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Profile: Michele Merritt (Arkansas State University)
  1.  89
    Michele Merritt, Queering Cognition: Extended Minds and Sociotechnologically Hybridized Gender.
    In the last forty years, significant developments in neuroscience, psychology, and robotic technology have been cause for major trend changes in the philosophy of mind. One such shift has been the reallocation of focus from entirely brain-centered theories of mind to more embodied, embedded, and even extended answers to the questions, what are cognitive processes and where do we find such phenomena? Given that hypotheses such as Clark and Chalmers‘ Extended Mind or Hutto‘s Radical Enactivism, systematically undermine the organism-bound, internal, (...)
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  2.  44
    Michele Merritt (2015). Thinking-is-Moving: Dance, Agency, and a Radically Enactive Mind. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (1):95-110.
    Recently, in cognitive science, the enactivist account of cognition has been gaining ground, due in part to studies of movement in conjunction with thought. The idea, as Noë , has put it, that “cognition is not something happening inside us or to us, but it’s something we do, something we achieve,” is increasingly supported by research on joint attention, movement coordination, and gesture. Not surprisingly, therefore, enactivists have also begun to look at “movement specialists”—dancers—for both scientific and phenomenological accounts of (...)
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  3.  16
    Michele Merritt (2015). Dismantling Standard Cognitive Science: It’s Time the Dog has its Day. Biology and Philosophy 30 (6):811-829.
    I argue that the standard paradigm for understanding cognition—namely, that thoughts are representational, internal, and propositional—does not account for a large number of genuinely cognitive processes. Instead, if we adopt a more radical approach, one that treats cognition as a cooperative, dynamic, and interactive process, accounting for shared meaning making and embodied thought becomes much more plausible. To support this thesis, rather than turn to the debate as it has been ongoing among philosophers of mind pertaining solely to human thought, (...)
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  4. Michele Merritt, Somogy Varga & Mog Stapleton (2013). Editorial Introduction: Socializing the Extended Mind. Cognitive Systems Research 25:1-3.
  5.  6
    Michele Merritt (forthcoming). Kristin Andrews: The Animal Mind: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Animal Cognition. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-7.
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  6.  52
    Michele Merritt (2011). The Cure for the Cure: Networking the Extended Mind. Philosophical Psychology 24 (4):463 - 485.
    The hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC), or the claim that cognitive processes are not entirely organism-bound and can extend into the world, has received a barrage of criticism. Likewise, defenders of HEC have responded and even retreated into more moderate positions. In this paper, I trace the debate, rehearsing what I take to be the three strongest cases against HEC: nonderived content, causally natural kinds, and informational integration. I then argue that so far, the replies have been unsatisfactory, mainly because (...)
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  7.  2
    Michele Merritt, Minimally Innate Ideas.
    This project provides a detailed examination and critique of current philosophical, linguistic, and cognitive accounts of first language acquisition. In particular, I focus on the concept of "innate" and how it is embraced, marginally utilized, or abandoned altogether in efforts to describe the way that a child comes to be a competent user of a language. A central question that naturally falls out of this general inquiry is therefore what exactly is supposed to be "innate," according to various theories? Philosophically, (...)
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