This article defends the idea that causal relations between reasons and actions are wholly irrelevant to the explanatory efficacy of reason-explanations. The analysis of reason-explanations provided in this article shows that the so-called “problem of explanatory force” is solved, not by putative causal relations between the reasons for which agents act and their actions, but rather by the intentions that agents necessarily have when they act for a reason. Additionally, the article provides a critique of the principal source of support (...) for the thesis that reason-explanations are causal explanations, namely, Davidson's argument in “Actions, Reasons, and Causes.” It is shown that Davidson's argument for this thesis rests crucially on two mistakes: his definition of intentional action and his ontological prejudice against intentions. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉCet article concerne le rejet controversé de la notion de signification métaphorique par Donald Davidson. Il a deux objectifs: d'abord, de montrer que l'argument de Davidson contre la signification mètaphorique est vicié par une ambiguîté qui, une fois révélée, lui ôte toute portée; et deuxièmement, d'expliquer d'où vient cette ambiguîté. L'explication proposée rapporte l'erreur de Davidson au sujet de la signification métaphorique à sa négligence de la notion de signification du locuteur et, plus généralement, à une orientation théorique envers le (...) langage, qui ne s'intéresse, principalement, qu'aux aspects de la communication qui peuvent recevoir un traitement sémantique formel. (shrink)

This thesis is a critical examination of three influential and interrelated aspects of Donald Davidson's philosophy of action. The first issue that is considered is Davidson's account of the logical form of action-sentences. After assessing the argument in support of Davidson's account, and suggesting certain amendments to it, I show how this modified version of Davidson's account can be extended to provide for more complicated types of action-sentences. The second issue that is considered is Davidson's views concerning the individuation of (...) actions; in particular, I examine Davidson's theory concerning the ontological implications of those sentences that assert that an agent did something by means of doing something else. The conclusion that I seek to establish in this case is essentially negative--that Davidson's theory is false. The third issue that is considered is Davidson's theory concerning the logical implications of those sentences that assert that an agent did something as a means of doing something else, which is also commonly known as the causal theory of action. Here I argue against Davidson's view by providing an alternative, and more satisfying response to the theoretical challenge that generates the causal theory. Subsequent to this I attempt to explain what motivates Davidson's commitment to the causal theory. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉ: Cet article concerne le rejet controversé de la notion de signification métaphorique par Donald Davidson. Il a deux objectifs: d’abord, de montrer que l’argument de Davidson contre la signification métaphorique est vicié par une ambiguïté qui, une fois révélée, lui ôte toute portée; et deuxièmement, d’expliquer d’où vient cette ambiguïté. L’explication proposée rapporte l’erreur de Davidson au sujet de la signification métaphorique à sa négligence de la notion de signification du locuteur et, plus généralement, à une orientation théorique envers (...) le langage, qui ne s’intéresse, principalement, qu’aux aspects de la communication qui peuvent recevoir un traitement sémantique formel. (shrink)

That the central thesis of Donald Davidson’s classic article on metaphor “What Metaphor Means” (WMM) is ambiguous between a weak and a strong interpretation is the primary claim that I sought to establish in my article “Sentence Meaning, Speaker Meaning, and Davidson’s Denial of Metaphorical Meaning.” In addition to this, I argued that the weak claim is trivially true and the strong claim is obviously false. Therefore, I concluded that when the central thesis of WMM is disambiguated, it is insignificant. (...) Finally, I explained the ambiguity in that thesis in terms of Davidson’s neglect in WMM for the concept of speaker meaning and this, in turn, in terms of a certain theoretical orientation to language that Davidson held at the time of writing WMM. In his commentary on my article, “Speaker Meaning and Davidson on Metaphor: A Reply to McGuire,” Robert J. Stainton raises objections to several of the foregoing claims. In this article, I review and defend each of these claims against Stainton’s objections. (shrink)

In 1978 Donald Davidson published an article entitled “What Metaphors Mean” (WMM), in which he championed the idea that “metaphors mean what the words, in their most literal interpretation, mean, and nothing more.” In 1986 Davidson published a somewhat related article entitled “ A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs” (NDE), in which he defended a unique and controversial theory of literal meaning according to which the literal meaning of an expression is determined by the speaker’s first intention in uttering it. Both (...) of these articles (WMM and NDE) have attracted a considerable amount of attention in the literature. However, the connection between these two articles has received much less attention, and those interested in Davidson’s philosophy of language have had to conjecture about whether the ideas expressed in WMM are consistent with those of NDE. The principal goal of this article is to clarify the connection between the main ideas expressed in those two articles. (shrink)

In this paper I show that two conflicting theories of literal meaning can be found in Donald Davidson's philosophy of language. In his earlier writings, Davidson espoused the common sense idea that words have literal meanings independently of particular contexts of use. In his later writings, however, Davidson insisted that the literal meaning of a word is a function of the speaker's intentions in using it, from which it follows that words do not have literal meanings independently of particular contexts. (...) In this paper I examine and evaluate the transition from Davidson's earlier to his later view of literal meaning. I show that the change in view came about through Davidson's efforts to extend a theory of literal meaning to malapropisms but that Davidson's understanding of malapropisms is seriously flawed. I conclude that Davidson had no good reason for espousing his later intentions-based theory of literal meaning. (shrink)

This article is concerned with the question of whether, and to what extent, the concept of metaphor properly applies to pictures (e.g., paintings or photographs). The question is approached dialectically through an examination of the views of Sonia Sedivy, who advances the following 4 claims: (a) that pictures possess propositional content, (b) that there are metaphoric pictures, (c) that metaphoric pictures do not possess metaphoric content, and (d) that there can be no theory of pictorial metaphor. Although the first of (...) Sedivy's claims is rejected in this article, the existence of pictorial metaphors is not denied. Thus, the fact that pictures do not possess propositional content does not preclude the possibility of pictorial metaphors. What are required, though, are changes to the conception of pictorial metaphor that Sedivy advances. (shrink)

What is the relation between acting intentionally and acting for a reason? While this question has generated a considerable amount of debate in the philosophy of action, on one point there has been a virtual consensus: actions performed for a reason are necessarily intentional. Recently, this consensus has been challenged by Joshua Knobe and Sean Kelly, who argue against it on the basis of empirical evidence concerning the ways in which ordinary speakers of the English language describe and explain certain (...) side-effect actions. Knobe and Kelly's argument is of interest not only because it challenges a widely accepted philosophical thesis on the basis of experimental evidence, but also because it indirectly raises an important and largely neglected question, the question of whether or in what sense an agent can perform a side-effect action for a reason. In this article, I address this question and provide a positive answer to it. Specifically, I argue that agents act for a reason whenever they perform side-effect actions as trade-offs. Thus, I claim that there are three distinct types of rational action: actions performed as ends in themselves, actions performed as means to further ends, and side-effect actions performed as trade-offs. Given this multiplicity of types of rational action, the question of whether or not actions performed for a reason are necessarily intentional is in need of refinement. The more specific question that lies at the heart of this article is whether or not side-effect actions performed as trade-offs are necessarily intentional. I conclude that, contrary to what Knobe and Kelly suggest, the question remains open. (shrink)

Drawing on a landscape analysis of existing data-sharing initiatives, in-depth interviews with expert stakeholders, and public deliberations with community advisory panels across the U.S., we describe features of the evolving medical information commons. We identify participant-centricity and trustworthiness as the most important features of an MIC and discuss the implications for those seeking to create a sustainable, useful, and widely available collection of linked resources for research and other purposes.

This book approaches the topic of the subjective, lived experience of hate crime from the perspective of Husserlian phenomenology. It provides an experientially well-grounded account of how and what is experienced as a hate crime, and what this reveals about ourselves as the continually reconstituted “subject” of such experiences. The book shows how qualitative social science methods can be better grounded in philosophically informed theory and methodological practices to add greater depth and explanatory power to experiential approaches to social sciences (...) topics. The Authors also highlight several gaps and contradictions within Husserlian analyses of prejudice, which are exposed by attempts to concretely apply this approach to the field of hate crimes. Coverage includes the difficulties in providing an empathetic understanding of expressions of harmful forms of prejudice underlying hate crimes, including hate speech, arising from our own and others’ ‘life worlds’. The Authors describe a ‘Husserlian-based’ view of hate crime as well as a novel interpretation of the value of the comprehensive methodological stages pioneered by Husserl. The intended readership includes those concerned with discrimination and hate crime, as well as those involved in qualitative research into social topics in general. The broader content level makes this work suitable for undergraduate and postgraduate students, even professionals within law enforcement. (shrink)

The behavior of individuals who compose an institution tends to mirror the behavior of that institution as a whole. This short work illustrates this principle.

An explanation of the psychology of the bureaucrat and of bureaucratic institutions.

The theorems of the propositional calculus and the predicate calculus are stated, and the analogous principles of Boolean Algebra are identified. Also, the primary principles of modal logic are stated, and a procedure is described for identifying their Boolean analogues.

The most basic laws and principles of the Predicate Calculus, also known as Quantification Theory, are stated, as clearly and concisely as possible.

For intellectuals, and probably others, one form of escapism is a kind of constricted and shallow hyper-realism—the hyper-realism of having a dead-end job, even though one has a PhD or an IQ of 170. And that sort of hyper-realism is pseudo-realism, because realism is not about having a bad life; it is having the courage to have a good life, which the intellectual with the dead end job does not have.

The greater the extent to which a given system rewards the absence of merit, the greater the incentive that people within that system have to perpetuate that system. People who are falsely rewarded have a double stake in the perpetuation of whatever it is that falsely rewarded them. First, without that system and all of the lies surrounding it, such people lose their wealth and their social status. Second, without that system, such people lose their self-respect. The more a given (...) person is overvalued, the more likely it is that his social status and self-image depend on specific institutions and, therefore, the more likely it is that he does not those institutions to be replaced or even improved. (shrink)

Les sciences empiriques font des suppositions qu'elles ne sont pas elles-mêmes capables de justifier. La philosophie justifie ces hypothèses; C'est son travail.

In this short work, Cantor's famous 'diagonal' proof of the non-recursivity of the class of real numbers is stated and discussed.

A system is counterentropic to the extent that it has a fractal structure and entropic to the extent that it doesn't.

Este trabajo da claras respuestas rigurosas a las cuestiones fundamentales de la epistemología, siendo estas: -/- * ¿Qué es el conocimiento? * ¿Cómo difiere el conocimiento declarativo del conocimiento procedimental? * ¿Cómo se diferencia el conocimiento intuitivo forma ¿conocimiento discursivo? * ¿Cómo difiere el conocimiento científico de los conocimientos no científicos? * ¿Cuál es la diferencia entre el descubrimiento y la justificación? * ¿Cuál es la naturaleza de nuestro conocimiento del pasado, del futuro, de lo meramente posible, y del presente (...) pero no perceptible? * ¿Cómo es el conocimiento conceptual diferente del conocimiento empírico? * ¿todo el conocimiento es inferencial? * ¿todo el conocimiento es teórico? * ¿todo el conocimiento inferencial es teórico? * ¿es la mente transparente para sí misma? * ¿es coherente el concepto de ideación inconsciente? * ¿Cuál es el problema de Gettier y cuál es la solución al problema de Gettier? -/- Este libro es apropiado para principiantes y también para los investigadores. (shrink)

An analysis of Gibbon's five signs of civilizational decay.

Beobachtung informiert uns, was ist, aber nicht was sein muss. Sie weist uns daher nicht auf logische Normen oder auf Beziehungen logischer Abhängigkeit hin. Darüber hinaus setzt die Umwandlung von sensorischer Information (Bildinformation) in propositionale (konzeptuelle, nicht-bildliche) Information das Wissen voraus, wie man Informationen einer Art in Informationen anderer Art umwandeln kann, und setzt daher die Kenntnis logischer Äquivalenzen voraus. So ist nicht jedes Wissen aus der Sinneswahrnehmung abgeleitet, auch wenn man sich auf die Unterscheidung zwischen wissensartigen, aber nicht wirklich (...) wissensvermittelnden, kognitiven Strukturen einerseits und echtem Wissen andererseits beruft. Eine philosophische Rechtfertigung wird für Freuds tiefgründige Einsichten in Kapitel VII der Traumdeutung über die Grenzen der ikonischen Ideation gegeben. Wittgensteins so genannte "Bildtheorie" der Sprache wird untersucht. (shrink)

Academic journals are clogged with gratuitous scholarship. This prevents the advancement of the corresponding disciplines in many ways, five of which are identified in this short work.

In this work, Descartes' metaphysics and epistemology are clearly stated and assiduously analyzed. It is shown that Descartes' epistemic foundationalism is tenable, and that his mind-body dualism is correct if taken to concern the relationship of mentalistic (mind-related) data to physicalistic data, even though it is incorrect if taken to concern the relationship of mind per se to body per se. Descartes' analysis of causation is shown to be correct, notwithstanding the copious criticism to which centuries have subjected it. Descartes (...) arguments for God's existence are clearly stated and, thereby, shown to be masterpieces of dialectical ingenuity. (shrink)

Does the conceit in question expand awareness or narrow it? If it narrows it, then it is pathological. It if expands it, it is non-pathological.

A case is made that so-called international law is law in name only and, moreover, that although bona fide international law is theoretically possible, it would not be desirable.

It is shown that institutions are fractals, meaning that are structurally the same as their parts, and that for this reason liberal institutions are quicker than conservative institutions to decay into a condition of abject psychopathy.

If It isn’t necessary, its non-existence is.

Lack of coordination is an expression of internal conflict.

Un certain nombre tente de fournir une base rationnelle pour le sentiment religieux sont clairement énoncés et soigneusement critiqué, la plupart d'entre eux étant montré à l'échec. Dans le même temps, on fait valoir que la légitimité du sentiment religieux n'est en aucun cas minée par de tels échecs, puisque toute perspective dont la légitimité dépend du résultat de l'enquête logique ou empirique est pour cette raison même une perspective non-religieuse. Et la raison pour cela n'est pas qu'une perspective religieuse (...) est obstinément irrationnelle. C'est que les fausses doctrines historiques et cosmologiques que les religions exigent que leurs disciples acceptent soient de simples feuilles. En croyant, faute d'un meilleur mot, que le Christ marchait sur l'eau, on accepte les enseignements du Christ; On n'accepte pas réellement le mensonge évident qu'un homme marchait sur l'eau. À moins que l'acceptation de ces enseignements ait pris la forme d'une quasi-acceptation de fictions évidentes, l'acceptation de ceux-ci serait aussi fragile et aussi inerte que toute autre croyance fondée sur la raison. De même, parce que le mensonge en question est invariablement d'un genre enfantin, l'acceptation de celui-ci représente un engagement existentiel de part et d'autre à un certain mode de vie. Ces vérités évidentes sont perdues sur les philosophes de la religion, étant donné leur tendance à prendre toutes les déclarations littéralement et leur défaut conséquent de donner en raison de poids à des informations contextuelles non-affirmées. En général, si le travail actuel démontre, les philosophes qui ont examiné la religion ont réussi seulement à étudier les projections de leur propre rationalisme fragile, qui, semble-t-il, ne fait que masquer un désir sous-jacent de revenir aux mêmes pieties ces mêmes les philosophes prétendent être indentés. Cela ne veut pas dire que la croyance religieuse ne doit pas être analysée, mais plutôt qu'elle tombe dans le bailliage non pas du logicien, mais du psychanalyste. (shrink)

The essence of psychosis is alienatedness from the truth, and the essence of psychopathy is alienatedness from moral truth. According to Marx, truth and morality from culture to culture and from epoch to epoch, the only epoch- and culture-invariant thing about them being, in Marx's view, that they are always so much self-serving propaganda. Thus, Marxism, in its insistence on the non-existence (or, what is the same, the relativity) of truth and morality, is nothing more than an exhortation to be (...) psyochotic and psychopathic; and the supposedly unsuccessful Marxist reovlutions in Russian, China, and Cambodia were, in fact, successful--that is to say, they successfully implemented the psychotic psychopathy that is the very heart of Marxism. (shrink)

According to Frege, n=Kn, where n is any cardinal number and Kn is the class of all n-tuples. According to Von Neumann, n=Kpn, where Kpn is the class of all of n's predecessors. These analyses are prima facie incompatible with each other, given that Kn≠Kpn, for n>0. In the present paper it is shown that these analyses are in fact compatible with each other, for the reason that each analysis can and ultimately must be interpreted as being to the effect (...) that n=Cn, where Cn is the class of all ordered pairs <Kn#,Rn#>, where Kn# is an arbitrary class and Rn# is an arbitrary relation such that a class k has n-many members exactly if k bears Rn# to Kn#. (shrink)

Neuroses are secondary mental illnesses, it being their purpose to contain psychoses.

There is no difference between autonomy and non-psychopathy or, equivalently, between psychopathy and non-autonomy. Or rather, there is a difference, but it is tenuous, in that someone who is non-autonomous is non-psychopathic only as long the institution that hosts him is non-psychopathic. So his non-psychopathy, being borrowed, is both weak and ultimately devoid of reality.

Obsessions are internalized compulsions, and compulsions are externalized obsessions.

In this paper, it is shown that an event E can be the cause of an event E* even if there is a less than 100% likelihood that, given an arbitrary E-similar event, an E*-similar event will ensue.

Insurance agents are confidence-men--con men--and that is what psychopaths are; and that is why psychopaths are drawn to the insurance industry, which is the insurance industry is so tightly regulated.

W.V.O. tried to prove that no statement is necessarily true. In this work, Quine's argument is stated, analyzed, and shown to be a broken argument for a false conclusion. It is shown that necessary truths are as important as empirical truths to the empirical sciences, the reason being that, without necessary truths, there is no way to organize or interpret data. It comes to light that, in addition to being false, every form of extreme empiricism (e.g. Dewey's pragmatism, Wittgenstein's verificationism, (...) Comte's positivism) is so incoherent that it cannot be clearly stated without thereby being refuted. (shrink)

Some illnesses, e.g. OCD and schizophrenia, corrupt the activity mediated by one's basic psychological framework but do not corrupt that framework itself. But some illnesses, e.g. psychopathy, corrupt that framework itself. Thus, whereas OCD and schizophrenia are structure-internal mental illnesses, psychopathy is a structural mental illness. Structure-internal mental illnesses can be alleviated, but structural mental illnesses cannot.

Une introduction rapide aux problèmes fondamentaux de l'éthique, ce travail consiste en des réponses pointues et profondes aux questions fondamentales: * les obligations légales ont-elles un poids moral? * peut-on agir immoralement envers soi-même? * Quelle est la base objective des revendications morales légitimes? * Comment savons-nous le bien du mal? * Comment peut-il y avoir une responsabilité morale dans un monde déterministe? -/- Rigoureux mais accessible, ce travail est une introduction idéale à l'éthique analytique et à la théorie de (...) la valeur. (shrink)

The widespread belief that the mind is a computer embodies a failure to distinguish between computers and information-processing systems. Minds are information-processing systems, but they are not computers.

Este libro establece y analiza la Teoría de las descripciones de Russell.

Freud said that 'the essence of neurosis is the inability to tolerate ambiguity.' In this short work, it is explained what this means and why it is true.

Instead of writing a book or article, which contains at most one paragraph’s worth of actual content, why not just write that one paragraph?

How a person is on the inside replicates how he is on the outside—so he is a fractal in that sense. And how he is in little matters replicates how he is in big ones—so he is a fractal in that sense as well. And so it is that a person’s identity has a doubly fractal structure.

A brief statement of the most basic principles of the discipline of Knowledge Management (KM).