Philosophy and Technology 34 (4):1057-1084 (2021)

Abstract
The notion of “responsibility gap” with artificial intelligence was originally introduced in the philosophical debate to indicate the concern that “learning automata” may make more difficult or impossible to attribute moral culpability to persons for untoward events. Building on literature in moral and legal philosophy, and ethics of technology, the paper proposes a broader and more comprehensive analysis of the responsibility gap. The responsibility gap, it is argued, is not one problem but a set of at least four interconnected problems – gaps in culpability, moral and public accountability, active responsibility—caused by different sources, some technical, other organisational, legal, ethical, and societal. Responsibility gaps may also happen with non-learning systems. The paper clarifies which aspect of AI may cause which gap in which form of responsibility, and why each of these gaps matter. It proposes a critical review of partial and non-satisfactory attempts to address the responsibility gap: those which present it as a new and intractable problem, those which dismiss it as a false problem, and those which reduce it to only one of its dimensions or sources and/or present it as a problem that can be solved by simply introducing new technical and/or legal tools. The paper also outlines a more comprehensive approach to address the responsibility gaps with AI in their entirety, based on the idea of designing socio-technical systems for “meaningful human control", that is systems aligned with the relevant human reasons and capacities.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s13347-021-00450-x
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 72,607
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1962 - Proceedings of the British Academy 48:187-211.
Living Without Free Will.Derk Pereboom - 2001 - Cambridge University Press.

View all 40 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Tragic Choices and the Virtue of Techno-Responsibility Gaps.John Danaher - 2022 - Philosophy and Technology 35 (2):1-26.
Machine Learning and Power Relations.Jonne Maas - forthcoming - AI and Society.

View all 19 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Collective Responsibility Gaps.Stephanie Collins - 2019 - Journal of Business Ethics 154 (4):943-954.
On the Legal Responsibility of Autonomous Machines.Bartosz Brożek & Marek Jakubiec - 2017 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 25 (3):293-304.
Responsibility for Killer Robots.Johannes Himmelreich - 2019 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (3):731-747.
Responsibility.Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred Dycus Miller & Jeffrey Paul (eds.) - 1999 - Cambridge University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2021-05-14

Total views
62 ( #187,839 of 2,533,661 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
29 ( #31,056 of 2,533,661 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes