Noûs 54 (4):839-866 (2020)

Authors
Blake Roeber
University of Notre Dame
Abstract
Is knowledge consistent with literally any credence in the relevant proposition, including credence 0? Of course not. But is credence 0 the only credence in p that entails that you don’t know that p? Knowledge entails belief (most epistemologists think), and it’s impossible to believe that p while having credence 0 in p. Is it true that, for every value of ‘x,’ if it’s impossible to know that p while having credence x in p, this is simply because it’s impossible to believe that p while having credence x in p? If so, is it possible to believe that p while having (say) credence 0.4 in p? These questions aren’t standard epistemological fare, at least in part because many epistemologists think their answers are obvious, but they have unanticipated consequences for epistemology. Let ‘improbabilism’ name the thesis that it’s possible to know that p while having a credence in p below 0.5. Improbabilism will strike many epistemologists as absurd, but careful reflection on these questions reveals that, if improbabilism is false, then all of the most plausible theories of knowledge are also false. Or so I argue in this paper. Since improbabilism is widely rejected by epistemologists (at least implicitly), this paper reveals a tension between all of the most plausible theories of knowledge and a widespread assumption in epistemology.
Keywords knowledge, credence, belief
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/nous.12280
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Knowing Full Well.Ernest Sosa - 2010 - Princeton University Press.
Betting on Theories.Patrick Maher - 1993 - Cambridge University Press.

View all 32 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Epistemic Akrasia and Belief-Credence Dualism.Elizabeth Jackson & Peter Tan - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
On the Independence of Belief and Credence.Elizabeth Jackson - forthcoming - Philosophical Perspectives.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

When Does Falsehood Preclude Knowledge?Neil Feit & Andrew Cullison - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (3):283-304.
When Does Falsehood Preclude Knowledge?Andrew Cullison Neil Feit - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (3):283-304.
Knowledge Despite Falsehood.Martin Montminy - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (3-4):463-475.
Defending the Tracking Theories of Knowledge.Fred Adams & Murray Clarke - 2007 - The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 6:3-8.
Husker Du?Fred Adams - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (1):81-94.
Defending the Tracking Theories of Knowledge.Fred Adams & Murray Clarke - 2007 - The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 6:3-8.
Knowledge Essentially Based Upon False Belief.Avram Hiller - 2013 - Logos and Episteme 4 (1):7-19.
Possibly False Knowledge.Alex Worsnip - 2015 - Journal of Philosophy 112 (5):225-246.
The Aviary Simile in the Theaetetus.H. D. P. Lee - 1939 - Classical Quarterly 33 (3-4):208-211.
The Aviary Simile in the Theaetetus.H. D. P. Lee - 1939 - Classical Quarterly 33 (3-4):208-.
Reasons, Knowledge, and Probability.Fred I. Dretske - 1971 - Philosophy of Science 38 (2):216-220.
C. I. Lewis.Susan Haack - 1985 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures 19:215-238.
Knowing How to Establish Intellectualism.Daniele Sgaravatti & Elia Zardini - 2008 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 77 (1):217-261.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2019-03-06

Total views
175 ( #57,215 of 2,432,200 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
26 ( #30,246 of 2,432,200 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes