This article argues that it is possible to bring the social sciences into evolutionary focus without being committed to a thesis the author calls ontological reductionism, which is a widespread predilection for lower-level explanations. After showing why we should reject ontological reductionism, the author argues that there is a way to construe cultural evolution that does justice to the autonomy of social science explanations. This paves the way for a liberal approach to explanation the author calls explanatory pluralism, which allows (...) for the possibility of explaining cultural phenomena in terms of different evolutionary processes. (shrink)

According to a popular version of the current evolutionary attitude in cognitive science, the mind is a massive aggregate of autonomous innate computational devices, each addressing specific adaptive problems. Our aim in this paper is to show that although this version of the attitude, which we call GOFEP , does not suffer from fatal flaws that would make it incoherent or otherwise conceptually inadequate, it will nevertheless prove unacceptable to most cognitive scientists today. To show this, we raise a common (...) objection to the concept of innateness, not to mount an attack on GOFEP but to study how its proponents have attempted to meet that challenge. The aim of this move is to show that GOFEP cannot face the challenge without, as it were, losing its soul. There is, or so we will argue, something deep at the heart of GOFEP that prevents its proponents from meeting the challenge. (shrink)

Dans ce texte, nous proposons un cadre, qui vise à intégrer les contributions des approches constructionnistes et biologiques dans un domaine précis, celui des maladies mentales. Pour ce faire, nous utiliserons quelques propositions récentes faites par des philosophes de la biologie — plus spécifiquement les idées avancées par les tenants de la « théorie des systèmes développementaux » ainsi que la notion d’« enracinement génératif » .In this paper, we are proposing a framework to integrate the core insights of the (...) constructivist and biological approaches of mental illness. In order to do so, we will use some recent propositions by philosophers of biology, specifically ideas put forth by «developmental system theory» and the notion of «generative entrenchment». (shrink)

The main thesis defended in this dissertation is that culture makes a difference. It is argued that this is so because culture evolves just as species do. It is maintained that if one views culture as an evolving system, then this has some fundamental conceptual, ontological, and explanatory implications. Specifically, construing culture as an evolving system leads one to explain cultural phenomena and behaviors differently from alternative theories. Hence, this thesis is devoted to laying the foundations for a satisfactory theory (...) of cultural evolution. Chapter 1 explains the conditions under which culture can be seen as evolving and attempts to clarify the structure of a theory of cultural evolution. Chapter 2 stresses the kind of explanatory work that a theory of cultural evolution is capable of doing by developing an approach to explanation called explanatory pluralism. Chapter 3 argues that a theory of cultural evolution must include an account of cultural fitness. A multidimensional approach to cultural fitness is put forth and the function and explanatory utility of this approach are stressed. Then chapter 4 addresses the question of whether there is such a thing as cultural selection. It is argued that though culture is no doubt selective, there is not one selection mechanism driving cultural evolution. Rather, it is claimed that the evolution of culture has been the evolution of a multitude of selection mechanisms. Chapter 5 concludes by pointing out another interesting consequence of culture, namely, that it may favor the evolution of altruism and maladaptive traits. (shrink)

Dan Sperber est un anthropologue français dont les travaux sont bien connus dans le monde anglo-saxon. Le livre qu’il nous propose, Explaining Culture: A Naturalistic Approach, réunit quelques-uns de ses meilleurs textes publiés au fil des ans. Il s’agit d’un ensembles d’articles qui doit d’abord être vu comme une contribution à l’épistémologie de l’anthropologie, mais dont les ramifications sont si vastes et les thèmes abordés si divers, qu’elle intéressera à coup sûr les philosophes, psychologues, sociologues et biologistes qui se préoccupent (...) de la culture. (shrink)