Do bioethicists need yet another theoretical approach with which to frame their disagreements? Many pragmatists contend that pragmatism, unlike its liberal and utilitarian counterparts, is uniquely commendable in (a) beginning from our lived experiences and (b) locating those experiences amid our social relations. In place of an " principlism," pragmatism offers a practical "bedside-bioethic"; in lieu of "autonomy run amuk," pragmatism proposes an ethic rooted in our communal resources. To date, however, efforts to develop such a bioethic have been stymied (...) by pragmatists' own abstract theoretical commitments, commitments that prevent them, most directly, from beginning with the lived experiences and communal resources of those who hold theological commitments. This self-imposed methodological constraint, I argue, has needlessly thwarted pragmatism's most striking methodological promise: its potential to cultivate productive debates among secular and theologically-informed participants. (shrink)

Argues that in order to reinvigorate our moral inheritances we must endeavor not only to live well, but also to live better.

If we can enhance ourselves genetically, should we? A plague of recent works in bioethics insist that we should not. Bill McKibben, for example, joins a chorus of theorists who oppose enhancement efforts not because they might harm individuals or undermine social practices, but because they imperil a human nature that is already “good enough,” and threaten to catapult us into a “post-human” world. But what’s wrong, exactly, with being post-human? These positions never answer that question. They fail biologically, sociologically, (...) and ethically, I argue, because just as ethics aims to improve us, bioethics aims properly to direct biotechnologies to enhance human life prospects. To refuse that injunction is to assert that we can, but will not, improve ourselves. It is to undercutany basis for bioethics, and for human progress, moral or material. It is, to re-work Leon Kass’s singularly apt phrase, moral hubris run amok. (shrink)

This essay is part of a special issue celebrating 50 years of Political Theory. The ambition of the editors was to mark this half century not with a retrospective but with a confabulation of futures. Contributors were asked: What will political theory look and sound like in the next century and beyond? What claims might political theorists or their descendants be making in ten, twenty-five, fifty, a hundred years’ time? How might they vindicate those claims in their future contexts? How (...) will the consistent concerns of political theorists evolve into the questions critical for people decades or centuries from now? What new problems will engage the political theorists (or their rough equivalents) of the future? What forms might those take? What follows is one of the many confabulations published in response to these queries. (shrink)

Lisa Bellantoni argues that contemporary bioethics divides into two logically incommensurable positions: a cult of rights, which identifies the worth of human life with our autonomy, and a cult of life, which identifies human worth with the possession of a soul, and thereby, of human dignity.

Many current debates between Catholic and secular bioethicists stalemate upon one central dispute: whether human dignity is a property persons bear at conception, or a product of social engagement, i.e., whether persons are born, or made. We need not resolve that dispute, however, to affirm two points that the prospect of human cloning should teach us. First, whether persons are born or made, whether we affirm a creationist, traducian, or even reincarnational view of the soul, the prospect of cloning highlights (...) the inescapably communitarian dimensions of human dignity. Second, within a pluralist moral culture, we’re best advised to conceive human dignity not only as a property ascribed to us through divine grace, but also as an ethical imperative to be inscribed, by us, in the dignifying social practices by which we bear and raise persons. (shrink)