mahāyāna sutras was originally developed as a result of interactions between Mahāyāna and non-Mahāyāna Buddhists. However, the purpose of the proof seems to have shifted from being based on arguments with actual opponents to internal discussions among Mahāyāna Buddhists, especially within East Asia. (shrink)

In this article, I elaborate on the approach to joy preserved in East Asian Yogācāra texts authored by Xuanzang and his disciple, Kuiji. I argue that these Yogācāra Buddhists propose a contextualist approach that does not presume joy to be an emotion with an essential property but rather perceives joy as always contextualized in lifeworlds at the personal and interpersonal levels. As such, Xuanzang and Kuiji outline two contrasting pictures of joy to capture how it is experienced in (...) the lifeworld of ignorance and the lifeworld of wisdom, respectively. Upon delineating what joy is and how it is experienced, I continue to explore what joy can promise. Since joy does not have an inherent property, people can always make a collaborative effort to recontextualize joy for inclusion and emancipation. As such, I hope to draw on the Yogācāra analysis of joy to enrich the feminist discussion on happiness. (shrink)

This article proposes a new reading of the mirror analogy presented in the doctrine of Chinese Yogācāra Buddhism. Clerics, such as Xuanzang 玄奘 and his protégé Kuiji 窺基, articulated this analogy to describe our experience of other minds. In contrast with existing interpretations of this analogy as figurative ways of expressing ideas of projecting and reproducing, I argue that this mirroring experience should be understood as revealing, whereby we perceive other minds through the second-person perspective. This mirroring experience, in (...) its allusion to the collectivity of consciousness, yields the metaphysical explication of mutual interdependence and the prescription of norms for compassionate actions. (shrink)

In this paper, I investigate the account of self-consciousness provided by Chinese Yogācārins Xuanzang (602-664CE) and Kuiji (632-682CE). I will explain how they clarify the transition from selfattaching to self-emptying through the articulation of consciousness (vijñāna). Current scholarship often interprets the Yogācāra account of consciousness either as a science of mind or as a metaphysical idealism. Both interpretations are misleading, partly because they perpetuate various stereotypes about Buddhism, partly also because they overlook the religious goal of realizing in practice (...) the wisdom of emptiness and the non-egoistic compassion. Against the status quo, I argue that through their account of self-consciousness, Xuanzang and Kuiji advocate what can be referred to as transcendental idealism that stresses the correlation between subjectivity and objectivity. Yogācārins thus neither nullify the existence of subjectivity nor formulate subjectivity as a higher entity. The transcendental idealism yields a Buddhist phenomenology that is similar to and also different from Edmund Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. In what follows I will first characterize Husserl’s phenomenology as an approach to consciousness at two levels (the descriptive level and the explicative level). Then, I elicit the Buddhist phenomenology from Yogācāra philosophy that is not only descriptive and explicative but also prescriptive. This three-level architectonic of consciousness, while reaffirming the importance of agency, further justifies the role of religious rituals and moral practices for Yogācāra devotees. (shrink)