This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
About this topic
Summary What is a chair? What is a plant? What is reasoning? What is an emotion? Philosophers are interested in these questions for different reasons. The reason why they were interested in emotions was for a very long time that many of them considered emotions and rationality to be opposites. This is not the case any longer. There exist appraisal theories, narrative theories, cognitive theories, perceptual theories and natural reaction theories about emotions. Correspondingly to the particular theories emotions are reconstructed as evaluative or normative judgments, as desires, beliefs, appraisals, narratives, as perceptions, as an innate disposition, or else they combine one or two of these aspects. Philosophers are interested in emotions nowadays for quite many reasons. The relation between rationality and emotions is one of them, not because they are regarded to be opponents any longer but because of the cognitive role that emotions are thought to have. And then there is a substantial interest in emotions in philosophy of mind. Emotions are considered to be mental states, they are intentionally directed towards a situation or an object and at the same time they seem to be bodily reactions that are caused by something. These aspects make them to be ideal subjects for discussing reductionism and representationism concerning consciousness and phenomenal mental states. But these are not the only areas of interest when it comes to emotions. Their role as values is also much discussed in ethics, namely in value theory, the area of moral philosophy that is concerned with theoretical questions about value and goodness of all varieties. The role of emotions for motivation is eventually discussed in action theory.
Key works Kenny 1963 is an early work on emotions that by some means introduced the subject to analytic philosophy. DE SOUSA 1987 provides a systematic survey of the topic. Griffiths 1997 is combining philosophy of mind and an evolutionary perspective in order to address the neurobiology of emotions and cognitive science. Wollheim 1999 is introducing psychoanalysis and art to the analytic discussions on emotions. Goldie 2000 is presenting an elaborate narrative theory of emotions. These are some of the key works for the analytic tradition but there are also quite eminent ones for the phenomenological tradition among which only the most important one shall be mentioned: Scheler 1973.
Introductions A useful encyclopedia article is de Sousa 2007 The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotions offers an overview of systematic discussions as well as some historical positions. 
Related categories

811 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 811
Material to categorize
  1. Functionalism and the Emotions.Juan R. Loaiza - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:1-34.
    Functionalism as a philosophical position has been recently applied to the case of emotion research. However, a number of objections have been raised against applying such a view to scientific theorizing on emotions. In this article, I argue that functionalism is still a viable strategy for emotion research. To do this, I present functionalism in philosophy of mind and offer a sketch of its application to emotions. I then discuss three recent objections raised against it and respond to each of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. Decostellare. Sul significato ultimo del desiderare: de-Sidera come de-Costellare (2014).Guido Cusinato - 2014 - In G. Cusinato, Periagoge,. Verona VR, Italia: pp. 445.
    il verbo latino «desiderare» deriva dal composto latino della particella de – che può indicare una mancanza oppure un’azione distruttiva – con il termine sidus, sideris, che significa "stella" e il plurale sidera che significa "stelle". Quindi il desiderio non ha a che fare con una singola stella, ma con un insieme di stelle. Perché? Gli antichi collegavano idealmente nel cielo le stelle fino a formare le costellazioni. e queste erano necessarie non solo per orientarsi ad es. nel mare, ma (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. Two Irreducible Classes of Emotional Experiences: Affective Imaginings and Affective Perceptions.Jonathan Mitchell - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.
    A view of prominence in the philosophy of emotion is that emotional experiences are not self-standing intentional experiences. Instead, they inherit the intentional content they have from their cognitive bases. One implication is that emotions whose intentional contents differ in terms of the modal and temporal properties of the relevant particular object – because the intentional contents on which they are based differ in these respects – nonetheless need not differ qua emotion-type. This leads to the same-emotional attitude, different content (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. Core Affect Dynamics: Arousal as a Modulator of Valence.Valentina Petrolini & Marco Viola - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (4):783-801.
    According to several researchers, core affect lies at the foundation of our affective lives and may be characterized as a consciously accessible state combining arousal and valence. The interaction between these two dimensions is still a matter of debate. In this paper we provide a novel hypothesis concerning their interaction, by arguing that subjective arousal levels modulate the experience of a stimulus’ affective quality. All things being equal, the higher the arousal, the more a given stimulus would be experienced as (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. Buddhist Therapies of Emotion and the Psychology of Moral Improvement.Emily McRae - 2015 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 3 (32).
    Buddhist philosophical traditions share the Hellenistic orientation toward therapy, particularly with regard to therapeutic interventions in our emotional life. As Pierre Hadot and Martha Nussbaum have ably argued, for the Hellenistic philosophers, philosophy itself is a therapy of the emotions. In this paper, I shift the focus of the contemporary philosophical literature on therapies of the emotions, which investigates almost exclusively the Hellenistic philosophers, and instead draw on the therapies developed by Tibetan Buddhist philosophers and yogis, in particular Gampopa (1079–1153), (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. Emotion: More Like Action Than Perception.Hichem Naar - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-30.
    Although some still advance reductive accounts of emotions—according to which they fall under a more familiar type of mental state—contemporary philosophers tend to agree that emotions probably constitute their own kind of mental state. Agreeing with this claim, however, is compatible with attempting to find commonalities between emotions and better understood things. According to the advocates of the so-called ‘perceptual analogy’, thinking of emotion in terms of perception can fruitfully advance our understanding even though emotion may not be reducible to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  7. Emotions Inside Out: The Content of Emotions.Christine Tappolet - forthcoming - In Concepts in Thought, Action, and Emotion: New Essays. New York:
    Most of those who hold that emotions involve appraisals also accept that the content of emotions is nonconceptual. The main motivation for nonconceptulism regarding emotions is that it accounts for the difference between emotions and evaluative judgements. This paper argues that if one assumes a broadly Fregean account of concepts, there are good reasons to accept that emotions have nonconceptual contents. All the main arguments for nonconceptualism regarding sensory perception easily transpose to the case of emotions. The paper ends by (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. The Irreducibility of Emotional Phenomenology.Jonathan Mitchell - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85.
    Emotion theory includes attempts to reduce or assimilate emotions to states such as bodily feelings, beliefs-desire combinations, and evaluative judgements. Resistance to such approaches is motivated by the claim that emotions possess a sui generis phenomenology. Uriah Kriegel defends a new form of emotion reductivism which avoids positing irreducible emotional phenomenology by specifying emotions’ phenomenal character in terms of a combination of other phenomenologies. This article argues Kriegel’s approach, and similar proposals, are unsuccessful, since typical emotional experiences are constituted by (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  9. Review of Emotions, Values and Agency, by Christine Tappolet (Oxford University Press 2016). [REVIEW]Jean Moritz Müller - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (280):647-650.
    Emotions, Values and Agency. By Tappolet Christine.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. Emotions and the Problem of Variability.Juan R. Loaiza - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology (2):1-23.
    In the last decades there has been a great controversy about the scientific status of emotion categories. This controversy stems from the idea that emotions are heterogeneous phenomena, which precludes classifying them under a common kind. In this article, I analyze this claim—which I call the Variability Thesis—and argue that as it stands, it is problematically underdefined. To show this, I examine a recent formulation of the thesis as offered by Scarantino (2015). On one hand, I raise some issues regarding (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  11. Relational Imperativism About Affective Valence.Antti Kauppinen - 2021 - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind 1:341-371.
    Affective experiences motivate and rationalize behavior in virtue of feeling good or bad, or their valence. It has become popular to explain such phenomenal character with intentional content. Rejecting evaluativism and extending earlier imperativist accounts of pain, I argue that when experiences feel bad, they both represent things as being in a certain way and tell us to see to it that they will no longer be that way. Such commands have subjective authority by virtue of linking up with a (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. How to Understand Feelings of Vitality: An Approach to Their Nature, Varieties and Functions.Íngrid Vendrell-Ferran - 2021 - In Susi Ferrarello (ed.), Phenomenology of Bioethics: Technoethics and Lived Experience.
    A very basic form of experience consists in feeling energetic, vital, alive, tired, dispirited, vigorous and so on. These feelings – which I call feelings of vitality or vital feelings – constitute the main concern of this paper. My aim is to argue that these feelings exhibit a distinctive form of affectivity which cannot be explained in terms of emotions, moods, background feelings or existential feelings and to explore different paths for their conceptualization. The paper proceeds as follows. After introducing (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13. Review of Jean Moritz Müller, The World-Directedness of Emotional Feeling. [REVIEW]Jonathan Mitchell - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
  14. A Kantian Account of Emotions as Feelings1.Alix Cohen - 2020 - Mind 129 (514):429-460.
    The aim of this paper is to extract from Kant's writings an account of the nature of the emotions and their function – and to do so despite the fact that Kant neither uses the term ‘emotion’ nor offers a systematic treatment of it. Kant's position, as I interpret it, challenges the contemporary trends that define emotions in terms of other mental states and defines them instead first and foremost as ‘feelings’. Although Kant's views on the nature of feelings have (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  15. Review of Christine Tappolet, Emotions, Values and Agency (Oxford University Press, 2016). [REVIEW]Benjamin De Mesel - 2017 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2017.
  16. Which Emotions Should Kantians Cultivate (and Which Ones Should They Discipline)?Uri Eran - 2020 - Kantian Review 25 (1):53-76.
    Commentators disagree about Kant’s view on the proper treatment of emotions. In contrast to a tendency in this literature to treat them uniformly, I argue that, according to Kant, feelings (but not affects) require cultivation, and inclinations – although they can and perhaps may be cultivated – generally require discipline. The appropriate treatment for emotions depends on their susceptibility to rational constraint and on the threat they pose to rational deliberation. Although I read Kant as recommending that we cultivate certain (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. Jealousy and the Sense of Self: Unamuno and the Contemporary Philosophy of Emotion.Íngrid Vendrell-Ferran - forthcoming - Philosophy and Literature.
    This paper explores jealousy in Unamuno’s drama El otro. Drawing on contemporary philosophy of emotion, I will argue that for the Spanish author jealousy gives the subject a sense of self. The paper begins by embedding Unamuno’s philosophical anthropology in the context of contemporary emotion theory. It then presents the drama as an investigation into the affective dimension of self-identity. The third section offers an analysis of jealousy as an emotion of self-assessment. The final section discusses how this drama can (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18. A Century of Misunderstanding? William James's Emotion Theory.Jake Spinella - 2020 - William James Studies 16 (1):01-25.
    I argue, contra traditional interpretations of James's emotion theory like Antonio Damasio and alternative interpretations like Phoebe Ellsworth and Lisa Barrett, that James is best classified as a functionalist regarding emotion categories. In arguing for this point, I will make four textual claims: (1) James was an important precursor to Basic Emotion Theory (BET) and his theory is best identified as a flavor of BET; (2) James's theory individuates emotion categories by their evolutionary, functional roles; (3) The only necessary condition (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19. Emotion, Wahrnehmung, evaluative Erkenntnis.Jean Moritz Müller - 2011 - In Achim Stephan, Jan Slaby, Henrik Walter & Sven Walter (eds.), Affektive Intentionalität: Beiträge zur welterschließenden Funktion der menschlichen Gefühle. Paderborn, Deutschland: pp. 110-127.
    This paper explores a currently popular view in the philosophy of emotion, according to which emotions constitute a specific form of evaluative aspect-perception (cf. esp. Roberts 2003, Döring 2004, Slaby 2008). On this view, adequate or fitting emotions play an important epistemic roe vis à vis evaluative knowledge. The paper specifically asks how to conceive of the adequacy or fittingness conditions of emotion. Considering the specific, relational nature of the evaluative properties disclosed by emotions, it is argued that a suitable (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20. Pre-Emotional Awareness and the Content-Priority View.Jonathan Mitchell - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (277):771-794.
    Much contemporary philosophy of emotion has been in broad agreement about the claim that emotional experiences have evaluative content. This paper assesses a relatively neglected alternative, which I call the content-priority view, according to which emotions are responses to a form of pre-emotional value awareness, as what we are aware of in having certain non-emotional evaluative states which are temporally prior to emotion. I argue that the central motivations of the view require a personal level conscious state of pre-emotional value (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  21. Affective Societies: Key Concepts.Jan Slaby & Christian von Scheve (eds.) - 2019 - New York: Routledge.
    Affect and emotion have come to dominate discourse on social and political life in the mobile and networked societies of the early 21st century. This volume introduces a unique collection of essential concepts for theorizing and empirically investigating societies as Affective Societies. The concepts engender insights into the affective foundations of social coexistence and are indispensable to comprehend the many areas of conflict linked to emotion such as migration, political populism, or local and global inequalities. Each chapters provides historical orientation; (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  22. Self-Deceptive Resistance to Self-Knowledge.Graham Hubbs - 2018 - Les Ateliers de l'Éthique / the Ethics Forum 13 (2):25-47.
    Graham Hubbs | : Philosophical accounts of self-deception have tended to focus on what is necessary for one to be in a state of self-deception or how one might arrive at such a state. Less attention has been paid to explaining why, so often, self-deceived individuals resist the proper explanation of their condition. This resistance may not be necessary for self-deception, but it is common enough to be a proper explanandum of any adequate account of the phenomenon. The goals of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. Hope, Hate and Indignation: Spinoza on Political Emotion in the Trump Era.Ericka Tucker - 2018 - In M. B. Sable & A. J. Torres (eds.), Trump and Political Philosophy. New York, NY, USA: pp. 131-158.
    Can we ever have politics without the noble lie? Can we have a collective political identity that does not exclude or define ‘us’ as ‘not them’? In the Ethics, Spinoza argues that individual human emotions and imagination shape the social world. This world, he argues, can in turn be shaped by political institutions to be more or less hopeful, more or less rational, or more or less angry and indignant. In his political works, Spinoza offered suggestions for how to shape (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. The World According to Suffering.Antti Kauppinen - 2020 - In Michael S. Brady, David Bain & Jennifer Corns (eds.), The Philosophy of Suffering. London: Routledge.
    On the face of it, suffering from the loss of a loved one and suffering from intense pain are very different things. What makes them both experiences of suffering? I argue it’s neither their unpleasantness nor the fact that we desire not to have such experiences. Rather, what we suffer from negatively transforms the way our situation as a whole appears to us. To cash this out, I introduce the notion of negative affective construal, which involves practically perceiving our situation (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  25. Periagoge. Teoria della singolarità e filosofia come esercizio di trasformazione (II ed.).Guido Cusinato - 2017 - Verona, Italy: QuiEdit.
    Botticelli and Tizian depict the Annunciation in two very different ways. Botticelli portrays a kneeling angel in an act of guiding from below, while Tizian represents an angel imposing himself from above with an authoritarian forefinger. Botticelli's painting suggests an intention of orientation that is not authoritarian yet able to bring about a transformation (Umbildung). It also suggests that an individual's transformation cannot be achieved in a closed solipsistic dimension, but requires a disclosure from otherness. My theory is that at (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  26. La Totalità incompiuta. Antropologia filosofica e ontologia della persona.Guido Cusinato - 2008 - Milano: FrancoAngeli.
    "Siamo come lucciole che hanno disimparato a illuminare e che prima si sono messe a girare attorno alla lanterna magica dell'ideale ascetico e ora attorno alle insegne pubblicitarie al neon. Lucciole che hanno scordato d’avere una potenzialità di orientatività preziosa nel proprio sistema affettivo" (G. Cusinato, La totalità incompiuta, Milano 2008, 314). Che cos'è una persona? Come si costituisce concretamente l'identità personale? Che rapporto c'è fra identità personale e identità psichica? C'è coincidenza fra persona e homo sapiens? La persona è (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  27. Antropogenese: Hunger nach Geburt und Sharing der Gefühle aus Max Schelers Perspektive.Guido Cusinato - 2015 - Thaumàzein 3:29-81.
    In this article I develop two arguments, taking Max Scheler’s phenomenology as a starting point. The first one is that emotions are not private and internal states of consciousness, but what makes us come into contact with the expressive dimension of reality, by orienting our placement in the world and our interaction with others. The second thesis is that some emotions have an “anthropogenetic” nature that is at the roots of the ontology of a person and of social ontology: it (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28. Review of Talia Morag Emotion, Imagination, and the Limits of Reason. [REVIEW]John M. Monteleone - 2019 - Philosophy 94 (1):171-177.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29. Justification et rationalité des émotions.Anne Meylan - 2018 - Philosophiques 45 (2):477-487.
    A la manière des expériences perceptuelles qui nous présentent des formes, des couleurs, des sons, des textures, etc. les émotions nous présentent des propriétés évaluatives. Ainsi, les émotions constituent un type d’expérience perceptuelle spécifique, un type qui nous donne accès à des valeurs (plutôt qu’à des propriétés non axiologiques). Cette théorie d’origine meinongienne doit beaucoup Christine Tappolet qui y consacre un second livre Emotions, Values and Agency que tous les amoureux des choses vraiment bien faites ne pourront qu’apprécier. Cet article (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30. Suffering Pains.Olivier Massin - 2020 - In Jennifer Corns & Michael S. Brady David Bain (ed.), Philosophy of Suffering: Metaphysics, Value and Normativity. London: Routledge. pp. 76-100.
    The paper aims at clarifying the distinctions and relations between pain and suffering. Three negative theses are defended: 1. Pain and suffering are not identical. 2. Pain is not a species of suffering, nor is suffering a species of pain, nor are pain and suffering of a common (proximate) genus. 3. Suffering cannot be defined as the perception of a pain’s badness, nor can pain be defined as a suffered bodily sensation. Three positive theses are endorsed: 4. Pain and suffering (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31. ‘Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice’, by Nussbaum, Martha C.: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013, Pp.Viii+457, US$35 (Hardback). [REVIEW]Bridget Clarke - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (3):614-615.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32. Are Emotions Embodied Evaluative Attitudes? Critical Review of Julien A. Deonna and Fabrice Teroni’s The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction.Joel Smith - 2014 - Disputatio 6 (38):93-106.
    Deonna and Teroni’s The Emotions is both an excellent introduction to philosophical work on emotions and a novel defence of their own Attitudinal Theory. After summarising their discussion of the literature I describe and evaluate their positive view. I challenge their theory on three fronts: their claim that emotions are a form of bodily awareness, their account of what makes an emotion correct, and their account of what justifies an emotion.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  33. Replies.Christine Tappolet - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (2):525-537.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  34. Senea. De ira / Über die Wut, lateinisch und deutsch.Jula Wildberger - 2007 - Stuttgart, Deutschland: Reclam.
    Bilingual edition with German translation, introduction, and notes.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35. Emotional Processing in Individual and Social Recalibration.Bryce Huebner & Trip Glazer - 2017 - In Julian Kiverstein (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of the Social Mind. Routledge. pp. 381-391.
    In this chapter, we explore three social functions of emotion, which parallel three interpretations of Herman Melville's Bartleby. We argue that emotions can serve as commitment devices, which nudge individuals toward social conformity and thereby increase the likelihood of ongoing cooperation. We argue that emotions can play a role in Machiavellian strategies, which help us get away with norm violations. And we argue that emotions can motivate social recalibration, by alerting us to systemic social failures. In the second half of (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36. Is Love and Emotion?Arina Pismenny & Jesse Prinz - 2017 - In Christopher Grau & Aaron Smuts (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Love. New York, NY, USA:
    What kind of mental phenomenon is romantic love? Many philosophers, psychologists, and ordinary folk treat it as an emotion. This chapter argues the category of emotion is inadequate to account for romantic love. It examines major emotion theories in philosophy and psychology and shows that they fail to illustrate that romantic love is an emotion. It considers the categories of basic emotions and emotion complexes, and demonstrates they too come short in accounting for romantic love. It assesses the roles of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  37. Consciousness and Emotion.Demian Whiting - 2018 - In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Consciousness. Routledge.
  38. The Part-Whole Perception of Emotion.Trip Glazer - 2018 - Consciousness and Cognition 58:34-43.
    A clever argument purports to show that we can directly perceive the emotions of others: (1) some emotional expressions are parts of the emotions they express; (2) perceiving a part of something is sufficient for perceiving the whole; (3) therefore, perceiving some emotional expressions is sufficient for perceiving the emotions they express. My aim in this paper is to assess the extent to which contemporary psychological theories of emotion support the first premise of this argument.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  39. Human Development and the Extended Mind: Review of Becoming Human: The Ontogenesis, Metaphysics, and Expression of Human Emotionality by Jennifer Greenwood. [REVIEW]Erik Nelson - 2017 - Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 23 (5):1092-1093.
    Jennifer Greenwood's Becoming Human: The Ontogenesis, Metaphysics, and Expression of Human Emotionality is an innovative exploration of the empirical literature on human development and its implications for the extended mind debate. Greenwood argues that an examination of the emotional and linguistic development of children, especially the unique relationship between mothers and infants, supports transcranialism. I summarize her argument and then point to some of the strengths and weaknesses of her position.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40. Review: Emotion and Value. Edited by Sabine Roeser and Cain Todd. [REVIEW]Hichem Naar & Christine Tappolet - 2017 - Analysis 77 (3):675-678.
    © The Authors 2017. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Trust. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.comIt is widely accepted that emotions have something to do with values. The major task of contemporary philosophy of emotion is to say precisely what that something is. How exactly are emotions related to evaluative properties? Unsurprisingly, there are various ways they may be related. First, emotions might themselves be bearers of value. It might be a good thing (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41. America’s Connection to India: Freud, Jones & Bose.Subhasis Chattopadhyay, Chatterjee - manuscript
    This is a rudimentary paper written to claim my connection that the American and the erstwhile Indian modes of psychoanalysis are more authentic modes vis-à-vis the French mode. Some of the claims I make in this paper have been already published in Prabuddha Bharata and some are forthcoming. For instance, I have written on Ritalin which is pertinent to this discussion yet I have avoided mentioning this since my contention regarding Ritalin is pending publication in Prabuddha Bharata. Addition : 2020, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42. I. Emotions, Thoughts and Feelings: What is a ‘Cognitive Theory’ of the Emotions and Does It Neglect Affectivity?: Robert C. Solomon.Robert C. Solomon - 2003 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 52:1-18.
    I have been arguing, for almost thirty years now, that emotions have been unduly neglected in philosophy. Back in the seventies, it was an argument that attracted little sympathy. I have also been arguing that emotions are a ripe for philosophical analysis, a view that, as evidenced by the Manchester 2001 conference and a large number of excellent publications, has now become mainstream. My own analysis of emotion, first published in 1973, challenged the sharp divide between emotions and rationality, insisted (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  43. Modularity, and the Psychoevolutionary Theory of Emotion.P. E. Griffiths - 1990 - Biology and Philosophy 5 (2):175.
    It is unreasonable to assume that our pre-scientific emotion vocabulary embodies all and only those distinctions required for a scientific psychology of emotion. The psychoevolutionary approach to emotion yields an alternative classification of certain emotion phenomena. The new categories are based on a set of evolved adaptive responses, or affect-programs, which are found in all cultures. The triggering of these responses involves a modular system of stimulus appraisal, whose evoluations may conflict with those of higher-level cognitive processes. Whilst the structure (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  44. Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions.Robert C. Solomon - 2002 - Mind 111 (444):897-901.
    Reviews the book, Upheavals of thought: The intelligence of emotions by Martha C. Nussbaum . Drawing from an astounding array of sources, Nussbaum argues against the common understanding of emotions as irrational and animalistic impulses disconnected from our thoughts and reason. Rather, she argues that emotions are highly discriminating responses to what is of value and importance that are, therefore, suffused with intelligence and discernment. Nussbaum explores the structure of a wide range of emotions, in particular, compassion and love, in (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   71 citations  
  45. Review: Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. [REVIEW]Andrea Scarantino - 2006 - Mind 115 (459):812-820.
  46. The Passions. The Myth and Nature of Human Emotions. [REVIEW]S. M. - 1977 - Review of Metaphysics 31 (1):124-126.
    This "philosophy of the passions" is intended as a radically new understanding of the nature of human emotions and as such as the only realistic philosophy of life. It is an attack on "the Myth of the Passions," the traditional Western view of emotional phenomena, according to which emotions are held to be beastly residues in our being and naturally opposed to the calm, divine objectivity of reason. This new "theory of the passions—with an almost exclusive emphasis on the emotions" (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47. In Defence of “Emotion”. [REVIEW]Louis C. Charland - 2001 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):133-154.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  48. A Comedy We Believe In: A Further Look at Sartre's Theory of Emotions.Martin Hartmann - 2016 - European Journal of Philosophy 24 (4).
    This paper discusses recent interpretations of Jean-Paul Sartre's early theory of emotions, in particular his Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions. Despite the great interest that Sartre's approach has generated, most interpretations assume that his approach fails because it appears to be focussed on ‘malformed’, ‘irrational’ or ‘distorted’ emotions. I argue that these criticisms adopt a rationalistic or epistemically biassed perspective on emotions that is wrongly applied to Sartre's text. In my defence of Sartre I show that the directional (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  49. Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice (by Martha Nussbaum). [REVIEW]Bradford Cokelet - 2016 - Ethics 127 (1):298-302.
    Summary of Nussbaum's book. Raises worries about the political neutrality of her psychoanalytic assumptions and about whether her compassion promoting policies can adequately mitigate problems like racism, selfishness, and partiality.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  50. What Emotions Really Are: The Problem of Psychological Categories. [REVIEW]Robert C. Solomon - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (1):131.
    “What is an emotion?” William James asked that question in the title of an essay he wrote in 1884, and his answer was that an emotion is a sensation brought about by bodily disturbance. Writing as a psychologist, he was concerned to help turn his discipline into a science. But as a philosopher writing about religious faith, by contrast, James argued that emotions must be understood in terms of such large and fuzzy issues as “the meaning of life.” The philosophy (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   142 citations  
1 — 50 / 811