According to Smell Objectivism, the smells we perceive in olfactory experience are objective and independent of perceivers, their experiences, and their perceptual systems. Variations in how things smell to different perceivers or in different contexts raise a challenge to this view. In this paper, I offer an objectivist account of non-illusory contextual variation: cases where the same thing smells different in different contexts of perception and there is no good reason to appeal to misperception. My central example is that of (...) dihydromyrcenol, a substance that can smell both woody and citrusy depending on what other odourants one has recently been exposed to. I first argue that the subjects’ apparently conflicting reports about the way dihydromyrcenol smells are best understood as comparative characterisations of a smell. Given this understanding, different reports can be correctly made in response to perceiving the very same smell. I then argue that the phenomenal difference between the experiences subjects have across contexts can be explained compatibly with Smell Objectivism. On the account proposed, subjects perceive the very same smell but different qualities, notes, or aspects of it are salient to them, depending on the context of perception. I then consider how the proposed defence of Smell Objectivism can be adapted to other cases where the same thing is reported as smelling different in different contexts. (shrink)

What kind of mental phenomenon is romantic love? Many philosophers, psychologists, and ordinary folk treat it as an emotion. This chapter argues the category of emotion is inadequate to account for romantic love. It examines major emotion theories in philosophy and psychology and shows that they fail to illustrate that romantic love is an emotion. It considers the categories of basic emotions and emotion complexes, and demonstrates they too come short in accounting for romantic love. It assesses the roles of (...) culture and evolution in shaping the romantic love phenomenon and evaluates the ways in which the norms of rationality that are applied to standard emotions fail to apply to love. It considers the category of sentiments and argue that despite coming close, it does not adequately capture the nature of romantic love. Finally, the chapter makes a case for love being best characterized as a syndrome. (shrink)

Vallortigara & Rogers's (V&R's) proposal that directional asymmetries evolved under social pressures raises questions about the ontogenetic mechanisms subserving the alignment of asymmetries in a population. Neuro-ontogenetic principles suggest that epigenetic factors are decisively involved in the determination of individual lateralization and that genetic factors align their direction. Clearly, directional asymmetry has an epigenetic trait.

When sharing a task with another person that requires turn taking, as in doubles games of table tennis, performance on the shared task is similar to performing the whole task alone. This has been taken to indicate that humans co-represent their partner’s task share, as if it were their own. Task co-representation allows prediction of the other’s responses when it is the other’s turn, and leads to response conflict in joint interference tasks. However, data from our lab cast doubt on (...) the view that task co-representation and resulting response conflict are the only or even primary source of effects observed in task sharing. Recent findings furthermore suggest another potential source of interference in joint task performance that has been neglected so far: Self-other discrimination and conflict related to agent identification (i.e., determining whether it is “my” or the other’s turn). Based on these findings we propose that participants might not always co-represent what their partner is supposed to do, but instead co-represent that another agent is responsible for part of the task, and when it is his turn. We call this account the actor co-representation account. (shrink)

Sustained neural activity during the delay phase of spatial working memory tasks is compelling evidence for the neural correlate of active storage and maintenance of spatial information, however, it does not provide insight into specific mechanisms of spatial coding. This activity may reflect a range of processes, such as maintenance of a stimulus position or a prepared motor response plan. The aim of our study was to examine neural evidence for the use of different coding strategies, depending on the characteristics (...) and demands of a spatial working memory task. Thirty-one and 44 participants performed a spatial working memory task while we measured their brain activity using fMRI in two separate experiments. Participants were asked to remember the position of a briefly presented target stimulus and, after a delay period, to use a joystick to indicate either the position of the remembered target or an indicated non-matching location. The task was designed so that the predictability of the response could be manipulated independently of task difficulty and memory retrieval process. We were particularly interested in contrasting conditions in which participants could use prospective coding of the motor response or had to rely on retrospective sensory information. Prospective motor coding was associated with activity in somatomotor, premotor, and motor cortices and increased integration of brain activity with and within the somatomotor network. In contrast, retrospective sensory coding was associated with increased activity in parietal regions and increased functional connectivity with and within secondary visual and dorsal attentional networks. The observed differences in activation levels, dynamics of differences over trial duration, and integration of information within and between brain networks provide compelling evidence for the use of complementary spatial working memory strategies optimized to meet task demands. (shrink)

The psychopathological analysis of hysteria is a victim of narrow conceptualizations. Among these is the inscription of hysteria in the feminine sphere, about body and sexuality, which incentivized conceptual reductionism. Hysteria has been mainly considered a gendered pathology, almost exclusively female, and it has been associated with cultural and/or religious features over time rather than treated as a psychopathological world. Further, hysteria has been dominated by conceptual inaccuracies and indecision, not only in terms of clinical features but also in terms (...) of its definition. For this reason, it seems necessary to “undress” hysteria from this feminization, sexualization, and corporealization with which it has been abundantly clothed over the years. “Undressing” hysteria will make possible a reconfiguring and deconstructing of the explanatory-causal model of Charcot and Freud. However, if we take out this cultural heritage, the stigma accompanying this diagnosis, and the weight of the enormous historical tradition that hysteria carries, the world of hysteria continues to constitute a domain full of complexity and nosographic challenges. Hysteria has been considered a sum of psychological behaviors and states illustrated by drama, mystery, or falsity. The difficulty in understanding the multiple somatic manifestations which characterize this clinical condition created several controversies and much confusion. In the current nosography, the personological component of hysteria has been separated from its symptomatic manifestation, in the Histrionic Personality Disorder and Conversion Disorder categories, respectively. This segmentation by descriptive nosography does contribute to a unitary understanding of the phenomenon and, consequently, of daily clinical practice. Clinical complexity can be grasped and deciphered only if the symptom is inscribed in the patient’s lifeworld and his/her subjective life history. Clinical practice is thus thought of in terms of a structural aggregation of a homogeneous set of phenomena, together constituting a specific way of being in the world. The starting point of this article is the evident modalities characterizing this life-world, taking care not to confuse the point of origin with the point of expression. (shrink)

This paper presents a framework for the design of human-centric identity management systems. Whilst many identity systems over the past few years have been labelled as _human-centred,_ we argue that the term has been appropriated by technologists to claim moral superiority of their products, and by system owners who confuse administrative convenience with benefits for users. The framework for human-centred identity presented here identifies a set of design properties that can impact the lived experience of the individuals whose identity is (...) being managed. These properties were identified through an analysis of public response to 15 historic national identity systems. They capture the practical design aspects of an identity system, from structural aspects that affect the flow of information - _Control Points, Subject Engagement, Identity Exposure, Population Coverage_—to the metrical aspects that considers how information is used and perceived—_Expert Interpretation, Population Comprehension, Information Accuracy, Information Stability, Subject Coupling, Information Polymorphism_. Any identity system can be described in terms of these fundamental properties, which affect individuals’ lived experience, and therefore help to determine the acceptance or rejection of such systems. We first apply each individual property within the context of two national identity systems—the UK DNA Database and the Austrian Citizen Card, and then also demonstrate the applicability of the framework within the contexts of two non-government identity platforms—Facebook and Phorm. Practitioners and researchers would make use of this framework by analysing an identity system in terms of the various properties, and the interactions between these properties within the context of use, thus allowing for the development of the potential impacts that the system has on the lived experience. (shrink)

This paper looks at the possibilities of using biographical research in social work focusing on the elderly. Social work with the elderly uses or should use biographical data to create individual plans for clients or for the purpose of sensory activation. Narrative interviews are a form of interaction between a senior client and a social worker. The social worker supports the senior’s narrative so they can view their life for themselves and explain its meaning from their own perspective. The use (...) of sensory activation in social work is only possible when the individual’s identity is supported by a sufficient amount of environmental stimuli, which can be achieved only by acquiring and analyzing data on the life events of the individual. The paper contains examples of the use of biographical data in social work with the elderly, which is essential for further structuring their lives. (shrink)

Das Werk des vorsokratischen Philosophen Parmenides, das nur fragmentarisch erhalten ist, kann als Lehrgedicht beschrieben werden. In diesem Buch werden zum ersten Mal die pädagogischen Aspekte des Gedichtes aufgrund einer detaillierten Diskussion von ausgewählten Fragmenten systematisch untersucht. Es werden u. a. folgende Fragen behandelt: Wie kommt der Suchende oder Lernende zur philosophischen Erkenntnis? Welche 'Wege' oder Methoden führen dorthin? Was für Lernstufen gibt es? Wie verhält sich der Lernende (der Kuros) zur Belehrenden (der Göttin)? Welcher geistige Zustand soll den Erkennenden (...) kennzeichnen? Parmenides' Ontologie wird hier als Beschreibung des Erkennenden in Betracht gezogen, insofern das erkennende Subjekt seinem Objekt entsprechen soll. Parmenides' philosophische Pädagogik wird im Rahmen der Erziehungstheorie und Praxis der antiken Philosophie dargestellt und mit dem Thema der Philosophie als Lebenskunst verglichen. (shrink)

Online data collection with infants raises special opportunities and challenges for developmental research. One of the most prevalent methods in infancy research is eye-tracking, which has been widely applied in laboratory settings to assess cognitive development. Technological advances now allow conducting eye-tracking online with various populations, including infants. However, the accuracy and reliability of online infant eye-tracking remain to be comprehensively evaluated. No research to date has directly compared webcam-based and in-lab eye-tracking data from infants, similarly to data from adults. (...) The present study provides a direct comparison of in-lab and webcam-based eye-tracking data from infants who completed an identical looking time paradigm in two different settings. We assessed 4-6-month-old infants in an eye-tracking task that measured the detection of audio-visual asynchrony. Webcam-based and in-lab eye-tracking data were compared on eye-tracking and video data quality, infants’ viewing behavior, and experimental effects. Results revealed no differences between the in-lab and online setting in the frequency of technical issues and participant attrition rates. Video data quality was comparable between settings in terms of completeness and brightness, despite lower frame rate and resolution online. Eye-tracking data quality was higher in the laboratory than online, except in case of relative sample loss. Gaze data quantity recorded by eye-tracking was significantly lower than by video in both settings. In valid trials, eye-tracking and video data captured infants’ viewing behavior uniformly, irrespective of setting. Despite the common challenges of infant eye-tracking across experimental settings, our results point toward the necessity to further improve the precision of online eye-tracking with infants. Taken together, online eye-tracking is a promising tool to assess infants’ gaze behavior but requires careful data quality control. The demographic composition of both samples differed from the generic population on caregiver education: our samples comprised caregivers with higher-than-average education levels, challenging the notion that online studies will per se reach more diverse populations. (shrink)

Jesse Prinz argues that recent work in philosophy, neuroscience, and anthropology supports two radical hypotheses about the nature of morality: moral values are based on emotional responses, and these emotional responses are inculcated by culture, not hard-wired through natural selection. In the first half of the book, Jesse Prinz defends the hypothesis that morality has an emotional foundation. Evidence from brain imaging, social psychology, and psychopathology suggest that, when we judge something to be right or wrong, we are (...) merely expressing our emotions. Prinz argues that these emotions do not track objective features of reality; rather, the rightness and wrongness of an act consists in the fact that people are disposed to have certain emotions towards it. In the second half of the book, he turns to a defense of moral relativism. Moral facts depend on emotional responses, and emotional responses vary from culture to culture. Prinz surveys the anthropological record to establish moral variation, and he draws on cultural history to show how attitudes toward practices such as cannibalism and marriage change over time. He also criticizes evidence from animal behavior and child development that has been taken to support the claim that moral attitudes are hard-wired by natural selection. Prinz concludes that there is no single true morality, but he also argues that some moral values are better than others; moral progress is possible. Throughout the book, Prinz relates his views to contemporary and historical work in philosophical ethics. His views echo themes in the writings of David Hume and Friedrich Nietzsche, but Prinz supports, extends, and revises these classic theories using the resources of cutting-edge cognitive science. The Emotional Construction of Morals will stimulate and challenge anyone who is curious about the nature and origin of moral values. (shrink)

Lebensspanne 2.0 – Sebastian Knell verwendet diesen Terminus nicht. Fasst man den Begriff aber, in Anlehnung an die üblichen Verwendungen von x.0, wie sie derzeit für verschiedene Bereiche zu finden sind, als eine technisch induzierte neue Dimension oder Weise menschlicher Existenz, dann ließen sich bei Knell zwei Varianten unterscheiden. Einerseits die biotechnisch möglich gemachte Verlängerung der menschlichen Lebensspanne, andererseits die Idee der biologischen Unsterblichkeit.

Since industrialization, machines have shaped and transformed human life. Currently, however, there is much talk of a new machine age. A new machine ethic is being discussed. But what characterizes these new machines? And what does it mean for the concept of the Anthropocene? The article differentiates between three categories of machines: the mechanical machine, the so-called trans-classical machine (computer, information-processing machine), and, finally, AI as a new category of machine. Each category of machines is related to historically different human-nature (...) and human-machine relationships. (shrink)

Menschen als Mängelwesen zu interpretieren, stellt eine der ältesten anthropologischen Grundbestimmungen dar. Damit wurde ein Mangel an den Beginn der Menschheit gesetzt; ein Mangel, der gleichwohl stets mit einer menschlichen Sonderstellung und der Möglichkeit, ja der Aufforderung zur Steigerung und Vervollkommnung der Menschen einherging. Das Mängelwesen-Theorem ist durch eine biologische Bestimmung des Mangels charakterisiert. In unterschiedlichen historischen Varianten der Figur des Mängelwesens ist es der menschliche Körper, der mangelhaft ist. Dies gilt auch für moderne Vergleiche der Menschen mit Technik, in (...) denen Menschen fehlerhaft erscheinen. Die Figur des Mängelwesens wurde vielfach kritisiert, sowohl aus der Perspektive der Biologie, der Evolutionstheorie und der Verhaltenswissenschaft als auch in den Kultur- und Geisteswissenschaften. problematisch gilt an dieser Figur ihr Eurozentrismus, das Denken vom Negativen her, die Vorstellung der Kompensation von Mängeln sowie die damit verbundene Idee der Verlängerung, Steigerung und Optimierung menschlicher Fähigkeiten und Körper. (shrink)

Robots have become increasingly present in the human environment. As this happens, the question of the relationship of humans and robots is becoming more urgent. Also, much more broadly, the question of the relationship of robots to organic things, to the living, to nature itself, is coming to the fore. Even though the term robot only became common at the beginning of the twentieth century, the concept of an artificial being is a very old one, dating back to the ancient (...) world. Over this long period of time the notion of what constituted a robot, including how it was technically constructed, underwent multiple changes. Five distinct narratives accompany the figure of the robot and its position in the human world. These narratives range from robots as servants to concepts of a post-biological world, and the so-called “Novocene” (Lovelock, Novacene: The Coming Age of Hyperintelligence. Penguin Books, Milton Keynes, 2019) in which humans and artificial intelligences live side-by-side. This article outlines the history of the robot and its accompanying narratives, and it raises the question of the position of robots in a web of diverse entities. (shrink)

Der Begriff der Technik ist schillernd, dynamisch und nicht eindeutig zu bestimmen. Technik lässt sich nicht allein über ihre Objekthaftigkeit definieren. Vielmehr verkörpert Technik stets ein Weltverhältnis, das sich in Konzepten von Technik zeigt. In einem modernistischen Verständnis ist Technik eng mit einer Steigerungs- und Optimierungslogik verbunden. Dies meint einerseits Technik als Mittel zur Gestaltung, Beherrschung und Eroberung der Welt zu interpretieren, womit in der Regel ein Versprechen auf eine „bessere“ Welt einherging. Andererseits bezieht sich die Vorstellung von Technik als (...) Mittel der Steigerung, Modifizierung und Erweiterung auf menschliche Körper. Prothesentheorien von Kapp über Gehlen zu McLuhan interpretierten Technik in diesem Sinne, aber auch gentechnologische Verfahren zielen auf eine Optimierung von Organismen. Cyborg-Aktivisten plädieren für eine technische Veränderung und Erweiterung des menschlichen Körpers, während Trans- und Posthumanisten vor allem die Defizite des menschlichen Körpers sehen und diese mittels Technik überwinden möchten. Seit dem letzten Drittel des 20. Jahrhunderte bestehen neue Konzepte, die solch anthropozentrische und dichotome Technikvorstellungen in Frage stellten und damit auch einer simplen Vorstellung von Technik als Instrument zur Steigerung menschlicher Fähigkeiten eine Absage erteilen. Menschen, Pflanzen, Stoffe, Technik werden als vernetzt, mit verschiedensten Entitäten verwoben gedacht. Menschen sind demnach Handelnde in komplexen und kontingenten Ökologien geworden. (shrink)

Die Zeitschrift Archiv für Papyrusforschung und verwandte Gebiete ist das älteste papyrologische Fachorgan der Welt. Sieunterscheidet sich von anderen papyrologischen Zeitschriften hauptsächlich durch ihre Referate (literarische Papyri, christliche Texte, Urkundenreferat, juristisches Referat, koptische Texte und Urkunden, Demotica Selecta sowie Darstellungen und Hilfsmittel). Die Beihefte zu der Zeitschrift vereinen sowohl Monographien als auch Sammelbände; im Zentrum stehen Neueditionen von Papyrustexten griechischer, lateinischer, koptischer, demotischer oder arabischer Sprache, die neue Erkenntnisse zu verschiedenen Bereichen des Altertums vermitteln: zu Philologie, Literatur, Philosophie, Religion, Politik (...) und Sozialgeschichte, zu Militär- und Rechtsgeschichte, zu Geographie und Landeskunde, zu Schul- und Gesundheitswesen und zum Alltagsleben; kurzum, zur antiken Kulturgeschichte überhaupt. (shrink)

Aesthetics is a normative domain. We evaluate artworks as better or worse, good or bad, great or grim. I will refer to a positive appraisal of an artwork as an aesthetic appreciation of that work, and I refer to a negative appraisal as aesthetic depreciation. (I will often drop the word “aesthetic.”) There has been considerable amount of work on what makes an artwork worthy of appreciation, and less, it seems, on the nature of appreciation itself. These two topics are (...) related, of course, because they nature of appreciation may bear on what things are worthy of that response, or at least on what things are likely to elicit it. So I will have some things to say about the latter. But I want to focus in this discussion on appreciation itself. When we praise a work of art, when we say it has aesthetic value, what does our praise consist in? This is a question about aesthetic psychology. I am interested in what kind of mental state appreciation is. What kind of state are we expressing when we say a work of art is “good”? This question has parallels in other areas of value theory. In ethics, most notably, there has been much attention lavished on the question of what people express when they refer to an action as “morally good.” One popular class of theories, associated with the British moralists and their followers, posits a link between moral valuation and emotion. To call an act morally good is to express an emotion toward that act. I think this approach to morality is right on target (Prinz, 2007). Here I want to argue that an emotional account of aesthetic valuation is equally promising. There are important differences between the two domains, but both have an affective foundation. I suspect that valuing of all kinds involves the emotions. Here I will inquire into the role of emotions in aesthetic valuing. I will not claim that artworks express emotions or even that they necessarily evoke emotions.. (shrink)