Acting for reasons, apt action, and knowledge

Synthese 190 (17):3865-3888 (2013)
Authors
Susanne Mantel
Universität des Saarlandes
Abstract
I argue for the view that there are important similarities between knowledge and acting for a normative reason. I interpret acting for a normative reason in terms of Sosa’s notion of an apt performance. Actions that are done for a normative reason are normatively apt actions. They are in accordance with a normative reason because of a competence to act in accordance with normative reasons. I argue that, if Sosa’s account of knowledge as apt belief is correct, this means that acting for a normative reason is in many respects similar to knowledge. In order to strengthen Sosa’s account of knowledge, I propose to supplement it with an appeal to sub-competences. This clarifies how this account can deal with certain Gettier cases, and it helps to understand how exactly acting for a normative reason is similar to apt belief
Keywords Acting for reasons  Acting for a normative reason  Gettier problem  Knowledge  Apt belief  Normative reasons  Explanation  Competence   Virtue epistemology  Apt action
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-012-0230-8
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.

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