This article criticizes Laura Valentini's criterion for distinguishing good and bad idealizations in normative political theory. I argue that, on an attentive reading of her criterion, all ideal theories she discusses must be written off as incorporating bad idealizations. This fact makes Valentini's criterion trivially implausible, for it is argued that there are good idealizations that succeed in promoting the action-guiding goal of ideal theory. Upon rejecting an attempt to salvage the idealizations that Valentini marks off as bad, I develop (...) an alternative criterion for demarcating good and bad idealizations. The criterion holds that the standing of a theory's idealized assumptions depends on whether the stipulated idealizations can be feasibly realized in the non-ideal world, and thus on whether the principles that the theory generates can be made relevant for real-world practice. I also claim that the feasibility criterion better reflects the function of idealization in promoting action-guidance. Unlike Valentini's criterion, the feasibility criterion yields the result that Rawls' theories of domestic and international justice both incorporate bad idealizations. (shrink)

Locke argues that the consent of market participants to the introduction of money justifies the economic inequalities resulting from monetarization. This paper shows that Locke’s argument fails to justify such inequalities. My critique proceeds in two parts. Regarding the consequences of the consent to money, neo-Lockeans wrongly take consent to justify inequalities in the original appropriation of land. In contrast, I defend the view that consent can only justify inequalities resulting directly from monetized commercial exchange. Secondly, regarding the nature of (...) consent, neo-Lockeans uncritically accept Locke’s account of money as a natural institution. In contrast, I argue that money is an irreducibly political institution and that monetary economies cannot develop in the state of nature. My political account of money has far-reaching implications for the normative analysis of the global monetary system and the justification of the economic inequalities consequent upon it. (shrink)

The development of vaccines against SARS-CoV-2 (COVID-19) presented a unique set of challenges. There was a global need for safe, effective vaccines against a new virus. In response to the development of vaccines for COVID-19 (some of which used novel technologies), there was a proliferation of no-fault compensation schemes (NFCS) for COVID-19 vaccine injuries. We identified 28 national vaccine injury NFCS operating in December 2019. Just 2 years later, over 130 countries had some NFCS coverage for COVID-19 vaccines. This rapid (...) expansion was primarily driven by the creation of three multinational schemes. The COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access (COVAX) scheme covers vaccines given under the COVAX framework in 92 low and middle-income countries across the globe. The African Vaccines Acquisition Trust (AVAT) scheme covers vaccines administered under the AVAT framework in 36 African and Caribbean countries. The UNICEF scheme covers vaccines administered by UNICEF in 18 Asian countries.Because of the sudden expansion of no-fault compensation for vaccine injury, especially in developing economies, more research on the foundations, procedures and outcomes of NFCS is needed. In this article, we examine how these NFCS meet the needs of individual claimants and society more widely. To do so, we first review the rationales offered to support the creation of vaccine injury NFCS. We then argue that, in order to achieve their function as compensation mechanisms, NFCS should be accessible and offer substantive and procedural justice to claimants. Finally, we focus on transparency and accountability as necessary requirements to allow scrutiny over existing NFCS and their wider impacts. (shrink)

The relationship between traumatic life events and increased suicide risk has been well reported in literature. However, the complex nature of suicidality phenomena still hinders our ability to comprehend the mediation mechanism underlying this association. In this study, we examined the mediating role of adult attachment and reflective functioning in the relationship between traumatic life events and suicidal ideation. Nine hundred and fifty Italian adults completed an online survey evaluating traumatic life events, adult attachment, reflective functioning and suicidal ideation. The (...) path analysis showed that the positive relationship between traumatic life events and suicidal ideation was partially mediated by attachment anxiety and reflective functioning. From a clinical point of view, these results support the relevance of evaluating and improving patients’ ability to mentalize as a part of psychotherapeutic intervention aimed at reducing suicidality in people with a history of traumatic experiences and attachment anxiety. (shrink)

Within the philosophy of science there has been a great deal of rather vague talk about the 'heuristic fruitfulness' (or what Peirce called the 'esperable uberty') of theories. It is my aim in the present paper to add some precision to these discussions by linking this 'fruitfulness' to the satisfaction of certain heuristic criteria. In this manner the demarcation between 'discovery' and 'pursuit' becomes blurred. As a case study, I present the competition between the paraparticle and colour models of quarks (...) in the late 1960s. I argue that the eventual appraisal of the latter as the more fruitful of the two was based on the incorporation of a particular symmetry principle, regarded as a heuristic guideline, rather than on non-epistemic factors concerning 'cognitive resources' and the like. (shrink)

Scientific evidence and scientific values under risk and uncertainty are strictly connected from the point of view of Peirce’s pragmaticism. In addition, economy and statistics play a key role in both choosing and testing hypotheses. Hence we may show also the connection between the methodology of the economy of research and statistical frequentism, both originating from pragmaticism. The connection is drawn by the regulative principles of synechism, tychism and uberty. These principles are values that have both epistemic and non-epistemic dimension. (...) They concern both the decisions to test a hypothesis as well as inductive risk. The validity of this result stems from the values cost–benefit analysis imposes on scientific inquiry. Values associated with the economy of research are important not only in the pre-test phases of generating hypotheses but also when hypotheses are effectively tested. Peirce took these economic considerations to leave room for an interpretation of probability which is not only a frequentist and propensity-theoretic but also a conceptualist one referring to degrees of belief. We show that this leeway nonetheless agrees with the theory of the economy of scientific methods. (shrink)

Il fascino di un libro, tra Reuchlin e Bruno. -/- RINASCIMENTO ESOTERICO Speciale V centenario De arte cabalistica (1517-2017) -/- Nella sua rinomata libreria antiquaria, nel cuore di Firenze, Paolo Pampaloni sta sfogliando un grazioso volumetto in ottavo, rilegato in pelle scura. Si tratta di un esemplare del De incertitudine et vanitate scientiarum di Heinrich Cornelius Agrippa von Nettesheim.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Another Look at Flage's Hume Lesley Friedman In recent articles, Daniel Flage (1985a, 1985b) offers an interpretation of Humean memory-ideas as relative ideas: ideas of memory are analogous to definite descriptionsinsofar as they single outexactly one entity.1 Consequently, Flage argues that Hume has provided an adequate distinction between ideas generated by memory and ideas generated by imagination. It is my contention that Flage's reading is neither consonant with Hume's (...) remarks in the Treatise nor successful in reducing the number ofdifficulties with Hume's theory ofmemory. I shall argue that (1) it is not clear that all memory-ideas are complex (an assumption necessary for Flage's interpretation); (2) Flage construes all memory as episodic, but he overlooks semantic memory; and (3) there isa distinction between mis-remembering and imagining which Flage's account cannot accommodate. It is worth noting that Flage contends that he is giving an interpretation ofHume's account ofmemory; he is not simply attempting to find out the truth ofthe matter. That is, Flage's position is that there is good reason to think that Hume construed memory-ideas as relative ideas. Accordingly, Flage must provide evidence, preferably textual, for the claim that Hume held such a view. My position is thatit is unlikely that Hume held such a view, and even if he did, it is inadequate for grounding an external distinction between memory-ideas and imagination-ideas. In short, claiming that Hume was interested in a decisive distinction between ideas ofmemory and ideas ofimagination is to involve Hume in problems with which he was not concerned. Not only are Flage's remarks in conflict with Hume's, but ifwe readhim as Flage suggests, Hume's theory ofmemory becomes considerably more riddled with problems than it is if we do not so read him. Flage and Hume In section 1 of Treatise 1.1, Hume draws his celebrated distinction between ideas and impressions. In the second section he considers impressions in some detail and he does the same for ideas in section three. Following every impression, Hume claims, there is a corresponding idea, either produced by the faculty of memory or the faculty of imagination. He takes it as no less than obvious that memory-ideas are more "lively and strong" than imagination-ideas: Volume XDi Number 1 177 LESLEY FRIEDMAN Tis evident at first sight, that the ideas of the memory are much more lively and strong than those of the imagination, and that the former faculty paints its objects in more distinct colours, than any which are emplo/d by the latter.2 That memory-ideas are more lively than their counterparts in imagination Hume construes as asensible difference between the two. Accordingly, I shall refer to this difference as the internal difference. Thereis,however,another difference betweenthesekinds ofideas, namely, that memory-ideas preserve the order and form of their corresponding simple ideas, while imagination-ideas need not: Tis evident, that the memory preserves the original form, in which its objects were presented, and that where-ever we depart from it in recollecting any thing, it proceeds from some defect or imperfection in that faculty.... The chiefexercise of the memoryis not to preserve the simpleideas, but their order and position.... The same evidence follows us in our second principle, of the Uberty ofthe imagination to transpose andchange its ideas. (T 9-10) I shall refer to the above as the external difference between memory-ideas andimagination-ideas.3 During his discussion ofcausation, Hume elaborates on the above differences. The external difference, he claims, "is not sufficient to... make us know the one from the other; it being impossible to recai the pastimpressions, in order to compare them with our present ideas, and see whether theirarrangementbe exactlysimilar" (T85). He concludes that the difference between memory and imagination is simply that memory-ideas are more forceful and vivacious than imagination-ideas. In short, since the external difference is non-phenomenal, it is inadequate for distinguishing, in practice, between ideas that are the product ofmemory and ideas that are the product of the imagination. Before concluding his discussion of the above differences Hume voices anote ofscepticismconcerningthe internal difference. He argues that theinternal... (shrink)

Addresses the implications of a document found in the Archivio di Stato di Siena which affirms a connection between Farinata degli Uberti, a Florentine conspicuously encountered by Dante the pilgrim in Inferno 10, and the Sienese Ghibellines with whom he and his fellow Florentine Ghibellines joined, in an alliance which produced the Sienese victory at the battle of Montaperti in 1260.

Ridare vita alle ombre esangui del passato”, che torna a vivere nel presente facendosinuovamente “carne e sangue”. Le citazioni di Dilthey e von Wartenburg delimitano ilcampo in cui, per l’Heidegger di Sein und Zeit, si gioca la partita decisiva della storicità delDasein. Per affondare il colpo, egli trova la stoccata vincente nelle frecciate che Nietzschescaglia contro lo storicismo nella seconda delle Considerazioni inattuali – Vom Nutzen undNachtheil der Historie für das Leben –. In lui, Heidegger intravede un autorevole alleato perinstaurare (...) un rapporto autentico con la storia. Essa non dovrà più essere confinata in unpassato museale, tanto grazioso quanto improduttivo per la vita: uscire dalla paralisi dellatradizione vuol dire scrollarsi di dosso il peso del passato e sbloccare il presente e ilfuturo. Solo così l’uomo sarà libero e la storicità recupererà il suo senso più elevato, alservizio della vita. Al di là delle differenze d’intento e di registro ermeneutico-stilistico, laricostruzione di un dialogo a distanza tra i passi di Sein und Zeit e le considerazioninietzscheane offrirà spunti interessanti per pensare alla storia e al suo rapporto, semprein bilico tra il vitale e il patologico, con l’esistenza umana. (shrink)

Peirce’s claims that methodeutic “concerns abduction alone” and that “pragmatism contributes to the security of reasoning but hardly to its uberty” are explained. They match as soon as a third claim is taken into account, namely that “pragmatism is the logic of abduction,” not of deduction or induction. Since methodeutic concerns abduction and not deduction or induction, it follows that pragmatism is a maxim of methodeutic. Then, since pragmatism contributes to the security of reasoning but not to its uberty, it (...) follows that methodeutic contributes to the security of the only reasoning it is concerned with, namely abduction. We then explain two related issues of methodeutic of abduction. First, in addition to the maxim of pragmatism, which suggests how to choose among experimental hypotheses contributing to the security of reasoning, there is the maxim of simplicity, which suggests hypotheses that are preferable for investment and which contributes to uberty of reasoning. Second, a third maxim of abduction is economy, which suggests adopting hypotheses that contribute to the advantageousness of reasoning even when pragmatism and simplicity cease to apply. These three maxims—experientiality for security, simplicity for uberty, and economy for advantageousness—are the bedrocks of Peirce’s methodeutic of abduction. (shrink)

The paper seeks to explain in what sense pragmatism was for Peirce a doctrine of logic. It is argued that pragmatism is a doctrine of logic for Peirce because its maxim, the pragmatic maxim, is a maxim of the methodeutic of abduction, i.e., concerns the method of selecting hypotheses for experimental testing. The paper also connects this idea to Peirce’s 1913 thesis according to which pragmatism contributes to the security but not to the uberty of reasoning. The connection consists in (...) that by excluding hypotheses that cannot be tested, the maxim renders the whole process of reasoning more secure, while any explanatory hypotheses is “uberous” in Peirce’s sense as any other. (shrink)

Resumen: No solo Platón y Aristóteles son recordados en la Firenze comunal. También está Epicuro, que mencionan Dante, Boccaccio y Villani. Pero ¿existió un epicureísmo florentino? En su imaginario viaje de la Commedìa, Dante y Virgilio -con la ayuda divina- logran entrar en la Ciudad de Ditis, donde se encuentran los heréticos. Dentro de sepulcros llenos de fuego, deberían estar los miembros de todas las sectas y también los seguidores de Epicuro, que era conocido a través de Cicerón. En realidad, (...) el poeta pone en evidencia a connotados gibelinos. Habla con Farinata degli Uberti e interviene también el padre de Guido Cavalcanti, al que da una ambigua respuesta que, en mi opinión, es un rayo de esperanza para uno que es tachado de sostener la “opinión de los epicúreos”. Más bien podría ser un averroísta, lo que acomuna a todo un grupo de intelectuales de la época que niegan la inmortalidad del alma.: Not only Plato and Aristotle are remembered in the communal Firenze. Epicurus also, mentioned by Dante, Boccaccio and Villani. But was there a Florentinian Epicureism? In their imaginary trip from the Commedia, Dante and Virgil -with divine help- manage to enter Ditis City, where the heretical are. In tombs full of fire, should be members of all sects and also the followers of Epicurus, who was known through Cicero. In fact, the poet brings out notorious Ghibellines. Talks with Farinata degli Uberti and also intervenes with Guido Cavalcanti's father, to whom gives an ambiguous answer, that is in my opinion, a ray of hope for one that is labeled as support the “Epicureans’ opinion”. Rather, he could be an averroist, which brings together a whole group of intellectuals of the time who deny the immortality of the soul. (shrink)

_Addresses the implications of a document found in the Archivio di Stato di Siena which affirms a connection between Farinata degli Uberti, a Florentine conspicuously encountered by Dante the pilgrim in Inferno 10, and the Sienese Ghibellines with whom he and his fellow Florentine Ghibellines joined, in an alliance which produced the Sienese victory at the battle of Montaperti in 1260._.