Accidentally factive mental states

Abstract
Knowledge is standardly taken to be belief that is both true and justified (and perhaps meets other conditions as well). Timothy Williamson rejects the standard epistemology for its inability to solve the Gettier problem. The moral of this failure, he argues, is that knowledge does not factor into a combination that includes a mental state (belief) and an external condition (truth), but is itself a type of mental state. Knowledge is, according to his preferred account, the most general factive mental state. I argue, however, that Gettier cases pose a serious problem for Williamson’s epistemology: in these cases, thesubject may have a factive mental state that fails to be cognitive. Hence, knowledge cannot be the most general factive mental state.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy of Mind
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ISBN(s) 0031-8205
DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2005.tb00434.x
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References found in this work BETA
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?Edmund Gettier - 1963 - Analysis 23 (6):121-123.
Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge.Alvin Goldman - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (November):771-791.
Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge.John McDowell - 1982 - Proceedings of the British Academy 68:455-79.
The Analysis of Knowing: A Decade of Research.Robert K. Shope - 1983 - Princeton: New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Does Perceiving Entail Knowing?John Turri - 2010 - Theoria 76 (3):197-206.
Fallibilism.Baron Reed - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (9):585-596.
A New Argument for Skepticism.Baron Reed - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 142 (1):91 - 104.

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Gettier and Factivity in Indo-Tibetan Epistemology.Jonathan Stoltz - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (228):394–415.

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