Abstract
In several papers, Hubert Dreyfus has used chess as a paradigmatic example of how experts act intuitively, rarely using deliberation when selecting actions, while individuals that are only competent rely on analytic and deliberative thought. By contrast, Montero and Evans (Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10:175–194, 2011 ) argue that intuitive aspects of chess are actually rational, in the sense that actions can be justified. In this paper, I show that both Dreyfus’s and Montero and Evans’s views are too extreme, and that expertise in chess, and presumably in other domains, depends on a combination of intuitive thinking and deliberative search, both mediated by perceptual processes. There is more to expertise than just rational thought. I further contend that both sides ignore emotions, which are important in acquiring and maintaining expertise. Finally, I argue that experimental data and first-person data, which are sometimes presented as irreconcilable in the phenomenology literature, actually lead to similar conclusions.
Keywords Action  Chess  Deliberation  Expertise  Hubert Dreyfus  Intuition  Skill
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DOI 10.1007/s11097-011-9246-7
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References found in this work BETA

Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 141:125-126.
The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1950 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 1 (4):328-332.

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Citations of this work BETA

Skilled Action.Wayne Christensen - 2019 - Philosophy Compass 14 (11).
Chess, Imagination, and Perceptual Understanding.Paul Coates - 2013 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 73:211-242.

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