Logos and Episteme 8 (2):195-206 (2017)

Authors
John Biro
University of Florida
Fabio Lampert
University of California, Irvine
Abstract
Richard Feldman’s well-known principle about disagreement and evidence – usually encapsulated in the slogan, ‘evidence of evidence is evidence’, (EEE) – invites the question, what should a rational believer do when faced by such evidence, especially when the disagreement is with an epistemic peer? The question has been the subject of much controversy. However, it has been recently suggested both that the principle is subject to counterexamples and that it is trivial. If either is the case, the question of what to do in the face of evidence of evi- dence becomes less pressing. We contend that even if one or the other of these suggestions is right about (EEE) as a general principle about evidence, they leave it untouched insofar as it plays a role in the debates about the rational way to respond to disagreement and, in particular, to disagreement by an epistemic peer. This is because in such cases the evidence about which one has evidence and which is supposed to provide evidence against one's belief is the mere fact of someone’s disagreeing, rather than something that is related to the content of the proposition about which the parties disagree. We go on to argue that, so understood, the principle is false.
Keywords Peer Disagreement  Evidence  Richard Feldman  Reasons  Epistemology  Evidentialism  Social Epistemology  Disagreement
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2017
ISBN(s) 2069-0533
DOI 10.5840/logos-episteme20178216
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 51,304
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Reflection and Disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.
The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement.Thomas Kelly - 2005 - In John Hawthorne & Tamar Gendler (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Volume 1. Oxford University Press. pp. 167-196.

View all 10 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Disagreement.Jonathan Matheson & Bryan Frances - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Evidence of Evidence is Evidence.Juan Comesaña & Eyal Tal - 2015 - Analysis 75 (4):557-559.
Tal and Comesaña on Evidence of Evidence.Luca Moretti - 2016 - The Reasoner 10 (5):38-39.
Uniqueness Revisited.Igor Douven - 2009 - American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (4):347 - 361.
Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2010 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. Oxford University Press. pp. 183--217.
Higher Order Evidence.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):185-215.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2017-06-09

Total views
43 ( #218,609 of 2,330,100 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #254,915 of 2,330,100 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes