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  1.  28
    Cultural Evolution, Reductionism in the Social Sciences, and Explanatory Pluralism.Jean Lachapelle - 2000 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 30 (3):331-361.
    This article argues that it is possible to bring the social sciences into evolutionary focus without being committed to a thesis the author calls ontological reductionism, which is a widespread predilection for lower-level explanations. After showing why we should reject ontological reductionism, the author argues that there is a way to construe cultural evolution that does justice to the autonomy of social science explanations. This paves the way for a liberal approach to explanation the author calls explanatory pluralism, which allows (...)
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  2.  27
    The Electric Meme: A New Theory of How We Think Robert Aunger New York: Free Press, 2002, 392 Pp., $41.00. [REVIEW]Jean Lachapelle, Luc Faucher & Pierre Poirier - 2005 - Dialogue 44 (2):410.
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  3.  10
    French Philosophy of Biology: An Overview. [REVIEW]Jean Lachapelle - 1999 - Metascience 8 (1):92-101.
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  4.  7
    Un Défi Pour La Psychologie Évolutionniste.Pierre Poirier, Luc Faucher & Jean Lachapelle - 2005 - Philosophia Scientiae 2:1-35.
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  5.  20
    Explanation, Causation, and Evolution.Jean Lachapelle - 1997 - Biology and Philosophy 12 (2):243-257.
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  6. Susan Oyama, Paul E. Griffiths, and Russell D. Gray, Eds., Cycles of Contingency Reviewed By.Jean Lachapelle, Luc Faucher & Pierre Poirier - 2003 - Philosophy in Review 23 (3):201-204.
     
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  7.  9
    Explaining Culture: A Naturalistic Approach Dan Sperber Cambridge, MA, Blackwell, 1996, Vii, 175 P.Jean Lachapelle - 1998 - Dialogue 37 (02):419-.
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  8.  3
    La théorie des systèmes développementaux et la construction sociale des maladies mentales.Luc Faucher, Pierre Poirier & Jean Lachapelle - 2006 - Philosophiques 33 (1):147-182.
    Dans ce texte, nous proposons un cadre, qui vise à intégrer les contributions des approches constructionnistes et biologiques dans un domaine précis, celui des maladies mentales. Pour ce faire, nous utiliserons quelques propositions récentes faites par des philosophes de la biologie — plus spécifiquement les idées avancées par les tenants de la « théorie des systèmes développementaux » ainsi que la notion d’« enracinement génératif » .In this paper, we are proposing a framework to integrate the core insights of the (...)
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  9.  5
    The Secret Chain: Evolution and Ethics Michael Bradie Albany, NY, State University of New York Press, 1994, Xi, 198 P.Jean Lachapelle - 1996 - Dialogue 35 (04):839-.
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  10.  1
    Yvon Gauthier, La philosophie des sciences. Une introduction critique, Montréal, Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 1995, 130 p.Yvon Gauthier, La philosophie des sciences. Une introduction critique, Montréal, Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 1995, 130 p. [REVIEW]Jean Lachapelle - 1997 - Philosophiques 24 (1):220-222.
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  11. Culture and Evolutionary Explanations.Jean Lachapelle - 1999 - Dissertation, University of Guelph (Canada)
    The main thesis defended in this dissertation is that culture makes a difference. It is argued that this is so because culture evolves just as species do. It is maintained that if one views culture as an evolving system, then this has some fundamental conceptual, ontological, and explanatory implications. Specifically, construing culture as an evolving system leads one to explain cultural phenomena and behaviors differently from alternative theories. Hence, this thesis is devoted to laying the foundations for a satisfactory theory (...)
     
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  12. Explaining Culture. [REVIEW]Jean LaChapelle - 1998 - Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie 37 (2):419-420.
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  13. Naturalism and Realism: The Best of Both Worlds?Jean Lachapelle - unknown - Eidos: The Canadian Graduate Journal of Philosophy 15.
     
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  14. The Electric Meme. [REVIEW]Jean LaChapelle, Luc Faucher & Pierre Poirier - 2005 - Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie 44 (2):410-412.
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  15. Yvon Gauthier, La philosophie des sciences. Une introduction critique, Montréal, Presses de l’Université de Montréal, 1995, 130 p. [REVIEW]Jean Lachapelle - 1997 - Philosophiques 24:220-222.
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  16. The Concept of Innateness and the Destiny of Evolutionary Psychology.Pierre Poirier, Luc Faucher & Jean Lachapelle - 2008 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 29 (1-2):17-47.
    According to a popular version of the current evolutionary attitude in cognitive science, the mind is a massive aggregate of autonomous innate computational devices, each addressing specific adaptive problems. Our aim in this paper is to show that although this version of the attitude, which we call GOFEP , does not suffer from fatal flaws that would make it incoherent or otherwise conceptually inadequate, it will nevertheless prove unacceptable to most cognitive scientists today. To show this, we raise a common (...)
     
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