A Dual-Component View of Propositional Grasping

Erkenntnis 79 (3):511-522 (2014)
Abstract
On a traditional or default view of the grasping or understanding of a singular proposition by an individual, it is assumed to be a unitary or holistic activity. However, naturalistic views of cognition plausibly could analyze propositional thinking in terms of more than one distinctive functional stage of cognitive processing, suggesting at least the potential legitimacy of a non-unitary analysis of propositional grasping. We outline a novel dual-component view of this kind, and show that it is well supported by current cognitive science research.
Keywords Dual-component theories of propositional structure  The nonconceptual content of perception  Perceptual categorization versus object recognition  Propositional grasping
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-013-9520-x
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The Language of Thought.Jerry A. Fodor - 1975 - Harvard University Press.

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