8 found
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  1.  87
    The Scientist Qua Policy Advisor Makes Value Judgments.Katie Siobhan Steele - 2012 - Philosophy of Science 79 (5):893-904.
    Richard Rudner famously argues that the communication of scientific advice to policy makers involves ethical value judgments. His argument has, however, been rightly criticized. This article revives Rudner’s conclusion, by strengthening both his lines of argument: we generalize his initial assumption regarding the form in which scientists must communicate their results and complete his ‘backup’ argument by appealing to the difference between private and public decisions. Our conclusion that science advisors must, for deep-seated pragmatic reasons, make value judgments is further (...)
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  2. Should Subjective Probabilities Be Sharp?Seamus Bradley & Katie Siobhan Steele - 2014 - Episteme 11 (3):277-289.
    There has been much recent interest in imprecise probabilities, models of belief that allow unsharp or fuzzy credence. There have also been some influential criticisms of this position. Here we argue, chiefly against Elga, that subjective probabilities need not be sharp. The key question is whether the imprecise probabilist can make reasonable sequences of decisions. We argue that she can. We outline Elga's argument and clarify the assumptions he makes and the principles of rationality he is implicitly committed to. We (...)
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  3. Modelling the Moral Dimension of Decisions.Mark Colyvan, Damian Cox & Katie Siobhan Steele - 2010 - Noûs 44 (3):503-529.
    In this paper we explore the connections between ethics and decision theory. In particular, we consider the question of whether decision theory carries with it a bias towards consequentialist ethical theories. We argue that there are plausible versions of the other ethical theories that can be accommodated by “standard” decision theory, but there are also variations of these ethical theories that are less easily accommodated. So while “standard” decision theory is not exclusively consequentialist, it is not necessarily ethically neutral. Moreover, (...)
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  4.  66
    Uncertainty, Learning, and the “Problem” of Dilation.Seamus Bradley & Katie Siobhan Steele - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (6):1287-1303.
    Imprecise probabilism—which holds that rational belief/credence is permissibly represented by a set of probability functions—apparently suffers from a problem known as dilation. We explore whether this problem can be avoided or mitigated by one of the following strategies: (a) modifying the rule by which the credal state is updated, (b) restricting the domain of reasonable credal states to those that preclude dilation.
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  5.  86
    What Are the Minimal Requirements of Rational Choice? Arguments From the Sequential-Decision Setting.Katie Siobhan Steele - 2010 - Theory and Decision 68 (4):463-487.
    There are at least two plausible generalisations of subjective expected utility (SEU) theory: cumulative prospect theory (which relaxes the independence axiom) and Levi’s decision theory (which relaxes at least ordering). These theories call for a re-assessment of the minimal requirements of rational choice. Here, I consider how an analysis of sequential decision making contributes to this assessment. I criticise Hammond’s (Economica 44(176):337–350, 1977; Econ Philos 4:292–297, 1988a; Risk, decision and rationality, 1988b; Theory Decis 25:25–78, 1988c) ‘consequentialist’ argument for the SEU (...)
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  6. Choice Models.Katie Siobhan Steele - unknown
  7. Bayesians Care About Stopping Rules Too.Katie Siobhan Steele - unknown
     
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  8.  17
    Uses and Misuses of Multicriteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) in Environmental Decision Making.Katie Siobhan Steele, Yohay Carmel, Jean Cross & Chris Wilcox - unknown
    We focus on a class of multicriteria methods that are commonly used in environmental decision making--those that employ the weighted linear average algorithm (and this includes the popular analytic hierarchy process (AHP)). While we do not doubt the potential benefits of using formal decision methods of this type, we draw attention to the consequences of not using them well. In particular, we highlight a property of these methods that should not be overlooked when they are applied in environmental and wider (...)
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