Speakers routinely rely on a vast store of fixed and semi-fixed institutionalized utterances. In our mother tongue, we know how to combine pre-patterned phrases, complete semi-fixed expressions, and produce deviant versions for humorous effect. There are analogies with the way traditional folk musicians embellish tunes with a largely fixed structure, and the way jazz musicians improvise, and also with oral traditions in which poets composed or improvised tales during performance by using fixed formulas and formulaic phrases (though without the metrical (...) requirements of Homeric poetry). In written literature, the use of ready-made language was long disparaged as the opposite of creativity, but Barthes describes both speech and literature in general as consisting entirely of transformations of words that have already been set in order, and describes individual style as essentially a citational process, and the transformation of earlier formulae. Formulaic language can be shown to underlie much linguistic creativity. (shrink)

Gadamer insists that we can never abandon our own ‘horizon’ and transpose ourselves into or reconstruct an artist’s historical context, and re-experience a work’s original meaning. Our context-bound values and beliefs, or prejudgments, are a necessary condition for all understanding, but we can become aware of them in the attempt to understand works of art of the past, and achieve a fusion of horizons. But what of contemporary forgeries of artworks from the past, produced by someone sharing our own horizon? (...) Forgers tend to exaggerate the qualities or properties of a work that their generation particularly appreciates. Only when interpreters are able to recognize the forger’s prejudgments, which render his work different from that of the horizon he seeks to imitate, does the true meaning of the forger’s work become apparent, as – famously – in the case of Van Meegeren’s imitations of ‘Vermeers.’ Contemporary forgeries are a good test of whether we are able to recognize our prejudgments. (shrink)

Paul de Man calls for rhetorical reading attentive to the materiality of language and the metaphorical nature of all words and concepts. He insists that tropes are purely cognitive and devoid of any aesthetic function, and describes language as mechanical and non-human. He contests Schiller’s account of aesthetic education, in which the ‘aesthetic state’– enjoyment of beauty or pure aesthetic form – leads man to truth and moral freedom. He links Schiller’s advocacy of pure form with the idea in Kleist’s (...) short story about marionette theatre that human perfection in dance can best be achieved by mechanization and mutilation. Schiller argued that the ideal man is represented by the State; de Man quotes Goebbels on how the statesman is an artist who ‘mechanizes’ the masses and shapes an aesthetic State out of the people, just as artists shape their material. But even though the Nazis aestheticized politics, the essence of fascism remains power rather than language or form. Whether or not the late de Man’s account of the aesthetic is a consequence of his wartime espousal of an implicitly fascist notion of aesthetic totality, the aesthetic is not as inherently dangerous as he describes it. (shrink)

Wittgenstein asserts that aesthetic responses are not causal. They name the objects or targets of feelings rather than their causes, and are not open to experimental revision. One cannot break the object down into distinct components and match particular parts to the response. Changing a work of art produces an entirely new object and a new response; changing so much as a word in a text changes its meaning and effect. But many critics do respond to expressive, affective or connotative (...) aspects of particular words (and contemplate ‘merely’ stylistic changes), and our response to artworks can change even without the work changing, such as when we learn who the author is, or that a painting is a forgery. Critics can identify the targets of their aesthetic responses, which makes their responses causal hypotheses, although these are valid only for the particular critic and the particular occasion, and do not rest on any causal aesthetic norms. (shrink)