- New
-
Topics
- All Categories
- Metaphysics and Epistemology
- Value Theory
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Logic and Philosophy of Logic
- Philosophy of Biology
- Philosophy of Cognitive Science
- Philosophy of Computing and Information
- Philosophy of Mathematics
- Philosophy of Physical Science
- Philosophy of Social Science
- Philosophy of Probability
- General Philosophy of Science
- Philosophy of Science, Misc
- History of Western Philosophy
- Philosophical Traditions
- Philosophy, Misc
- Other Academic Areas
- Journals
- Submit material
- More
Painless pain: Property dualism and the causal role of phenomenal consciousness
American Philosophical Quarterly 37 (1):51-64 (2000)
Abstract
This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)Author's Profile
My notes
Similar books and articles
Do pains make a difference to our behavior?William S. Robinson - 1979 - American Philosophical Quarterly 16 (4):327-34.
Metaphysics of consciousness, and David Chalmers's property dualism.Chhanda Chakraborti - 2002 - Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 19 (2):59-84.
On the psycho-physical identity theory.Jaegwon Kim - 1966 - American Philosophical Quarterly 3 (3):227-35.
Property dualism, phenomenal concepts, and the semantic premise.Stephen L. White - 2006 - In Torin Andrew Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. New York, US: Oxford University Press. pp. 210-248.
Emergentism and consciousness: Going beyond property dualism.Charles Taliaferro - 2001 - In Soul, Body, and Survival: Essays on the Metaphysics of Human Persons. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Analytics
Added to PP
2009-01-28
Downloads
85 (#194,206)
6 months
4 (#1,004,582)
2009-01-28
Downloads
85 (#194,206)
6 months
4 (#1,004,582)
Historical graph of downloads
Author's Profile
Citations of this work
Measuring the mental.Michael Pauen & John-Dylan Haynes - 2021 - Consciousness and Cognition 90:103106.
Physical-Effect Epiphenomenalism and Common Underlying Causes.Dwayne Moore - 2012 - Dialogue 51 (3):397-418.
Consciousness regained? Philosophical arguments for and against reductive physicalism.Thomas Sturm - 2012 - Dialogues in Clinical Neuroscience 14 (1):55-63.
Will Science and Consciousness Ever Meat? Complexity, Symmetry and Qualia.Roger Vergauwen - 2010 - Symmetry 2 (3):1250-1269.
PhilPapers logo by Andrea Andrews and Meghan Driscoll.
This site uses cookies and Google Analytics (see our terms & conditions for details regarding the privacy implications). Use of this site is subject to terms & conditions.
All rights reserved by The PhilPapers Foundation
Server: philpapers-web-6686886f5-xdvnm uwo