This is Jürgen Habermas's most concrete historical-sociological book and one of the key contributions to political thought in the postwar period. It will be a revelation to those who have known Habermas only through his theoretical writing to find his later interests in problems of legitimation and communication foreshadowed in this lucid study of the origins, nature, and evolution of public opinion in democratic societies.

In this important book, Jürgen Habermas takes up certain fundamental questions of philosophy. While much of his recent work has been concerned with issues of morality and law, in this new work Habermas returns to the traditional philosophical questions of truth, objectivity and reality which were at the centre of his earlier classic book _Knowledge and Human Interests_. In this new work Habermas returns to the traditional philosophical questions of truth, objectivity and reality. Habermas pursues these questions from the perspective (...) of his own formal pragmatic theory which is based on an analysis of speech acts and language use. He asks: How can the idea that our world exists independently of our attempts to describe it be reconciled with the insight that we can never reach reality without the mediation of language? Addresses the limits of philosophy and reassesses the relation between theory and practice from a ‘post-Marxist' perspective. (shrink)

This book provides a comprehensive introduction to, and selection from, Jrgen Habermas's writings from the early 1960s to the present. The book is divided into seven sections, covering the principal areas of Habermas's work. Each section includes an introduction and a selection of substantial extracts from relevant books.In the general introduction, Outhwaite outlines the central themes of Habermas's work and analyses the development of his views over the years. Subsequent sections are organized thematically and chronologically, so that the book will (...) be easy to use by students.There are extracts from all of Habermas's major works, including his early work on the public sphere and on science and technology; his writings on the methodology and epistemology of the social sciences; his work on evolution and legitimation; his theory of communication and discourse ethics; his analysis of modernity and his critique of postmodernism; and his most recent work on law and the state.By bringing these wide-ranging contributions together in a single volume, The Habermas Reader is an ideal teaching text. It will also be of interest to anyone who wishes to gain an overview of the work of one of the most important social thinkers of the twentieth century. (shrink)

Jürgen Habermas; XIV*—On the Cognitive Content of Morality, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 96, Issue 1, 1 June 1996, Pages 335–358, https://doi.

In Descartes, the concept of a ‘universal science’ differs from that of a ‘mathesis universalis’, in that the latter is simply a general theory of quantities and proportions. Mathesis universalis is closely linked with mathematical analysis; the theorem to be proved is taken as given, and the analyst seeks to discover that from which the theorem follows. Though the analytic method is followed in the Meditations, Descartes is not concerned with a mathematisation of method; mathematics merely provides him with examples. (...) Leibniz, on the other hand, stressed the importance of a calculus as a way of representing and adding to what is known, and tried to construct a ‘universal calculus’ as part of his proposed universal symbolism, his ‘characteristica universalis’. The characteristica universalis was never completed—it proved impossible, for example, to list its basic terms, the ‘alphabet of human thoughts’—but parts of it did come to fruition, in the shape of Leibniz's infinitesimal calculus and his various logical calculi. By his construction of these calculi, Leibniz proved that it is possible to operate with concepts in a purely formal way. (shrink)

This article discusses the complex space of the city as an urban milieu of vitality. On the skin of the city, a permanent change of its physical and physiognomic appearance takes place. The alternation of urban “faces” is constituted situationally in the structures and wrinkles of the skin. However, characteristic features of urban quarters do not only appear visually; they become bodily felt and are perceptible as holistic impressions, emanating from atmospheric “vital qualities”. Therefore, lively urban districts are discussed as (...) “body islands” in urban space. Seen from this vitalistic perspective, the city is not only a world of rational actors—as it is common ground in the social sciences—but also an unpredictable space of performativity. (shrink)

Dwelling is understood in the sense of Martin Heidegger: »Dwelling is the manner in which mortals are on the earth.« The way in which people are living on earth situates them in their dwelling. Because dwelling is not an activity, but a mode of being, an ethics of dwelling is required because »habitability« of the earth is limited. This demands a sustainable way of life. Responsible housing therefore needs a structural pause in the growth-focussed process of civilisation. As a result, (...) dwelling becomes a reason for a critical reflection on life and this becomes an existential piece of thinking about dwelling. (shrink)

The way people live is neither a task, nor an action, nor a function. Rather, living expresses how people carry out their lives in places and spaces. One’s home in the broader sense (beyond ‘one's own four walls’) is the earth as a whole. In order for living to be successful on both a local and global scale, and for the earth not to become overly inhabited, people must live in a good way. But where extraction (from the resources of (...) nature as well as the social sphere) breaks the principle of conservation, living becomes a matter of care for the habitability of the earth in the future. That is why today an ethical revision of all the ways and means in which people are on the earth is required. (shrink)

Speech given by Jürgen Habermas in the occasion of Rorty's Memorial. Stanford University, November 2, 2007.