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About this topic
Summary What is a chair? What is a plant? What is reasoning? What is an emotion? Philosophers are interested in these questions for different reasons. The reason why they were interested in emotions was for a very long time that many of them considered emotions and rationality to be opposites. This is not the case any longer. There exist appraisal theories, narrative theories, cognitive theories, perceptual theories and natural reaction theories about emotions. Correspondingly to the particular theories emotions are reconstructed as evaluative or normative judgments, as desires, beliefs, appraisals, narratives, as perceptions, as an innate disposition, or else they combine one or two of these aspects. Philosophers are interested in emotions nowadays for quite many reasons. The relation between rationality and emotions is one of them, not because they are regarded to be opponents any longer but because of the cognitive role that emotions are thought to have. And then there is a substantial interest in emotions in philosophy of mind. Emotions are considered to be mental states, they are intentionally directed towards a situation or an object and at the same time they seem to be bodily reactions that are caused by something. These aspects make them to be ideal subjects for discussing reductionism and representationism concerning consciousness and phenomenal mental states. But these are not the only areas of interest when it comes to emotions. Their role as values is also much discussed in ethics, namely in value theory, the area of moral philosophy that is concerned with theoretical questions about value and goodness of all varieties. The role of emotions for motivation is eventually discussed in action theory.
Key works Kenny 1963 is an early work on emotions that by some means introduced the subject to analytic philosophy. de Sousa 1987 provides a systematic survey of the topic. Griffiths Paul 1997 is combining philosophy of mind and an evolutionary perspective in order to address the neurobiology of emotions and cognitive science. Wollheim 1999 is introducing psychoanalysis and art to the analytic discussions on emotions. Goldie 2000 is presenting an elaborate narrative theory of emotions. These are some of the key works for the analytic tradition but there are also quite eminent ones for the phenomenological tradition among which only the most important one shall be mentioned: Scheler 1973.
Introductions A useful encyclopedia article is de Sousa 2007 The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotions offers an overview of systematic discussions as well as some historical positions. 
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  1. The Cognitive Functions of Emotion.R. T. Allen - 2000 - Appraisal 3:38.
  2. Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy. [REVIEW]David Appleby - 2008 - The Medieval Review 1.
  3. The Thomistic Theory of the Passions and Their Influence Upon the Will ... By Richard R. Baker.Richard Russell Baker - 1941 - Notre Dame, Ind..
  4. Review: Emotions Are Not Mere Judgments. [REVIEW]Aaron Ben-Ze'Ev - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):450 - 457.
  5. Reply to Solomon.Laurence BonJour - 1990 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (4):779-782.
  6. Feeling Our Feelings: What Philosophers Think and People Know.Eva T. H. Brann - 2008 - Paul Dry Books.
    By way of preface: on the title -- Passion itself: poetry -- Eros, spirit, pleasure: Plato's beginning -- The passions as extremes: Aristotle as the founder of passion studies -- The pathology and therapy of the passions: stoicism through Cicero -- The passions sited: Thomas Aquinas and the soul in sum -- The passions of the soul as actions of the body: Descartes and the obscurity of clear and distinct ideas -- Human affect as our body's vitality: Spinoza and the (...)
  7. Professor James on the Emotions.Sophie Bryant - 1895 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 3 (2):52 - 64.
  8. Jeff Malpas and Robert C. Solomon, Eds., Death and Philosophy. [REVIEW]Kenneth Bryson - 2000 - Philosophy in Review 20:50-52.
  9. The Psychology of Emotion.Ross Buck - 1986 - In David A. Oakley (ed.), Mind and Brain. Methuen. pp. 275.
  10. Jeff Malpas & Robert C. Solomon (Ed), Death and Philosophy.A. Campbell - 1999 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 6:123-124.
  11. In Defence of “Emotion” Critical Notice.Louis C. Charland - 2001 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):113-154.
  12. In Defence of “Emotion”. [REVIEW]Louis C. Charland - 2001 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):133-154.
  13. Review: In Defence of "Emotion". [REVIEW]Louis C. Charland - 2001 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):133 - 154.
  14. Review of Passion and Reason: Making Sense of Our Emotions by Richard and Bernice Lazarus. [REVIEW]Louis C. Charland - 1996 - Philosophical Psychology 9 (3):401-404.
  15. ‘Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice’, by Nussbaum, Martha C.Bridget Clarke - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (3):614-615.
  16. ‘Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice’, by Nussbaum, Martha C.Bridget Clarke - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (3):614-615.
  17. Thinking About the Emotions: A Philosophical History.Alix Cohen & Robert Stern (eds.) - 2017 - Oxford University Press.
    Leading philosophers offer a rich survey of the development of our understanding of the emotions, discussing major thinkers from antiquity to the 20th century. Thinking about the Emotions is a fascinating and illuminating study of how philosophers have grappled with this intriguing part of our nature as beings who feel as well as think and act.
  18. Review of Martha Nussbaum, Poltical Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice. [REVIEW]Bradford Cokelet - 2016 - Ethics 127 (1):298-302.
  19. Thinking Through Feeling: God, Emotion and Passibility, by Anastasia Philippa Scrutton.Richard E. Creel - 2012 - Faith and Philosophy 29 (4):487-490.
  20. Emotion, Cognition, and the Classical Elements of Mind.William A. Cunningham & Tabitha Kirkland - 2012 - Emotion Review 4 (4):369-370.
    The scientific study of emotion faces a potentially serious problem: after over a hundred years of psychological study, we lack consensus regarding the very definition of emotion. We propose that part of the problem may be the tendency to define emotion in contrast to cognition, rather than viewing both “emotion” and “cognition” as being comprised of more elemental processes. We argue that considering emotion as a type of cognition (viewed broadly as information processing) may provide an understanding of the mechanisms (...)
  21. Emotion and Social Cognition: Lessons From Contemporary Human Neuroanatomy.Ricardo de Oliveira-Souza, Jorge Moll & Jordan Grafman - 2011 - Emotion Review 3 (3):310-312.
    Two paradigms have guided emotion research over the past decades. The dual-system view embraces the long-held Western belief, espoused most prominently by decision-making and social cognition researchers, that emotion and reason are often at odds. The integrative view, which asserts that emotion and cognition work synergistically, has been less explored experimentally. However, the integrative view (a) may help explain several findings that are not easily accounted for by the dual-system approach, and (b) is better supported by a growing body of (...)
  22. Thinking and Feeling: A Buddhist Perspective.Padmasiri de Silva - 2011 - Sophia 50 (2):253-263.
    The work ‘Thinking and Feeling’ edited by Robert C. Solomon may be considered as a landmark in the history of the philosophy of the emotions. The work also has assembled together some of the best minds in the Anglo American Traditions. The central focus in this work is to mediate between the physiological arousal theories of emotions and the cognitive appraisal theories of emotions. My article is an attempt to mediate from my Asian background and in specific terms using the (...)
  23. William James and the Rise of the Scientific Study of Emotion.J. Deigh - 2014 - Emotion Review 6 (1):4-12.
  24. Writing the Self in Nausea and the'Theory of Emotions'.Kendra Drischler - 2008 - Gnosis 9 (3):1-21.
  25. Seeing the Blush : Feeling Emotions.Otniel E. Dror - 2011 - In Lorraine Daston & Elizabeth Lunbeck (eds.), Histories of Scientific Observation. University of Chicago Press.
  26. Do Emotions Represent Values by Registering Bodily Changes?Eva-Maria Düringer - 2009 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 16 (1):62-81.
    This paper outlines Jesse Prinz’s theory that emotions represent values by registering bodily changes, discusses two objections, and concludes that Prinz’s theory stands in need of modification: while emotions do represent values, they do not do so in the first place by registering bodily changes, but by processing information about how things we care about fare in the world. The function of bodily changes is primarily to motivate and prepare us for action.
  27. Modularity, and the Psychoevolutionary Theory of Emotion.P. E. Griffiths - 1990 - Biology and Philosophy 5 (2):175.
    It is unreasonable to assume that our pre-scientific emotion vocabulary embodies all and only those distinctions required for a scientific psychology of emotion. The psychoevolutionary approach to emotion yields an alternative classification of certain emotion phenomena. The new categories are based on a set of evolved adaptive responses, or affect-programs, which are found in all cultures. The triggering of these responses involves a modular system of stimulus appraisal, whose evoluations may conflict with those of higher-level cognitive processes. Whilst the structure (...)
  28. Restoring to Cognition the Forgotten Primacy of Action, Intention and Emotion.Walter J. Freeman & Rafael Núñez - 1999 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (11-12):11-12.
    Introduction to Special Issue on ‘Reclaiming Cognition: The Primacy of Action, Intention and Emotion’. Making sense of the mind is the human odyssey. Today, the cognitive sciences provide the vehicles and equipage. As do all culturally shaped activities, they manifest crystallized generalizations and ideological legacies, many of which go unquestioned for centuries. From time to time, these ideologies are successfully challenged, generating revisions and new forms of understanding. We believe that the cognitive sciences have reached a situation in which they (...)
  29. Not Passion's Slave.Nico H. Frijda - 2010 - Emotion Review 2 (1):68-75.
    Bob Solomon claimed that we are not passion’s slaves. I examine whether or not we are, considering universal determinism. I argue that we indeed are free, or at least that we can be, and try to understand this. Free will resides in the presence of alternative action options, in our ability to freely search for, detect, or create them, in our ability to use them, and in our ability to, in some measure, free ourselves from the automatic impact of external (...)
  30. Bob Solomon's Legacy: Introduction.Nico H. Frijda & Jenefer M. Robinson - 2010 - Emotion Review 2 (1):3-4.
  31. Review of Robert C. Solomon, In Defense of Sentimentality[REVIEW]Rick Anthony Furtak - 2005 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (10).
  32. Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions.Edwin E. Gantt - 2002 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 22 (1):76.
  33. Prolegomena to a Theory of the Emotions.E. Gellhorn - 1961 - Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 4 (4):403-436.
  34. The Part-Whole Perception of Emotion.Trip Glazer - 2018 - Consciousness and Cognition 58:34-43.
    A clever argument purports to show that we can directly perceive the emotions of others: (1) some emotional expressions are parts of the emotions they express; (2) perceiving a part of something is sufficient for perceiving the whole; (3) therefore, perceiving some emotional expressions is sufficient for perceiving the emotions they express. My aim in this paper is to assess the extent to which contemporary psychological theories of emotion support the first premise of this argument.
  35. Feelings Are Not Enough.Stephen Grant - 2009 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (4):5-19.
    This article addresses whether contemporary feeling theories of the emotions can overcome the problems generally associated with such theories. Specifically, it considers whether they can explain the normative assessment of the emotions, their availability for introspective identification, and their intentionality. The article looks primarily at the work of Jesse Prinz, and suggests that his responses to these problems fall short as a result of a flawed account of the intentional nature of emotions. I conclude with brief comments on how theories (...)
  36. Emotion, Cognition Et Sentiment.Stephen Grant - 2008 - Synthesis Philosophica 23 (1):53-71.
    Le texte examine les recherches récentes et le développement de la théorie cognitive des émotions, et cherche à développer une théorie originale dans le cadre de cette approche. L e texte s’oriente particulièrement sur la critique qui réduit ces théories des émotions trop intellectualisées à des attitudes selon des propositions et exclue les sentiments. Je tiens que quelques cognitivistes seulement ont représenté ladite théorie, et qu’il est possible d’affirmer que les émotions sont partiellement constituées de sentiments et qu’elles restent à (...)
  37. Reviews-What Emotions Really Are: The Problem of Psychological Categories.Paul E. Griffiths & Peter Goldie - 1998 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (4):642-648.
  38. Emotion and Emotionless-Newer Contribution to the Theory of Emotions.Juergen Grosse - 2007 - Philosophische Rundschau 54 (3):195 - 216.
  39. Robert C. Solomon and Kathleen M. Higgins, Eds., From Africa to Zen: An Invitation to World Philosophy Reviewed By.Ouyang Guangwei - 1994 - Philosophy in Review 14 (2):141-144.
  40. Robert C. Solomon, Kathleen M. Higgins, World Philosophy. A Text With Rea-Ding. [REVIEW]Gérard Guyon - 1997 - Archives de Philosophie du Droit 41:525-525.
  41. A Comedy We Believe In: A Further Look at Sartre's Theory of Emotions.Martin Hartmann - 2016 - European Journal of Philosophy 24 (4).
    This paper discusses recent interpretations of Jean-Paul Sartre's early theory of emotions, in particular his Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions. Despite the great interest that Sartre's approach has generated, most interpretations assume that his approach fails because it appears to be focussed on ‘malformed’, ‘irrational’ or ‘distorted’ emotions. I argue that these criticisms adopt a rationalistic or epistemically biassed perspective on emotions that is wrongly applied to Sartre's text. In my defence of Sartre I show that the directional (...)
  42. The Critical Assessment of Cognitivism: A Closer Look.John Haugeland - 1978 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (2):254.
  43. Cognitivism as a Paradigm.P. J. Hayes - 1978 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (2):238.
  44. A Connection Between Cognitive Ethics and Existentialist Thinking: The Necessary Revitalization of Emotions.Asuncion Herrera Guevara - 2013 - Pensamiento 69 (258):103-114.
  45. Emotional Processing in Individual and Social Recalibration.Bryce Huebner & Trip Glazer - 2017 - In Julian Kiverstein (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of the Social Mind. Routledge. pp. 381-391.
    In this chapter, we explore three social functions of emotion, which parallel three interpretations of Herman Melville's Bartleby. We argue that emotions can serve as commitment devices, which nudge individuals toward social conformity and thereby increase the likelihood of ongoing cooperation. We argue that emotions can play a role in Machiavellian strategies, which help us get away with norm violations. And we argue that emotions can motivate social recalibration, by alerting us to systemic social failures. In the second half of (...)
  46. Truly Enactive Emotion.Daniel D. Hutto - 2012 - Emotion Review 4 (2):176-181.
    Any adequate account of emotion must accommodate the fact that emotions, even those of the most basic kind, exhibit intentionality as well as phenomenality. This article argues that a good place to start in providing such an account is by adjusting Prinz’s (2004) embodied appraisal theory (EAT) of emotions. EAT appeals to teleosemantics in order to account for the world-directed content of embodied appraisals. Although the central idea behind EAT is essentially along the right lines, as it stands Prinz’s proposal (...)
  47. Solomon, Hegel, and Truth.M. J. Inwood - 1977 - Review of Metaphysics 31 (2):272 - 282.
  48. Discussion: Recent Developments in Theory of Emotion.David Irons - 1895 - Psychological Review 2 (3):279-284.
  49. Forms and Functions of Emotions: Matters of Emotion–Cognition Interactions.Carroll E. Izard - 2011 - Emotion Review 3 (4):371-378.
    This article clarifies my current and seemingly ever-changing position on issues relating to emotions. The position derives from my differential emotions theory and it changes with new empirical findings and with insights from my own and others’ thinking and writing. The theory distinguishes between first-order emotions and emotion schemas. For example, it proposes that first-order negative emotions are attributable mainly to infants and young children in distress and to older individuals in emergency or highly challenging situations. Emotion schemas are defined (...)
  50. The Politics of Emotion: Liberalism and Cognitivism.Susan James - 2006 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 58:231-244.
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