This essay is a chapter in a book about the concepts of will and action in late-antique philosophy. It focuses on Augustine of Hippo's concept of the will. Augustine is notorious for developing the concept of an 'evil will', something considered impossible in classical Aristotelian philosophy. The essay tries to show how Augustine developed this concept from an 'intellectualist' position. It argues that while it is true that later voluntarist philosophies could refer back to Augustine as a starting point, Augustine (...) himself must also be considered within the intellectualist tradition. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 40.2 (2002) 256-257 [Access article in PDF] Book Review Die Struktur des menschlichen Geistes nach Augustinus: Selbstreflexion und Erkenntnis Gottes in "De Trinitate" Johannes Brachtendorf. Die Struktur des menschlichen Geistes nach Augustinus: Selbstreflexion und Erkenntnis Gottes in "De Trinitate." Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2000. Pp. viii + 335. Cloth, DM 128,00. "The Trinity" is arguably Augustine's (philosophically) most demanding work. Yet it is (...) precisely its philosophical quality that is nowadays sometimes called in question for its apparent lack of argumentative coherence. H. I. Marrou has even expressed the view that this may have been intended, as the text is designed as an exercitatioanimi, a spiritual-mental exercise; i.e., the argumentative gaps are deliberately left open to be filled in by whoever undergoes the exercise. This would mean that "The Trinity" lacks any philosophical or theological position or doctrine in particular, and that it must not be judged by the standards of philosophical discourse, even those of Augustine's own day and age. Brachtendorf sets out with a revision of that view. Augustine, he argues, does indeed formulate a particular position. The impression that there may be gaps in his arguments could well stem from a misunderstanding of some of them. Augustine, Brachtendorf reports in his first chapter (1), developed his teaching of the triune God in close contact with the philosophy of Plotinus. However, he distanced himself from Plotinus by analyzing the process of cognition not by taking as an example the divine nous, but the menshumana. Apart from that he developed an ontology of the Trinity (2) and only then analyzed the human mind in analogy to it (3-4). He also looked into the relationship of mind and language ("word") (5) and developed further some aspects of this relationship such as the trinitarian structure of the human mind (6), the relationship of knowledge and wisdom (7), the human mind as the image of God (8), the self-reflection of the human mind (9), language as an expression of that self-reflection in the image of God (10), and the concept of the "inner word" (11).Brachtendorf concludes with an appeal not to read into Augustine's link of notitia and amor that he was interested in the analysis of self-knowledge merely for ethical reasons. Amor, he argues, expressly includes operations of the intellect. Augustine's interest was therefore genuinely theoretical and intellectualist. Amor, for Augustine, was a force that creates knowledge as such, no matter what the content. Its impact is practical and theoretical. Referring to the works of Charles Taylor, Martin Heidegger, Max Scheler, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Hannah Arendt, Brachtendorf demonstrates how influential Augustine was with this aspect of his thought in the development of "Subjekt"-centered philosophies in the twentieth century. Yet, as influential as this approach may have been in this particular field, arguing, as it did, for the ontological character of human subjectivity (i.e., that the human mind was naturally structured in a trinitarian way, but had to make its natural intelligence explicit in thought through the learning of language) it did not revolutionize [End Page 256] the understanding of language. In consequence it did not impress the philosophers of the linguistic turn, and that is probably why today the argument of "The Trinity" is so often found wanting.Pointing back to the source Brachtendorf's study is a welcome contribution to the subject and a useful guide for all who now--hopefully, and encouraged by this work--set out for themselves to have a (closer) look at the original. Josef Lössl Catholic University Leuven... (shrink)

Anne Conway, née Finch, is arguably one of the most important British philosophers of the seventeenth century. Her main work, published posthumously, in 1690, "Principia Philosophiae Antiquissimae et Recentissimae", translated two years later into English as "The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy: Concerning God, Christ, and the Creature; that is, concerning Spirit and Matter in General", engages critically with most relevant thinkers of her time, in particular Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, and her friend and mentor Henry More. As (...) the sub-title of the English translation suggests, the "Principia" are also influenced by Christian, and especially early Christian - Patristic, teaching. The chapter studies the "Principia" with a view to the way in which they use or engage with these teachings. Anne Conway was not a specialist historical theologian or Patristic scholar and no specific sources are explicitely referenced in her work. However, the way in which she approaches her main themes suggests that she was influenced by very specific early Christian thinkers, in particular Origen, whom she may have known through George Rust's "Letter of Resolution", which Henry More recommended to her in a letter in 1660. At the same time she also developed elements of early Christian thought independently, creatively, pursuing her very own agenda. Studying the "Principia" with a view to their exposure to early Christian thought reveals Anne Conway once more as a fascinating early modern philosopher who indeed combines very ancient with very recent thinking. (shrink)

In this second chapter of the book 'Human Dignity in the Judaeo-Christian Tradition' the case is made that human dignity is a concept which is also rooted outside this tradition, namely in the philosophical and educational tradition of Greek and Roman Antiquity. It was to this tradition that the Renaissance and the Enlightenment appealed with their concept of human dignity, and the commitment to the concept in modern human rights and constitutional legislation too is indebted to it. The chapter traces (...) the concept from early Greek legal sources via early philosophical documents to Plato and Aristotle and the Hellenistic philosophical schools down to Cicero, where it finds its most philosophical and idealistic expression. The presence of the concept in classical Greek and Roman thought calls in question the view, frequently heard today, that human dignity is a faith-based concept without any basis in philosophical reflection. Instead it demonstrates that even a materialistic philosophy such as Epicureanism was unable to speak adequately of the human being and its place in the universe without raising the question of its unique nature and destiny. (shrink)

This study shows how St. Augustine of Hippo in his works on grace identifies the concepts of intellect and grace. It recommends this concept of "intellectus gratiae" as a key to Augustine's theology as a whole.

Qu'Éclane soit le siège de l'évêché de Julien est un fait bien établi. Mais quelle était sa patrie d'origine? Cet article résume un certain nombre de suggestions faites au cours des derniers siècles et jette un oeil neuf sur les sources. Prenant en considération aussi bien le domaine des textes que ceux de l'histoire, de la géographie ou de l'ethnologie, l'auteur arrive à la conclusion qu'Éclane fut non seulement le siège de l'évêché de Julien mais également son lieu de naissance.

Cet article présente une vue d'ensemble de l'histoire de la recherche sur la structure et le sujet de «De vera religione», ainsi que de nouvelles suggestions.

Following conventional wisdom Theology as an academic discipline (taught at Universities) is something which developed only in the Middle Ages, or in a certain sense even as late as the 19th century. The present essay in contrast traces its origins to Classical Antiquity and outlines its development in early Christianity, especially with a view to institutions of higher education that existed in Late Antiquity, e. g. in rhetoric and philosophy. It concludes that there were forms of academic theological discourse in (...) Late Antiquity which were to become the basis of later developments in the discipline. (shrink)

Following conventional wisdom Theology as an academic discipline (taught at Universities) is something which developed only in the Middle Ages, or in a certain sense even as late as the 19th century. The present essay in contrast traces its origins to Classical Antiquity and outlines its development in early Christianity, especially with a view to institutions of higher education that existed in Late Antiquity, e. g. in rhetoric and philosophy. It concludes that there were forms of academic theological discourse in (...) Late Antiquity which were to become the basis of later developments in the discipline. (shrink)

Pain was one of the issues debated between Julian of Aeclanum and Augustine of Hippo. For Augustine pain was an evil caused by original sin. Julian argued that, in the context of creation as a whole, pain can be treated as a good, since its moderate forms are creational. Only in excess are they evil. This article aims at presenting Julian's position in detail, not only in the context of the debate with Augustine, but in the wider context of late (...) ancient philosophy and early Christian doctrine. Julian is well acquainted with philosophical and medical texts and with the biblical and patristic tradition. He rejects Augustine's attempt to work all these into a universal theological theory of pain and thereby deny, in Julian's view, philosophy and medicine their relative autonomy. Julian's plea—as a theologian—for a rational and empirical approach to pain draws as much upon ancient sources as it anticipates an attitude towards natural science and philosophy usually associated with much later periods in history. (shrink)

Zusammenfassung Ein wichtiger Aspekt des Themas „Religion und Gewalt“ ist der Zusammenhang von Sprache und Gewalt. Sprache kann Gewalt sowohl literarisch- ästhetisch darstellen als auch ausüben, direkt, als psychische Gewalt, oder indirekt, als physische Gewalt, insofern sie zur Ausübung physischer Gewalt „bewegt“. Der vorliegende Beitrag möchte diesen Themenkomplex anhand einer frühchristlichen Apologie, der Rede Tatians an die Griechen etwas genauer untersuchen. Vergleichbare Untersuchungen wurden bisher in erster Linie an christlichen Texten des 4. und 5. Jahrhunderts im Hinblick auf eine in (...) jener Epoche wahrgenommene Zunahme von Intoleranz und Gewaltbereitschaft des Christentums, insbesondere gegenüber Juden, Heiden und Häretikern unternommen. Eine Analyse einer weit früheren Apologie wie der Tatians – sie ist tatsächlich einer der frühesten erhaltenen Texte dieser Art – legt jedoch nahe, dass die Motive für die Verwendung sprachlicher Gewalt differenzierter Art waren und nicht auf eine dem Christentum inhärente Tendenz zur Intoleranz reduziert werden können. Auf dem Hintergrund heutiger soziolinguistischer Forschung sollte die Verwendung sprachlicher Gewalt vielleicht sogar eher als eine Technik zur Deeskalation physischer Gewalt erwogen werden denn als Indiz für eine Tendenz zur Eskalation physischer Gewalt. (shrink)

The question ‘What is death?’ is by no means exclusively or primarily a question of medical science. It is, in the last analysis, a philosophical question. The philosopher’s role in the discussion of death is twofold: On the one hand, he has to explore those highly intelligible and essentially necessary aspects of death which no other human science investigates. This task includes a phenomenology of life and death, an ontology and metaphysics, as well as a philosophical anthropology of death. It (...) likewise includes an analysis of the language of death and life and of the logical structure of the arguments used in the debates about life and death. On the other hand the philosopher has to warn representatives of other disciplines against concluding too much from the little they know and extending their methods to areas where they are not appropriate. Careful reflection on both philosophical knowledge and philosophical ignorance concerning death shows, I shall argue, that the definition of death in terms of ‘brain death’ ought to be rejected. (shrink)

The question ‘What is death?’ is by no means exclusively or primarily a question of medical science. It is, in the last analysis, a philosophical question. The philosopher’s role in the discussion of death is twofold: On the one hand, he has to explore those highly intelligible and essentially necessary aspects of death which no other human science investigates. This task includes a phenomenology of life and death, an ontology and metaphysics, as well as a philosophical anthropology of death. It (...) likewise includes an analysis of the language of death and life and of the logical structure of the arguments used in the debates about life and death. On the other hand the philosopher has to warn representatives of other disciplines against concluding too much from the little they know and extending their methods to areas where they are not appropriate. Careful reflection on both philosophical knowledge and philosophical ignorance concerning death shows, I shall argue, that the definition of death in terms of ‘brain death’ ought to be rejected. (shrink)

1. Matter and form -- 2. Maimonides' theory of the parable -- 3. The parable of adamic perfection -- 4. Physical matter and its limitations on intellects -- 5. Maimonidean skepticism I -- 6. Maimonidean skepticism II -- 7. In the inner chamber of the ruler's palace: the critique of the theory of separate intellects -- 8. The embodied life of an intellect -- 9. Excrement and exegesis, or shame over matter.