Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Value Theory" by Mark Schroeder |
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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.
This experiment has been authorized by the editors of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The original article and bibliography can be found here.
- Bradley, Ben, 2006. “Two Concepts of Intrinsic Value”. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 9: 111–130. (Scholar)
- Brook, Richard, 1991. “Agency and Morality”. Journal of Philosophy, 88: 190–212. (Scholar)
- Broome, John, 1997. “Is Incommensurability vagueness?”. In Chang, ed., Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reasoning. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 67–89. (Scholar)
- Brown, Campbell, 2007. “Two Kinds of Holism About Values”. Philosophical Quarterly, 57: 456–463. (Scholar)
- Bykvist, Krister, 2009. “No Good Fit: Why the Fitting-Attitude Analysis of Value Fails”. Mind, 118: 1–30. (Scholar)
- Carlson, Erik, 1995. Consequentialism Reconsidered. Dordrecht: Kluwer. (Scholar)
- Chang, Ruth, 1997. “Introduction”. In Chang, ed., Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reasoning. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2002. “The Possibility of Parity”. Ethics, 112: 659–688. (Scholar)
- Crisp, Roger, 2005. “Value, Reasons, and the Structure of Justification: How to Avoid Passing the Buck”. Analysis, 65: 80–85. (Scholar)
- Dancy, Jonathan, 2003. “Are there Organic Unities?” Ethics, 113: 629–650. (Scholar)
- –––, 2004. Ethics Without Principles. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- D'Arms, Justin, and Daniel Jacobson, 2000. “Sentiment and Value”. Ethics, 110: 722–748. (Scholar)
- –––, 2000b. “The Moralistic Fallacy: On the ‘Appropriateness’ of Emotions”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 61: 65–90. (Scholar)
- Darwall, Stephen, 2002. Welfare and Rational Care. Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- Dorsey, Dale, 2012. “Intrinsic Value and the Supervenience Principle”. Philosophical Studies, 157: 267–285. (Scholar)
- Dreier, James, 1993. “The Structure of Normative Theories”. Monist, 76: 22–40. (Scholar)
- –––, 1996. “Accepting Agent-Centered Norms”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74: 409–422. (Scholar)
- –––, 2004. “Why Ethical Satisficing Makes Sense and Rational Satisficing Doesn't”. In Michael Byron, ed., Satisficing and Maximizing. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 131–154. (Scholar)
- Ewing, A.C., 1947. The Definition of Good. London: Macmillan. (Scholar)
- Finlay, Stephen, 2004. “The Conversational Practicality of Value Judgment”. The Journal of Ethics, 8: 205–223. (Scholar)
- Finnis, John, 1980. Natural Law and Natural Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Fletcher, Guy, 2008. “Mill, Moore, and Intrinsic Value”. Social Theory and Practice, 34: 517–532. (Scholar)
- Geach, Peter, 1956. “Good and Evil”. Analysis, 17: 33–42. (Scholar)
- Hare, R.M., 1952. The Language of Morals. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Hieronymi, Pamela, 2005. “The Wrong Kind of Reason”. The Journal of Philosophy, 102: 437–457. (Scholar)
- Hurka, Tom, 2010. “Asymmetries in Value”. Nous, 44: 199–223. (Scholar)
- Kagan, Shelly, 1989. The Limits of Morality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Kamm, Frances, 1989. “Harming Some to Save Others”. Philosophical Studies, 57: 227–260. (Scholar)
- Kant, Immanuel, 1785. Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, Mary Gregor, trans. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. (Scholar)
- Kavka, Gregory, 1983. “The Toxin Puzzle”. Analysis, 43: 33–36. (Scholar)
- Korsgaard, Christine, 1983. “Two Distinctions in Goodness”. Philosophical Review, 92: 169–195. (Scholar)
- Kraut, Richard, 2007. What is Good and Why: The Ethics of Well-Being. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Langton, Rae, 2007. “Objective and Unconditioned Value”. Philosophical Review, 116: 157–185. (Scholar)
- Lemos, Noah, 1994. Intrinsic Value. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Louise, Jennie, 2004. “Relativity of Value and the Consequentialist Umbrella”. Philosophical Quarterly, 54: 518–536. (Scholar)
- Mackie, J.L., 1977. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. New York: Penguin. (Scholar)
- Mill, John Stuart, 1861. Utilitarianism. In Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, J. M. Robson (ed., Toronto: University of Toronto Press, v.29, pp. 371–577. (Scholar)
- Moore, G.E., 1993. Principia Ethica, revised edn. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Murphy, Mark, 2001. Natural Law and Practical Rationality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Nagel, Thomas, 1970. The Possibility of Altruism. Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1985. The View From Nowhere. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Oddie, Graham, and Peter Milne, 1991. “Act and Value: Expectation and the Representability of Moral Theories”. Theoria, 57: 42–76. (Scholar)
- Olson, Jonas, 2009. “Fitting Attitudes Analyses of Value and the Partiality Challenge”. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 12: 365–378. (Scholar)
- Parfit, Derek, 1984. Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2001. “Rationality and Reasons”. In Dan Egonsson, et al, eds., Exploring Practical Philosophy. Aldershot: Ashgate, 17–39. (Scholar)
- Pettit, Philip, 1997. “The Consequentialist Perspective”. In Baron, Pettit, and Slote, Three Methods of Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell, 92–174. (Scholar)
- Perry, R.B., 1926. General Theory of Value. New York: Longmans, Green & Co. (Scholar)
- Piller, Christian, 2006. “Content-Related and Attitude-Related Reasons for Preferences”. Philosophy, 81: 155–182. (Scholar)
- Portmore, Douglas, 2005. “Combining Teleological Ethics with Evaluator Relativism: A Promising Result”. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 86: 95–113. (Scholar)
- –––, 2007. “Consequentializing Moral Theories”. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 88: 39–73. (Scholar)
- Rabinowicz, Wlodek, 2008. “Value Relations”. Theoria, 74: 18–49. (Scholar)
- Rabinowicz, Wlodek, and Toni Rönnow-Rasmussen, 2004. “The Strike of the Demon: On Fitting Pro-Attitudes and Value”. Ethics, 114: 391–423. (Scholar)
- Rawls, John, 1971. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Raz, Joseph, 1999. Engaging Reason: On the Theory of Value and Action. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Rönnow-Rasmussen, Toni, 2009. Personal Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Ross, W.D., 1930. The Right and The Good. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Scanlon, T.M., 1998. What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Scheffler, Samuel, 1983. The Rejection of Consequentialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Schroeder, Mark, 2005. Cudworth and Normative Explanations. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, vol 1, issue 3. www.jesp.org. (Scholar)
- –––, 2007. “Teleology, Agent-Relative Value, and ‘Good’”. Ethics, 116: 265–295. (Scholar)
- Sen, Amartya, 1982. “Rights and Agency”. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 11: 3–39. (Scholar)
- –––, 1983. “Evaluator Relativity and Consequential Evaluation”. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 12: 113–132. (Scholar)
- Shanklin, Robert, 2011. On Good and ‘Good’. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Southern California. (Scholar)
- Sidgwick, Henry, 1907. The Methods of Ethics, 7th edn. Indianapolis, Hackett. (Scholar)
- Slote, Michael, 1989. Beyond Optimizing. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Smith, Michael, 2003. “Neutral and Relative Value After Moore”. Ethics, 113: 576–598. (Scholar)
- Stocker, Michael, 1990. Plural and Conflicting Values. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Suikkanen, Jussi, 2009. “Buck-Passing Accounts of Value”. Philosphy Compass, 4: 768–779. (Scholar)
- Szabo, Zoltan, 2001. “Adjectives in Context”. In Kiefer, Kenesei, and Harnish, eds., Perspectives on Semantics, Pragmatics, and Discourse. John Benjamins Publishing Co, 119–146. (Scholar)
- Thomson, Judith Jarvis, 2001. Goodness and Advice. Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- Urmson, J.O., 1967. The Emotive Theory of Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Väyrynen, Pekka, 2006. “Resisting the Buck-Passing Account of Value”. Oxford Studies in Metaethics, 1: 295–324. (Scholar)
- Wedgwood, Ralph, 2009. “Intrinsic Values and Reasons for Action”. In Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva (eds), Philosophical Issues, 19: 321–342. (Scholar)
- Ziff, Paul, 1960. Semantic Analysis. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
- Zimmerman, Michael, 2001. The Nature of Intrinsic Value. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield. (Scholar)
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