Building on our diverse research traditions in the study of reasoning, language and communication, the Polish School of Argumentation integrates various disciplines and institutions across Poland in which scholars are dedicated to understanding the phenomenon of the force of argument. Our primary goal is to craft a methodological programme and establish organisational infrastructure: this is the first key step in facilitating and fostering our research movement, which joins people with a common research focus, complementary skills and an enthusiasm to work (...) together. This statement—the Manifesto—lays the foundations for the research programme of the Polish School of Argumentation. (shrink)

In the article we are trying to answer the question why people make mistakes in their reasoning. According to the theory proposed by P. N. Johnson-Laird, reasoning is a semantic process based on mental models. Reasoners build models of the situations described in premises and then check which conclusion holds in all the models. Unfortunately, our working memory has a limited processing capacity, and so we often fail to represent all possibilities necessary to draw a valid conclusion. The more models (...) we have to build, the higher the chance of making a mistake. Due to limitations of our working memory, we tend to represent in the models only what is true, but not what is false. One of the consequences of this fact is the occurrence of certain illusions: inferences that are compelling but invalid. The existence of such illusionary inferences have been corroborated by numerous experiments. (shrink)

The paper defines dialogic rationality and shows a rational path and understanding from the individual point of view. A separate discipline or discourse should coordinate the urgent need of deeper emotional transformation (metanoia) and explore the appearance of inner spiritual connectedness. This will establish the importance of every unique creature in the universe. Consequently in postmodernism, epistemology can no longer be accomplished by a “clear” cognitive theory, separated from ontological and anthropological elements. Cognition can no longer progress to an unchangeable, (...) non-falsifiable knowledge, because of changes within the object’s inner ontological level. Thus an observer can only interpret the phenomena but can never say “the last word”. Human cognition is based on time-coordinates when an observer tries to make a projection before the future has come. Yet existing now, it also contains the step back to the past as a shore of memory, experience, and knowledge. In this view history is considered to be non-linear—it is a complicated forward process, still continuously going back to the origin of human correlations with nature. A dialogic approach does not reject the importance of self-organizing processes, but tries to compose a sphere of acknowledgeable co-existence with the other to save the whole specter of human physical and mental, existential and creational features. Facing rational or mystical, but still radical, transformation, we get a sense of self-existence and can actively work and challenge ourselves to realize this in every-day life and in communication with the other. (shrink)

The empirical slippery slope arguments are arguments of the following form: if we take a first step A, as a result of a sequence of events, step N will necessarily or very likely follow; N is clearly not acceptable; therefore we must not take step A. Such arguments are often used in the discussions concerning abortion, assisted suicide, human gene therapy, free speech, decriminalizing marijuana, gun control and other ethical or social issues. In this article, I am trying to argue (...) that although slippery slope arguments are not deductive, they need not to be considered as fallacies. There are some mechanisms that make the realization of the scenarios sketched in the slippery slope arguments much more probable than one could think. I analyze three different examples of such mechanisms. The first one originates in the psychological phenomenon of cognitive dissonance. The second is connected with the use of precedents. The third mechanism depends on so-called multi-peaked preferences which some people might have when they make their decisions. (shrink)

Józef Tischner, a Polish philosopher and a seasoned commentator on the political transformations associated with the decline of communism and the building of a new democratic order in the final decades of the twentieth century, was, and still is, a controversial figure. Some see him as a profound philosopher, others as a moral authority, while others see him as a political opponent. I discuss the question concerning where Józef Tischner drew the line between political engagement sensu stricto and metapolitics, which (...) is philosophically and programmatically grounded and neutral to the differences in world views. I inquire whether it is legitimate to attribute to Tischner political views and sympathies sometimes referred to as left-wing Christian liberalism and whether these views influenced the structure and the main theses of Tischner’s metapolitical thought. I attempt a reconstruction of Tischner’s position and indicate its basis in the assumptions of Christian personalism, the philosophy of dialogue, and the ethics of solidarity. (shrink)