A companion volume to In the Realm of Organization, this book explores in detail the intricate relationships that exist between technology, representation and organization from a diversity of perspectives, relocating the study of organization in wider social theory.

We present a one per cent measurement of the cosmic distance scale from the detections of the baryon acoustic oscillations in the clustering of galaxies from the Baryon Oscillation Spectroscopic Survey, which is part of the Sloan Digital Sky Survey III. Our results come from the Data Release 11 sample, containing nearly one million galaxies and covering approximately 8500 square degrees and the redshift range 0.2 < z < 0.7. We also compare these results with those from the publicly released (...) DR9 and DR10 samples. Assuming a concordance Λ cold dark matter cosmological model, the DR11 sample covers a volume of 13 Gpc3 and is the largest region of the Universe ever surveyed at this density. We measure the correlation function and power spectrum, including density-field reconstruction of the BAO feature. The acoustic features are detected at a significance of over 7σ in both the correlation function and power spectrum. Fitting for the position of the acoustic features measures the distance relative to the sound horizon at the drag epoch, rd, which has a value of rd,fid = 149.28 Mpc in our fiducial cosmology. We find DV = at z = 0.32 and DV = at z = 0.57. At 1.0 per cent, this latter measure is the most precise distance constraint ever obtained from a galaxy survey. Separating the clustering along and transverse to the line of sight yields measurements at z = 0.57 of DA = and H =. Our measurements of the distance scale are in good agreement with previous BAO measurements and with the predictions from cosmic microwave background data for a spatially flat CDM model with a cosmological constant. © 2014 The Author Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Royal Astronomical Society. (shrink)

I. The Antiope.—The papyrus fragments of theAntiope, written in a small and crabbed hand of the third century B.C., were first published by Mahaffy in vol. 1 of the Petrie papyri in 1891, a time when the study of writing on papyrus was in its early days and there was not the abundance of other literary texts to provide practice and comparison that there is to-day. An advance in the study of the text was made by Blass in 1892, whose (...) readings were based on first-hand knowledge of the manuscript; he was followed by von Arnim, who in his text in the Supplementum Euripideum introduced several startling alterations, based on the autotypes alone and very rarely justified by the papyrus. A landmark in the history of the text was reached when Hans Schaal published his dissertation De Euripidis Antiopa; not only had he studied the papyrus closely in London, but he was able to make use of several readings of Wilamowitz. Though he left some of the major problems unattacked, perhaps too readily, his text represents a great advance on that of his predecessors, and I have found his readings in the majority of cases where he differs from Mahaffy or von Arnim confirmed by the papyrus, and consequently I have taken his text as the basis of my collation. That there was still a little more to be deciphered was suggested to me by the late Dr. Hunt, and I am indebted to him as the instigator of these notes if there is anything of value in them. (shrink)

I. The Antiope.—The papyrus fragments of theAntiope, written in a small and crabbed hand of the third century B.C., were first published by Mahaffy in vol. 1 of the Petrie papyri in 1891, a time when the study of writing on papyrus was in its early days and there was not the abundance of other literary texts to provide practice and comparison that there is to-day. An advance in the study of the text was made by Blass in 1892, whose (...) readings were based on first-hand knowledge of the manuscript; he was followed by von Arnim, who in his text in the Supplementum Euripideum introduced several startling alterations, based on the autotypes alone and very rarely justified by the papyrus. A landmark in the history of the text was reached when Hans Schaal published his dissertation De Euripidis Antiopa; not only had he studied the papyrus closely in London, but he was able to make use of several readings of Wilamowitz. Though he left some of the major problems unattacked, perhaps too readily, his text represents a great advance on that of his predecessors, and I have found his readings in the majority of cases where he differs from Mahaffy or von Arnim confirmed by the papyrus, and consequently I have taken his text as the basis of my collation. That there was still a little more to be deciphered was suggested to me by the late Dr. Hunt, and I am indebted to him as the instigator of these notes if there is anything of value in them. (shrink)

The first amounts, roughly, to "It is necessarily the case that any President of the U.S. is a citizen of the U.S." But the second says, "the person who in fact is the President of the U.S, has the property of necessarily being a citizen of the U.S," Thus, while (2) is clearly true, it would be reasonable to consider (3) false.

This book presents a theory about the kind of thing a mind is and, on the basis of this theory, a view about how minds are individuated and when two mental states belong to the same mind.

There is substantial controversy about the nature of both particulars and properties. Some philosophers think that the categories of particular and property are fundamental, that at least some of the things in both are in no way derived from or dependent on things in another category. These philosophers are Realists about both particulars and properties. Nominalists think of particulars as fundamental and of properties as non‐fundamental, with the latter being derived from the former. This chapter explores why someone might go (...) in for Realism about properties. If one insists that universals are just properties that could be exemplified by more than one thing, Class and Resemblance Nominalism turn out to be committed to universals. Ostrich Nominalism is much larger qualitatively, since UP‐Realism has only two fundamental kinds, whereas Ostrich Nominalism has n fundamental kinds. Ostrich Nominalists must posit a very large number of metaphysically fundamental sorts of things: spheres, cubes, blue things, red things, etc. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on two clusters of questions concerning existence. The first cluster concerns the scope of existence, examining how wide the domain of existing things is and whether it encompass absolutely everything. The second cluster concerns vagueness and indeterminacy, explaining whether vague things and vague categories of things are there or all vagueness is a matter of referring indifferently to a large number of absolutely precise things and showing the ultimate source of vagueness. There are two theories of vagueness, (...) epistemic and metaphysical. The chapter focuses on Meinongian definitions of 'existence' and examines four arguments in favor of Anti‐Actualism. The first and second respectively appeals to common sense and the need for intentional objects, that is, objects of certain mental attitudes. The third appeals to the need for fictional and illusory entities. And the fourth appeals to the need for non‐existent things as constituents of certain merely possible situations. (shrink)

One might think that the best metaphysical theory of the world includes the existence of other minds and of the physical world, while denying that we can know or be certain that this theory is true. This chapter considers Solipsism as a theory about reality. It examines the Veil of Perception, and then considers a series of direct arguments against the Solipsistic Veil, Phenomenalism, and Solipsism itself. The chapter looks at two obviously inadequate arguments for the Veil, namely, Berkeley's inconceivability (...) argument and the argument from causal mediation. Then, the chapter looks at two much more interesting and important arguments, namely, the argument from hallucination and illusion and the argument from color and other secondary qualities. Besides the Veil of Perception, arguments for Idealism and Solipsism depend on an appeal to Ockham's Razor. These arguments can be taken either as providing additional support for Perceptual Realism or as a defense of Inferred Anti‐Idealism. (shrink)

This book is the first philosophy of religion anthology to offer a broad survey of classical and contemporary, Western and non-Western readings. This book includes the standard topics for traditional philosophy of religion courses, as well as ample material for courses incorporating a more global approach. The text also provides abundant pedagogical support for both instructors and stiudents new to the study of non-Western philosophies of religion. It includes such features as an introductory chapter on world religions, introductions to each (...) reading, study questions, glossary, pronunciation guide, and suggested readings. --. (shrink)

Fred Dretske, David M. Armstrong, and Michael Tooley have all proposed that the truths about the laws of nature are metaphysically fundamental, consisting in a primitive, unanalyzable relation of 'necessitation' holding between two or more properties or universals. According to Strong Nomism, the laws of nature determine which counterfactual conditionals are true, and they also determine which powers and tendencies particular things have. This chapter treats Nomism as committed to the Dretske‐Armstrong‐Tooley (DAT) theory. Nomism provides a metaphysical explanation of the (...) difference between lawful and accidental generalization. The chapter focuses on the Neo‐Humeist or Ramsey/Lewis Theory of the laws of nature. The Neo‐Humeist program proceeds in the following way. First, give a reductionist account of the laws of nature, and then use the laws to ground the truths of attributions of power and of counterfactual conditionals. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on question of the relation of properties to particulars. It considers three theories of facts: as tropes, as states of affairs, and as nexuses between particulars and universals, noting that in each case, facts turn out to be particulars of a kind. The chapter investigates the question of substances, considering two accounts about the relationship between substances and properties, namely, Relational and Constituent Ontology. Substances would have a surprising degree of metaphysical complexity. According to Constituent Ontology, properties (...) are literally parts of substances they characterize. According to Relational Ontology, in contrast, properties are separate things, extrinsically related to their instances. The chapter examines two versions of Constituent Ontology, Bundle Theory and Substrate Theory. Classical Bundle Theory purports to reduce substances to bundles of universals. The chapter also examines Nuclear Bundle Theory that faces an especially virulent form of the problem of Individuation. (shrink)

One popular approach to the metaphysics of dispositional properties takes them to involve ascribing a conditional property, a property corresponding to a conditional statement. This chapter looks at some recent work on the semantics and logic of conditionals, followed by a consideration of Hypotheticalism, Nomism, Neo‐Humeism, and Powerism. It examines directly the question whether Hypotheticalism or Anti‐Hypotheticalism (categoricalism) is correct, and shows how to evaluate counterfactual conditionals. The evaluation of conditionals seems to turn on two sorts of facts about the (...) actual world: the laws of nature, and the true propositions that are co‐tenable with the conditional's antecedent. Strong Hypotheticalists hold that the truths of counterfactual conditionals are fundamental, and that truths about the laws of nature and of powers and dispositions are reducible to them. (shrink)

This chapter considers various views about the precise nature of possible worlds, but each view is compatible with this initial characterization. It considers modality, particularly focusing on metaphysical possibility, necessity, and impossibility, that broadest kind of modality. The chapter offers an example of why one might care about this issue, an example of why the study of modality matters to philosophy more generally. It is plausible that modality is importantly connected to understanding. The chapter focuses on two contrasting views about (...) the nature of possible worlds, Concretism and Abstractionism. The fundamental difference between Concretism and Abstractionism is whether possible worlds are concrete or abstract. Concretism is the view that possible worlds are like parallel universes. Concretism requires Modal Indexicalism and denies Modal Anti‐Indexicalism. The chapter describes the ways that the Concretism carries out its reduction of possibility and actuality. (shrink)

This chapter examines questions having to do with whether and how things persist through change and how things do so If they do persist. Next, assuming that intrinsic change does take place, the chapter examines two principal views about how things persist through change of intrinsic properties, Substratism and Replacementism. It focuses on the specific but very important case of motion, or change of location. There are three major theories: Intrinsic Motion; Bertrand Russell's At/At Theory, and an Aristotelian theory (Motion (...) Intervalism). The chapter also considers the problem of the persistence of composite objects, including objects that can gain or lose parts. Replacementists might consider taking on board a metaphysically fundamental genidentity relation. Substratists have an explanation for the reflexivity, symmetry, and transitivity of genidentity, something that Classical Genidentity Theorists have to posit as a brute metaphysical necessity. This provides the Substatists with an advantage in terms of Ockham's Razor. (shrink)

This chapter focuses mainly on how possible worlds relate to the truth and falsity of modal claims (or propositions), and therefore to whether claims are necessarily true, necessarily false, possibly true, possibly false, and so on. This issue is that of modality de dicto, modality concerning propositions. But there is another type of modality, namely modality de re. This has to do with the modal status of relations between things and their properties, with whether things possess properties necessarily, contingently or (...) not even possibly. This chapter introduces the distinction between de dicto and de re necessity, and then explores different ways of making sense of de re necessity‐necessities involving particular individuals. It talks about Strong Transworld Identity, and explores how Abstractionists respond to the Leibniz's Law argument. Some metaphysicians go farther and identify what is possible with what is conceivable, or perhaps with what we are justified in believing to be possible. (shrink)

An appeal to ontological parsimony or economy plays an important, perhaps indispensable, role in evaluating metaphysical theories. This chapter focuses primarily on the first conception of grounding, grounding as metaphysical explanation. It briefly discusses the relation of ontological dependency and its connections with grounding as explanation. Debates about grounding are a recurring theme in the history of Western philosophy. Much of Aristotle's metaphysical method also presupposes the existence of a grounding relation. The chapter investigates both conceptual and ontological grounding and (...) explores the relationship between grounding and truthmaking. The chapter considers various alternatives or competitors to grounding theory. It examines the connection between grounding, fundamentally, and Ockham's Razor and also relation between grounding and ontological dependence. The chapter shows how grounding is different from causal explanation and discusses connections between grounding and entailment. (shrink)

This chapter examines the problem of unity and considers how it is possible for one thing to exist in and through a plurality of parts or phases. It begins with a general discussion of the existence of composite things. The chapter considers the view that composite entities are always an 'ontological free lunch', things that can be freely posited without incurring any cost in relation to ontological economy or Ockham's Razor. It looks at the issue of causal redundancy, a consideration (...) which suggests that positing composite entities as fundamental things is in fact quite costly, something to be undertaken only with strong reasons. The chapter examines three candidates for fundamental composite entities: heaps, artifacts, and organisms. It considers question of which sorts of composite things exist at all, whether fundamentally or derivatively. This involves a search for an intelligible principle of composition. (shrink)

The first way that a discussion of truth gets one going in metaphysics is via its connection to propositions. Philosophers have taken a number of views about the true nature of propositions. The early part of the twentieth century saw a strong reaction against holism, led prominently by Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein. This chapter considers why we should believe in Classical Truthmaker Theory in the first place, as well as a fundamental challenge to the very foundation of truthmaker theory: (...) the deflationary theory of truth. The simplest, most natural understanding of Truthmaker Theory is the view that every truth has a truthmaker. This is 'Truthmaker Maximalism'. One of the fundamental motivations for truthmaker theory of any form is, as we have seen, the Correspondence Theory of Truth. Importantly, deflationists are anti‐realists only about one thing: the existence of a real property of truth. (shrink)

This chapter covers number of Abstractionist views of modality. It considers three ways that Abstractionists might account for how possible worlds represent possibilities, rather than in terms of the categorial nature of worlds. First, there is Magical Abstractionism, according to which that question has no informative answer. Second, there is Linguistic Abstractionism, according to which possible worlds represent in the way that languages do. And finally, there is Pictorial Abstractionism, according to which possible worlds represent in the way that pictures (...) do. Pictorial Abstractionists might respond by trying to identify a feature that Concretist worlds have that their worlds don't, or vice versa. One way for something to be possible is for actual things to have the power to make it so. Since the notion of power is central to Aristotelian Modality, we get sub‐varieties of the view depending on one's metaphysical account of powers. (shrink)

Laws of nature are merely expressions of the powers possessed by various kinds of things, and counterfactual conditionals are grounded in the powers and tendencies of the entities involved in the counterfactual supposition together with their counterfactual surroundings. There are two versions of Strong Powerism. One takes the truthmakers for causal laws to be universals (a 'Realist' version). The second takes the truthmakers for causal laws to be the particulars that fall under the laws (a 'Nominalist' version). This chapter focuses (...) on how Powerism compares to other views about the laws. Neo‐Humeism has the leanest metaphysical theory, since its class of fundamental truths includes no conditionals, laws of nature or attributions of power. Metaphysically, Nomism is burdened with a large number of brute necessities, linking laws with actual patterns of particular fact. The chapter talks about the causal theory of properties: causal structuralism. (shrink)

This chapter takes up issues to do with Peter van Inwagen's (1990a) general composition question: what is it for one thing to be a part of another? The chapter begins with some background to do with formal mereology, the study of parts and wholes. In discussing the metaphysics of parts and wholes, it is helpful to have some specialized vocabulary, as well as a well thought‐out mathematical model of a very broad, inclusive theory. The theory of mereology, proposed by the (...) logician Stanislaw Lesniewski and introduced to the widerworld by Goodman and Leonard in an article in the Journal of Symbolic Logic, provides that vocabulary and such a model. These mereologists proposed some basic axioms for the part‐whole relation. Alternatively, the Composition as Identity (CAI) theorist could try to build transitivity into their definition of the part‐whole relation. Finally, the chapter provides some answers to the General Composition Question and considers whether those answers can supply a ground for the correct principles of mereology. (shrink)

This chapter considers the possibility of Nihilism, that nothing exists, and its alternative, Aliquidism, that something exists. This will lead us into an investigation of the point of positing existing things. The chapter looks at the debate between Monists, who believe in only one thing, and Pluralists, who believe in many. It also considers both radical and more moderate forms of both Nihilism and Monism, including, for example, Priority Monism. The chapter examines four arguments for Monism: those of Parmenides, Spinoza, (...) Bradley, and Jonathan Schaffer. Parmenides of Elea authored a single work, a poem traditionally titled On Nature. In the first part of this poem, Parmenides seems to be arguing for Monism. Baruch Spinoza offered a set of metaphysical arguments that could be interpreted as attempting to show that only one thing exists. The chapter considers the import of Bradley's Regress for Constituent Realism, UPRealism combined with Constituent Ontology. (shrink)

There are a number of different versions of Reductive Nominalism, versions distinguished by the way in which each accounts for facts about having and sharing properties. This chapter discusses three broad varieties of Reductive Nominalism: Predicate Nominalism, Class Nominalism, and Resemblance Nominalism. Class Nominalism identifies properties with classes or sets. Resemblance Nominalists come in two sub‐varieties, depending on whether they take the resemblance relation to hold between particular properties (called 'tropes') or particular things that have properties (ordinary particulars). Trope Theory (...) comes in two varieties depending on whether one plumps for universals. It should not be difficult to see that Extreme Resemblance Nominalism is faced with Class Nominalism's extensionality problems, both the problem of contingent predication and the co‐extensive property problem. Resemblance Nominalists can reply by insisting on a distinction between a priori or conceptual equivalence and metaphysical equivalence. The chapter focuses on the extensionality problems for Class Nominalism. (shrink)

The nature of causation has been one of the central questions of metaphysics since ancient times. This chapter looks at the arguments for Causal Anti‐Realism. Causation requires necessary connections between separate existences. David Hume argued that the ordinary conception of causation involves the separateness of the cause and effect. Hume had a further, closely related argument against the reality of causation. Authors' idea of causation is merely a confusion of several distinct concepts, namely, the concepts of regular succession and contiguity (...) among events, and the concept of a felt propensity on their own part to infer one thing from another. There are four objections to Universal Causation, one assuming Mereological Universalism, a second employing a pluralized version of Universal Causation, a third involving a chain principle, and a fourth including an argument against infinite causal regresses. (shrink)

Causal connectionists need to provide an account of causal linkage and of causal direction. This chapter distinguishes between two kinds of causal connection, namely, discrete and continuous. Causal connectionists have a number of options for explaining the linkage between causes and effects in the case of discrete causation. The chapter provides some popular options. If some causation is discrete, and the exercise of causal powers provides a direction to discrete causation, then the causal direction of processes can be derived from (...) the causal direction of discrete interaction. David Hume famously made the claim about the knowledge of causation in his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Hume offers, in defense of his principle, a set of thought‐experiments that seem to show that we can always imagine any event's having a different result from the one we in fact observe. Causal processes like locomotion may provide counterexamples to Hume's Epistemic Principle. (shrink)

This chapter examines arguments in favor of Tensism. These arguments fall into two main categories. First, there are those arguments, like the Thank Goodness argument, our experience of the flow of time, and the reality of intrinsic change, that appeal to how time appears to us in our ordinary, everyday experience. Metaphysicians must take such data seriously if they are not to embrace a global skepticism about the world of appearances. Second, there are arguments that presuppose a particular conception of (...) time and of the nature of power. A tensed proposition is a proposition that can have different truth‐values at different times. Those who embrace Powerism and an Aristotelian views about time have several good arguments for embracing Tensism, namely, the threat of fatalism, the impossibility of time travel, and the present as an actual boundary between past and present. (shrink)

This chapter looks at six arguments against Tensism. They are, equivalently, arguments for Anti‐Tensism. The arguments are of three basic kinds: those that argue that Tensism is incoherent or mysterious, those that argue that it is in irresolvable conflict with modern science, and those that fault Tensism for its unexplainable or brute necessities. The chapter considers the objection that Tensism cannot sensibly account for the rate of the flow of time. It shows in which a variety of objections based on (...) Truthmaker Theory are lodged against various versions of Tensism. The chapter looks at science, especially Einstein's theory of relativity, as the basis for an argument against Tensism. It concerns additional philosophical objections to Tensism and then considers epistemological problems for Tensism; and McTaggart's argument that Tensism is self‐contradictory. The chapter explores the number of brute necessities for which Tensism can provide no simple explanation. (shrink)

This chapter explores whether causation is a relation between things, like being next to or being taller than, or it is something else entirely. It considers two ways of thinking about causation. The chapter considers it as a real relation, the relation of causal connection, between things or events, or as a logical relation, the relation of causal explanation, among truths. For metaphysicians, the crucial question is whether causal connection or causal explanation is more fundamental. There are two major objections (...) to all three versions of Causal Explanationism: the problem of causal linkage and the problem of the direction or asymmetry of causation. Causal Connectionists posit a category of thing, events (or states or conditions), members of which stand in the fundamental relation of causation. The weightiest objection to Causal Connectionism concerns the phenomenon of negative causation. Causal Connectionism entails that causation is always a matter of some real relation between things. (shrink)

This chapter discusses four packages, including Ludovician, Aristotelian, Fortibracchian, and Quietist. There are two quite coherent packages of answers to the some issues: a neo‐Humeist or Ludovician package, and a neo‐Aristotelian package. Ludovicians put little weight on common sense beliefs, especially when they are embedded in ethical and legal practices, and they do not rely heavily on the "manifest image of the world". Aristotelians rely more heavily on the semantic intuition about what could possibly be the truthmakers for familiar kinds (...) of claims, including those involving tense and modality. This chapter lists the Aristotelian package as including Meinongianism, ontological vagueness, and Tensism on the passage of time. Fortibracchians are very similar in methodology to Ludovicains. In practice, Fortibracchians give more weight to a kind of naive realism with respect to scientific theory than do Ludovicians. (shrink)

This chapter considers three substantivalist theories, namely, the theory of spatial qualities, spatial monism, and body‐space dualism, and two relationist theories, namely, Aristotelian relationism and modern relationism. Spatial Substantivalism comes in two forms, depending on whether places are properties or not. Assuming that places are properties amounts to the theory of spatial qualities; the alternative version of substantivalism is spatial particularism. Spatial particularism in turn comes in two forms, body‐space dualism and spatial monism. Spatial relationists also come in two forms, (...) Aristotelian and modern. modern relationists believe that the fundamental spatial relation is the distance between dimensionless point‐masses. Aristotelian Relationists take the fundamental spatial properties to be volume and shape, and the only fundamental spatial relation to be contiguity. A critical difference between spatial substantivalists and spatial relationists concerns their treatments of empty space. (shrink)

This introduction provides an overview of the key concepts discussed in the following chapters of this book. The book begins with a short history of metaphysics, and discusses some reasons why metaphysics matters. The practice of metaphysics is controversial within philosophy itself. This controversy stems from two primary sources: skepticism and pragmatism. The book introduces the two notions of truthmaking and of grounding, ideas that lie at the heart of a significant number of metaphysical projects. It develops an account of (...) dispositions: conditionals, laws of nature, and intrinsic powers. Th book examines the alternative view of Nominalism, according to which everything real is particular and unshareable, including the form of Nominalism that posits individualized properties or tropes. It also considers whether space is a thing in its own right or whether it consists merely in the holding of spatial relations between bodies. (shrink)

This chapter examines four special problems involving properties whether universals or tropes. It looks at various accounts of relational facts, facts that involve properties relating two or more particulars. The chapter examines an important special case of relational facts: those that involve nonsymmetric or ordering relations. It focuses on structural properties, those relational properties that enable many things to form a single structure, like a group or a team. Finally, it considers the problem of measurable quantities. Monadism is the view (...) that all relational truths are grounded in the intrinsic character of substances taken individually. The most difficult problem for Leibniz's version of Monadism is giving a full and adequate theory of monadic representation. A monad's representing the world as being a certain way must consist of a set of intrinsic mental acts. The chapter surveys the various metaphysical options for Anti‐Monadism, and considers the most difficult test case: that of non‐symmetric relations. (shrink)

This chapter examines whether space and extended bodies are ultimately composed of points (and point‐masses) or spatial regions (and voluminous bodies). It focuses on three positions: Pointillism, according to which only points and point‐sized bodies are fundamental; Voluminism, according to which the only fundamental things are regions and voluminous bodies; and Volume‐Boundary Dualism, according to which both points and regions really exist and are equally fundamental. The first prima facie problem for Voluminism concerns continuous variation. The chapter looks at the (...) idea of constructing points from regions and concerns whether points or regions are fundamental. It lays out three arguments against Pointillism, the thesis that points are the only fundamental entities, namely, the arguments from Finitism, from mathematical paradoxes, and from the nature of contact. Aristotelian Finitists can explain why some sets of points have measurable volume and why some do not. (shrink)