Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):237-250 (2012)
In several papers, Hubert Dreyfus has used chess as a paradigmatic example of how experts act intuitively, rarely using deliberation when selecting actions, while individuals that are only competent rely on analytic and deliberative thought. By contrast, Montero and Evans (Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10:175–194, 2011 ) argue that intuitive aspects of chess are actually rational, in the sense that actions can be justified. In this paper, I show that both Dreyfus’s and Montero and Evans’s views are too extreme, and that expertise in chess, and presumably in other domains, depends on a combination of intuitive thinking and deliberative search, both mediated by perceptual processes. There is more to expertise than just rational thought. I further contend that both sides ignore emotions, which are important in acquiring and maintaining expertise. Finally, I argue that experimental data and first-person data, which are sometimes presented as irreconcilable in the phenomenology literature, actually lead to similar conclusions.
|Keywords||Action Chess Deliberation Expertise Hubert Dreyfus Intuition Skill|
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References found in this work BETA
Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes.Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy D. Wilson - 1977 - Psychological Review 84 (3):231-59.
The Return of the Myth of the Mental.Hubert L. Dreyfus - 2007 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 50 (4):352 – 365.
What Myth?John Mcdowell - 2007 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 50 (4):338 – 351.
Citations of this work BETA
Chess, Imagination, and Perceptual Understanding.Paul Coates - 2013 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 73:211-242.
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