Mi exposición está estructurada en cuatro partes. El proyecto se inició buscando describir y darle especificación categorial a una serie de fenómenos diferenciales, que por comparación y contraste acababan formando constelaciones. No sabíamos si constituirlos en anomalías o si podían ser otra cosa. Voy a referirme sólo a tres de ellos. El primero toca con la forma como a partir de 1809 y hasta la década de 1820 fue mediatizada y comunicada a través de símbolos la nueva realidad política que (...) al nivel de la vida cotidiana y de intentos de institucionalización, estaba en trance de constituirse. Pues es sabido que para imponer sus pretensiones de validez y conseguir mantenerse y reproducirse, todos los sistemas y órdenes políticos requieren de representaciones simbólicas. Una figura alegórica de mujer, como representación de la Patria, la Libertad o la República les proporcionó a la Revolución de las trece colonias norteamericanas, y a la Revolución francesa durante toda su trayectoria, hasta el Consulado y el Imperio, una estructura simbólica básica. Con ayuda de esa figura femenina pudieron establecer tanto indicaciones de sentido como cadenas de equivalencia y diferencias, en el momento a que el Monarca soberano y sus símbolos fueron reemplazados por la Soberanía popular. [Fragmento]. (shrink)

This paper traces the borders between presupposing, believing, and having faith. These three attitudes are often equated and confused in the contemporary image of the historically and culturally situated character of rationality. This confusion is problematic because, on the one hand, it prevents us from fully appreciating the way in which this image of rationality points towards a dissolving of the opposition between faith and reason; on the other hand, it leads to forms of fideism. After bringing this differentiation into (...) sharper focus, a concept of faith in turn will come into view which challenges contemporary forms of fideism, to the extent that it embraces the possibility of examining and evaluating our systems of beliefs and basic presuppositions. This examination has nothing to do with justification or verification but rather with a sort of confrontation and discernment of the trust we have in what we take for granted. (shrink)

This paper traces the borders between presupposing, believing, and having faith. These three attitudes are often equated and confused in the contemporary image of the historically and culturally situated character of rationality. This confusion is problematic because, on the one hand, it prevents us from fully appreciating the way in which this image of rationality points towards a dissolving of the opposition between faith and reason; on the other hand, it leads to forms of fideism. After bringing this differentiation into (...) sharper focus, a concept of faith in turn will come into view which challenges contemporary forms of fideism, to the extent that it embraces the possibility of examining and evaluating our systems of beliefs and basic presuppositions. This examination has nothing to do with justification or verification but rather with a sort of confrontation and discernment of the trust we have in what we take for granted. (shrink)

This paper traces the borders between presupposing, believing, and having faith. These three attitudes are often equated and confused in the contemporary image of the historically and culturally situated character of rationality. This confusion is problematic because, on the one hand, it prevents us from fully appreciating the way in which this image of rationality points towards a dissolving of the opposition between faith and reason; on the other hand, it leads to forms of fideism. After bringing this differentiation into (...) sharper focus, a concept of faith in turn will come into view which challenges contemporary forms of fideism, to the extent that it embraces the possibility of examining and evaluating our systems of beliefs and basic presuppositions. This examination has nothing to do with justification or verification but rather with a sort of confrontation and discernment of the trust we have in what we take for granted. (shrink)

This paper traces the borders between presupposing, believing, and having faith. These three attitudes are often equated and confused in the contemporary image of the historically and culturally situated character of rationality. This confusion is problematic because, on the one hand, it prevents us from fully appreciating the way in which this image of rationality points towards a dissolving of the opposition between faith and reason; on the other hand, it leads to forms of fideism. After bringing this differentiation into (...) sharper focus, a concept of faith in turn will come into view which challenges contemporary forms of fideism, to the extent that it embraces the possibility of examining and evaluating our systems of beliefs and basic presuppositions. This examination has nothing to do with justification or verification but rather with a sort of confrontation and discernment of the trust we have in what we take for granted. (shrink)