Analysis 80 (1):66-76 (2020)

Authors
Thomas Raleigh
University of Luxembourg
Abstract
Barnett provides an interesting new challenge for Dogmatist accounts of perceptual justification. The challenge is that such accounts, by accepting that a perceptual experience can provide a distinctive kind of boost to one’s credences, would lead to a form of diachronic irrationality in cases where one has already learnt in advance that one will have such an experience. I show that this challenge rests on a misleading feature of using the 0–1 interval to express probabilities and show that if we switch to using Odds or Log-Odds, the misleading appearance that there is only ‘a little room’ for one’s credences to increase evaporates. Moreover, there are familiar, independent reasons for taking the Log-Odds scale to provide a clearer picture of the confirmatory effect of evidence. Thus the Dogmatist can after all escape the charge of diachronic irrationality.
Keywords Epistemology  Dogmatism  Reflection  Perceptual Justification  Bayesian Updating  Perceptual Experience  Measure Sensitivity  Formal Epistemology  Perceptual Experience
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DOI 10.1093/analys/anz035
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References found in this work BETA

Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
The Skeptic and the Dogmatist.James Pryor - 2000 - Noûs 34 (4):517–549.
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Epistemological Disjunctivism.Duncan Pritchard - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
Mind and World.John Mcdowell - 1996 - Philosophical Quarterly 46 (182):99-109.

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