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Friderik Klampfer
University of Maribor
  1. Moral Thought-Experiments, Intuitions, and Heuristics.Friderik Klampfer - 2018 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 18 (1):133-160.
    Philosophical thought-experimentation has a long and influential history. In recent years, however, both the traditionally secure place of the method of thought experimentation in philosophy and its presumed epistemic credentials have been increasingly and repeatedly questioned. In the paper, I join the choir of the discontents. I present and discuss two types of evidence that in my opinion undermine our close-to-blind trust in moral thought experiments and the intuitions that these elicit: the disappointing record of thought-experimentation in contemporary moral philosophy, (...)
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  2. The False Promise of Thought Experimentation in Moral and Political Philosophy.Friderik Klampfer - 2017 - In Borstner Bojan & Gartner Smiljana (ed.), Thought Experiments between Nature and Society. A Festschrift for Nenad Miščević. Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. pp. 328-348.
    Prof. Miščević has long been an ardent defender of the use of thought experiments in philosophy, foremost metaphysics, epistemology and philosophy of mind. Recently he has, in his typically sophisticated manner, extended his general account of philosophical thought-experimenting to the domain of normative politics. Not only can the history of political philosophy be better understood and appreciated, according to Miščević, when seen as a more or less continuous, yet covert, practice of thought-experimenting, the very progress of the discipline may crucially (...)
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  3. Should we Consult Kant when Assessing Agent’s Moral Responsibility for Harm?Friderik Klampfer - 2009 - Balkan Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):131-156.
    The paper focuses on the conditions under which an agent can be justifiably held responsible or liable for the harmful consequences of his or her actions. Kant has famously argued that as long as the agent fulfills his or her moral duty, he or she cannot be blamed for any potential harm that might result from his or her action, no matter how foreseeable these may (have) be(en). I call this the Duty-Absolves-Thesis or DA. I begin by stating the thesis (...)
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  4. Consequentializing Moral Responsibility.Friderik Klampfer - 2014 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy (40):121-150.
    In the paper, I try to cast some doubt on traditional attempts to define, or explicate, moral responsibility in terms of deserved praise and blame. Desert-based accounts of moral responsibility, though no doubt more faithful to our ordinary notion of moral responsibility, tend to run into trouble in the face of challenges posed by a deterministic picture of the world on the one hand and the impact of moral luck on human action on the other. Besides, grounding responsibility in desert (...)
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  5. Euthanasia Laws, Slippery Slopes, and (Un)reasonable Precaution.Friderik Klampfer - 2019 - Prolegomena: Časopis Za Filozofiju 18 (2):121-147.
    The article examines the so-called slippery slope argument (SSA) against the legalization of active voluntary euthanasia (AVE). According to the SSA, by legalizing AVE, the least morally controversial type of euthanasia, we will take the first step onto a slippery slope and inevitably end up in the moral abyss of widespread abuse and violations of the rights of the weakest and most vulnerable patients. In the first part of the paper, empirical evidence to the contrary is presented and analyzed: None (...)
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  6.  90
    Euthanasia Laws, Slippery Slopes, and (Un)reasonable Precaution.Friderik Klampfer - 2019 - Prolegomena: Časopis Za Filozofiju 18 (2):121-147.
    The article examines the so-called slippery slope argument (SSA) against the legalization of active voluntary euthanasia (AVE). According to the SSA, by legalizing AVE, the least morally controversial type of euthanasia, we will take the first step onto a slippery slope and inevitably end up in the moral abyss of widespread abuse and violations of the rights of the weakest and most vulnerable patients. In the first part of the paper, empirical evidence to the contrary is presented and analyzed: None (...)
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  7. Suicide, Euthanasia and Human Dignity.Friderik Klampfer - 2001 - Acta Analytica 16:7-34.
    Kant has famously argued that human beings or persons, in virtue of their capacity for rational and autonomous choice and agency, possess dignity, which is an intrinsic, final, unconditional, inviolable, incomparable and irreplaceable value. This value, wherever found, commands respect and imposes rather strict moral constraints on our deliberations, intentions and actions. This paper deals with the question of whether, as some Kantians have recently argued, certain types of (physician-assisted) suicide and active euthanasia, most notably the intentional destruction of the (...)
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  8.  76
    Moral responsibility for unprevented harm.Friderik Klampfer - 2004 - Acta Analytica 19 (33):119-161.
    That we are morally responsible for what we do willingly and knowingly is a commonplace. That our moral responsibility extends as far as to cover at least the intended consequences of our voluntary actions and perhaps also the ones we did not intend, but could or did foresee, is equally beyond dispute. But what about omissions? Are we, or can we be, (equally) morally responsible for the harm that has occured because we did not prevent it, even though we could (...)
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  9.  28
    Contextualism and Moral Justification: A Discussion of Mark Timmons, Morality Without Foundations: A Defense of Ethical Contextualism.Friderik Klampfer - 2005 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 5 (3):569-582.
    In his insightful and stimulating book Morality Without Foundations: A Defense of Ethical Contextualism, Mark Timmons presents a strong case for embracing contextualism as a vibrant alternative to the two rival accounts that used to dominate moral epistemology in the past, foundationalism and coherentism. His sophisticated version of contextualist moral epistemology comprises of several intriguing and mind-boggling theses: moral beliefs that lack Justification altogether can nevertheless be held in an epistemically responsible way; such unjustified beliefs can provide justification for other (...)
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  10.  34
    Contextualism and Moral Justification: A Discussion of Mark Timmons, Morality Without Foundations: A Defense of Ethical Contextualism.Friderik Klampfer - 2005 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 5 (3):569-582.
    In his insightful and stimulating book Morality Without Foundations: A Defense of Ethical Contextualism, Mark Timmons presents a strong case for embracing contextualism as a vibrant alternative to the two rival accounts that used to dominate moral epistemology in the past, foundationalism and coherentism. His sophisticated version of contextualist moral epistemology (CME) comprises of several intriguing and mind-boggling theses: (i) moral beliefs that lack Justification altogether can nevertheless be held in an epistemically responsible way; (ii) such unjustified beliefs can provide (...)
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