The manuscript B of Aulus Gellius, containing N.A. 9-12 and 13.5, and now split at potuit/admonendi 12.10.3 between Cod. Bern. 404 and Cod. Lugd.- Bat. B. P. L. 1925, is dated by Hosius and Marshall to 1173 on the strength of the subscript to an astronomical work immediately preceding Gellius in Cod. Bern. 404. This work is the ‘Liber Atphargan'i [sic] in scientia astrorum et radicibus motuum caelestium’’ translated by Johannes Hispalensis; the subscriptio, quoted in full by Hertz , indicates (...) the date as follows : Expletus est die uicesimo quarto. V. mensis lunaris anni Arabum quingentesimi. XXVIIII. existente,. . die mensis Martii era. M.C.LXXIII. (shrink)

The manuscript B of Aulus Gellius, containing N.A. 9-12 and 13.5, and now split at potuit/admonendi 12.10.3 between Cod. Bern. 404 and Cod. Lugd.- Bat. B. P. L. 1925, is dated by Hosius and Marshall to 1173 on the strength of the subscript to an astronomical work immediately preceding Gellius in Cod. Bern. 404. This work is the ‘Liber Atphargan'i [sic] in scientia astrorum et radicibus motuum caelestium’’ translated by Johannes Hispalensis; the subscriptio, quoted in full by Hertz, indicates the (...) date as follows : Expletus est die uicesimo quarto. V. mensis lunaris anni Arabum quingentesimi. XXVIIII. existente,.. die mensis Martii era. M.C.LXXIII. (shrink)

Gellius, in N. A. 6. 20, claims to have read ‘in quodam commentario’ that theoriginal text had been not ora but Nola; ‘postea Vergilium petisse a Nolanis, aquam uti duceret in propincum rus, Nolanos beneficium petitum non fecisse, poetam offensum nomen urbis eorum, quasi ex hominum memoria, sic excarmine suo derasisse oramque pro Nola mutasse’. It may be from this passagethat by way of Donatus this story reached the expanded Servius: ‘et hocemendauit ipse, quia Nolam posuerat; nam postea offensus a (...) Nolanis, qui eidemaquam negauerant, “ora” pro “Nola” posuit.’. (shrink)

In L. D. Reynolds , Texts and Transmission: a Survey of the Latin Classics , it is stated by J. G. F. Powell and by M. D. Reeve that MS. Berlin, Deutsche Staatsbibliothek Lat. 4° 404 , containing Cicero, De amicitia, and Publilius Syrus, Sententiae, is missing. Not so: it is currently held with numerous other Berlin MSS., including humanistic and musical autographs, at the Jagellonian Library in Cracow, where I saw it on 5 May 1992. Other classical MSS. from (...) Berlin now held in Cracow are Lat. 4° 1 , 257 , 590 , 939 , and 8° 102. (shrink)

Not only was Gellius' preface received in the fifteenth century at the end of his work instead of the beginning, but it arrived almost or wholly without the Greek, which had to be patched up by guesswork; between siluarum and quidam early editors read ‘ille κηρον, alius κρας μαλӨεας’, the first two names in the similar passage, Plin. N.H. pr. 24. Salmasius, in the preface to his Plinianae exercitationes, printed a text ‘ex vestigiis antiquae scripturae optimi exemplaris [sc. MS P (...) = Paris, BN lat. 5765] partim etiam coniecturis nostris correctiorem’; following κρας he gave, in the right place but with the wrong accent, ‘alius Κρια’. But when eleven years later he came to annotate Simplicius' commentary on Epictetus' γχειρδιον, alerted by Simplicius' statement συνταξεν ρριανς, τ καιριτατα κα ναγκαιτατα ν øιλοσοø κα κινητικτατα τν ψυχν πιλεξμενος κ τν πικττου λγων, he remarked: ‘Quidam et inscripsere libros suos olim τ καρια, quod maxime ad rem quam tractabant pertinentia eo opere persequebantur’, citing Gellius with ‘alius καρια and commenting ‘Ita enim ex veteri codice ibi scribendum est, non ut vulgo editur, κριον [sic]'. Nevertheless, editors preferred his first thoughts to his second; Hertz, in his separate edition of Gellius' preface and in his editio maior , gives three parallels: Plin. N.H. pr. 24, ‘Κηρον inscripsere quod uolebant intellegi fauom’, where the Latin translation guarantees the reading; Clem. Alex. 6.1.2.1 ν μν ον τ λειμνι τ νӨη ποικλως νӨοȗντα κν τ παραδεσ [‘orchard’] τν κροδρων øυτεα ο κατ εδος καστον κεχρισται τν λλογενν , where again the sense requires the honeycomb; Philost. VS 565 πιστολα δ πλεȋσται ρδου κα διαλξει κα øημερδες γχειρδι τε κα καίρια τν ρχααν πολυμӨειαν ν βραχεȋ πηνӨισμνα, where hertz emends καρια to κηρα. (shrink)

Besides the direct tradition, these verses are cited by Stephanus of Byzantium, s.n. Aγυς, who explains: λγος πρ ‘Eλυης Λακωυικς οὒσης κα ρρυ μτκοσης κα τ ’Aλζυδρω κα Δηϊøβω γαμηθσης Commentators have followed him both as to the identity of the three husbands and the sense of θηλπαις: ‘female-childed’.

Besides the direct tradition, these verses are cited by Stephanus of Byzantium, s.n. Aῖγυς, who explains: λγος π∊ρ ‘Eλυης Λακωυικς οὒσης καῷ ἂρρ∊υ μτ∊κοσης κα τ ’Aλ∊ζυδρω κα Δηϊøβω γαμηθ∊σης Commentators have followed him both as to the identity of the three husbands and the sense of θηλπαις: ‘female-childed’.

The purpose of this note is to banish for ever from our histories of Roman literature the term elocutio nouella as a description of the style preached and practised by Cornelius Fronto. Commenting on a speech recently delivered by the Emperor Marcus, Fronto declares : Pleraque in oratione recenti tua, quod ad sententias attinet, animaduerto egregia esse; pauca admodum uno tenus uerbo corrigenda; non nihil interdum elocutione nouella parum signatum. The standard interpretation of the last clause is that given by (...) Haines : ‘some parts here and there were not sufficiently marked with novelty of expression’. It is my contention that it means: ‘some parts here and there were insufficiently clear through new-fangled diction’. (shrink)

Besides the direct tradition, these verses are cited by Stephanus of Byzantium, s.n. Aῖγυς, who explains: λγος π∊ρ ‘Eλυης Λακωυικς οὒσης καῷ ἂρρ∊υ μτ∊κοσης κα τ ’Aλ∊ζυδρω κα Δηϊøβω γαμηθ∊σης Commentators have followed him both as to the identity of the three husbands and the sense of θηλπαις: ‘female-childed’.

The late Sir Roger Mynors, in a letter to Sebastiano Timpanaro quoted in the latter's Contributi difilologia e di storia della lingua latina , p. 543 n. 15, states that he had wondered ‘whether it might be a habit of Latin writers, when they were putting only one or two “parolette” between two pieces of Greek’, to use Greek rather than Latin: he invents as an example ‘θος κα πθος where logic demanded θος et πθος’. The answer is that they (...) sometimes did: the present paper will concentrate on the type instantiated by his imaginary example, the use of κα for et. I do not claim to have recorded every case, but those I have observed are the following. (shrink)

Continuing previous studies of medieval and modern false quotations from Gellius,1 I present two more misascriptions, one by an early modern editor, the other by a medieval author.

Besides the direct tradition, these verses are cited by Stephanus of Byzantium, s.n. Aῖγυς, who explains: λγος π∊ρ ‘Eλυης Λακωυικς οὒσης καῷ ἂρρ∊υ μτ∊κοσης κα τ ’Aλ∊ζυδρω κα Δηϊøβω γαμηθ∊σης Commentators have followed him both as to the identity of the three husbands and the sense of θηλπαις: ‘female-childed’.

Gell. NA 3.10.13 citing Varro's Hebdomades uel de imaginibus, reports: Venas etiam in hominibus, uel potius arterias, medicos musicos dicere ait numero moueri septenario, quod ipsi appellant τν δι τεσσρων συμφωναν, quae fit in collatione quaternarii et ternarii numeri. He also states that doctors who make use of music theory declare that the veins, or rather arteries, in human beings move in accordance with the number seven; they call this motion ‘the consonance of the fourth’, which is produced by the (...) proportional relation of the numbers four and three. (shrink)

In the 21stcentury, there is a turn of thinking toward its reorientation first of all to the human as an author of thought and not to the nature, existing independently of us and of the process of scientific knowledge obtaining. It is possible to see the difference of these two types of thinking in the context of dialogue between W. Whewell’s philosophy and the scientific investigations after the scientific revolution in the beginning of the 20thcentury. In the philosophy of 21stcentury, (...) man is a social being and this is the basis of social philosophy. The artificial world around us is created by a human, it has its foundation in the laws of thinking but not the laws of nature. The foundations of both systems are quite different. In what way can we achieve mutual understanding between them? From both sides some aspects can be put forward, for instance, the concept of a mediator of a thought. This concept is studied actively by W. Whewell and by philosophers of our time, and this leads in both cases to some unexpected interpretation of the basic question of philosophy: the border between thing and thought is becoming less noticeable. We can come to the same result, going by different ways. Whewell finds common qualities for some group of things. Social philosophers are interested in what makes things different. Not one of these idealizations corresponds completely to the reality. Always something is not taken into consideration. A thinker chooses out of real world some of its characteristics that become a basis of a thought system, which explains everything but in its own way. The paper demonstrates the way of possible creation of a new type of thinking. (shrink)

1. NA 1.22.11 qui dicit ergo superesse se ei quem defendit, nihil istorum [sc. of the legitimate senses listed by Julius Paulus in §§9–10] uult dicere, sed nescioquid aliud indictum inscitumque dicit.

This chapter presents an opinionated account of how to understand the contributions of experience, especially with respect to the role of cognitive science, in developing and assessing metaphysical theories of reality. I develop a methodological basis for the idea that, independently of work in experimental philosophy focused on explications of concepts, contemporary metaphysical theories with a role for experiential evidence can be fruitfully connected to empirical work in psychology, especially cognitive science. My argument is not that cognitive science should replace (...) the metaphysician’s use of a priori theorizing and ordinary experience as a guide to metaphysical reality. Rather, we should enrich our perspective on a priori theorizing and ordinary experience as a guide to metaphysical reality by drawing on any relevant work in cognitive science. (shrink)

I explore some of the ways that assumptions about the nature of substance shape metaphysical debates about the structure of Reality. Assumptions about the priority of substance play a role in an argument for monism, are embedded in certain pluralist metaphysical treatments of laws of nature, and are central to discussions of substantivalism and relationalism. I will then argue that we should reject such assumptions and collapse the categorical distinction between substance and property.

Catalog of the collection of the Madamkhand Museum of Art, named after the wife of Batzhargalyn Batbai︠a︡r, businessman and member of the Mongolian Khural.

Causation is at once familiar and mysterious. Neither common sense nor extensive philosophical debate has led us to anything like agreement on the correct analysis of the concept of causation, or an account of the metaphysical nature of the causal relation. Causation: A User's Guide cuts a clear path through this confusing but vital landscape. L. A. Paul and Ned Hall guide the reader through the most important philosophical treatments of causation, negotiating the terrain by taking a set of examples (...) as landmarks. They clarify the central themes of the debate about causation, and cover questions about causation involving omissions or absences, preemption and other species of redundant causation, and the possibility that causation is not transitive. Along the way, Paul and Hall examine several contemporary proposals for analyzing the nature of causation and assess their merits and overall methodological cogency.The book is designed to be of value both to trained specialists and those coming to the problem of causation for the first time. It provides the reader with a broad and sophisticated view of the metaphysics of the causal relation. (shrink)

The term fuzzy logic is used in this paper to describe an imprecise logical system, FL, in which the truth-values are fuzzy subsets of the unit interval with linguistic labels such as true, false, not true, very true, quite true, not very true and not very false, etc. The truth-value set, , of FL is assumed to be generated by a context-free grammar, with a semantic rule providing a means of computing the meaning of each linguistic truth-value in as a (...) fuzzy subset of [0, 1].Since is not closed under the operations of negation, conjunction, disjunction and implication, the result of an operation on truth-values in requires, in general, a linguistic approximation by a truth-value in . As a consequence, the truth tables and the rules of inference in fuzzy logic are (i) inexact and (ii) dependent on the meaning associated with the primary truth-value true as well as the modifiers very, quite, more or less, etc. (shrink)