On the basis of three physical axioms, we prove that if the choice of a particular type of spin 1 experiment is not a function of the information accessible to the experimenters, then its outcome is equally not a function of the information accessible to the particles. We show that this result is robust, and deduce that neither hidden variable theories nor mechanisms of the GRW type for wave function collapse can be made relativistic and causal. We also establish the (...) consistency of our axioms and discuss the philosophical implications. (shrink)

We respond to criticisms of our paper “The Free Will Theorem”, and produce a new form of the theorem based on weaker assumptions.

We prove a no-triplets theorem for spin 1 particles, which implies a strengthened form of the no-cloning theorem.

We describe the Ax-Kochen definable subsets of the value group of a Hensel field and apply our results to a problem on identifying invariant factors in Hecke algebras.

One has it that earlier circumstances and the laws of nature uniquely determine later circumstances, and the other has it that past present and future all exist tenselessly in a ‘block universe,’ so that the passage of time and associated changes in the world are illusions or at best merely apparent.

In a recent paper, Conway and Kochen proposed what is now known as the “Free Will theorem” which, among other things, should prove the impossibility of combining GRW models with special relativity, i.e., of formulating relativistically invariant models of spontaneous wavefunction collapse. Since their argument basically amounts to a non-locality proof for any theory aiming at reproducing quantum correlations, and since it was clear since very a long time that any relativistic collapse model must be non-local in some (...) way, we discuss why the theorem of Conway and Kochen does not affect the program of formulating relativistic GRW models. (shrink)

Bell’s Theorem from Physics 36:1–28 (1964) and the (Strong) Free Will Theorem of Conway and Kochen from Notices AMS 56:226–232 (2009) both exclude deterministic hidden variable theories (or, in modern parlance, ‘ontological models’) that are compatible with some small fragment of quantum mechanics, admit ‘free’ settings of the archetypal Alice and Bob experiment, and satisfy a locality condition akin to parameter independence. We clarify the relationship between these theorems by giving reformulations of both that exactly pinpoint their (...) resemblance and their differences. Our reformulation imposes determinism in what we see as the only consistent way, in which the ‘ontological state’ initially determines both the settings and the outcome of the experiment. The usual status of the settings as ‘free’ parameters is subsequently recovered from independence assumptions on the pertinent (random) variables. Our reformulation also clarifies the role of the settings in Bell’s later generalization of his theorem to stochastic hidden variable theories. (shrink)

If the concept of “free will” is reduced to that of “choice” all physical world share the latter quality. Anyway the “free will” can be distinguished from the “choice”: The “free will” involves implicitly certain preliminary goal, and the choice is only the mean, by which it can be achieved or not by the one who determines the goal. Thus, for example, an electron has always a choice but not free will unlike a human possessing both. Consequently, and paradoxically, the (...) determinism of classical physics is more subjective and more anthropomorphic than the indeterminism of quantum mechanics for the former presupposes certain deterministic goal implicitly following the model of human freewill behavior. The choice is usually linked to very complicated systems such as human brain or society and even often associated with consciousness. In its background, the material world is deterministic and absolutely devoid of choice. However, quantum mechanics introduces the choice in the fundament of physical world, in the only way, in which it can exist: All exists in the “phase transition” of the present between the uncertain future and the well-ordered past. Thus the present is forced to choose in order to be able to transform the coherent state of future into the well-ordering of past. The concept of choice as if suggests that there is one who chooses. However quantum mechanics involves a generalized case of choice, which can be called “subjectless”: There is certain choice, which originates from the transition of the future into the past. Thus that kind of choice is shared of all existing and does not need any subject: It can be considered as a low of nature. There are a few theorems in quantum mechanics directly relevant to the topic: two of them are called “free will theorems” by their authors, Conway and Kochen, and according to them: “Do we really have free will, or, as a few determined folk maintain, is it all an illusion? We don’t know, but will prove in this paper that if indeed there exist any experimenters with a modicum of free will, then elementary particles must have their own share of this valuable commodity” “The import of the free will theorem is that it is not only current quantum theory, but the world itself that is non-deterministic, so that no future theory can return us to a clockwork universe”. Those theorems can be considered as a continuation of the so-called theorems about the absence of “hidden variables” in quantum mechanics. (shrink)

In a recent paper Conway and Kochen, Found. Phys. 36, 2006, claim to have established that theories of the Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber (RW) type, i.e., of spontaneous wave function collapse, cannot be made relativistic. On the other hand, relativistic GRW-type theories have already been presented, in my recent paper, J. Stat. Phys. 125, 2006, and by Dowker and Henson, J. Stat. Phys. 115, 2004. Here, I elucidate why these are not excluded by the arguments of Conway and Kochen.

In well-known papers ([A-K1], [A-K2], and [E]) J. Ax, S. Kochen, and J. Ershov prove a transfer theorem for henselian valued fields. Here we prove an analogue for henselian valued and ordered fields. The orders for which this result apply are the usual orders and also the higher level orders introduced by E. Becker in [B1] and [B2]. With certain restrictions, two henselian valued and ordered fields are elementarily equivalent if and only if their value groups (with a (...) little bit more structure) and their residually ordered residue fields (a henselian valued and ordered field induces in a natural way an order in its residue field) are elementarily equivalent. Similar results are proved for elementary embeddings and ∀-extensions (extensions where the structure is existentially closed). (shrink)

Conway and Kochen have presented a “free will theorem” [4, 6] which they claim shows that “if indeed we humans have free will, then [so do] elementary particles.” In a more precise fashion, they claim it shows that for certain quantum experiments in which the experimenters can choose between several options, no deterministic or stochastic model can account for the observed outcomes without violating a condition “MIN” motivated by relativistic symmetry. We point out that for stochastic models this (...) conclusion is not correct, while for deterministic models it is not new. In the way the free will theorem is formulated and proved, it only concerns deterministic models. But Conway and Kochen have argued [4, 5, 6, 7] that “randomness can’t help,” meaning that stochastic models are excluded as well if we insist on the conditions “SPIN”, “TWIN”, and “MIN”. We point out a mistake in their argument. Namely, the theorem is of the form deterministic model with SPIN & TWIN & MIN ⇒ contradiction , (1) and in order to derive the further claim, which is of the form stochastic model with SPIN & TWIN & MIN ⇒ contradiction , (2) Conway and Kochen propose a method for converting any stochastic model into a deterministic one [4]. (shrink)

We review the argument that latent image formation is a measurement in which the state vector collapses, requiring an enhanced noise parameter in objective reduction models. Tentative observation of a residual noise at this level, plus several experimental bounds, imply that the noise must be colored, and hence frame dependent and non-relativistic. Thus a relativistic objective reduction model, even if achievable in principle, would be incompatible with experiment; the best one can do is the non-relativistic CSL model. This negative conclusion (...) has a positive aspect, in that the non-relativistic CSL reduction model evades the argument leading to the Conway–Kochen “Free Will Theorem”. (shrink)

L. van den Dries proved that the theory of n-valued rings has a model companion. We show here that this result is still true when the valuation rings are required to satisfy given inclusion relations (we restrict ourselves to the case of residual characteristic zero).

C. U. Jensen suggested the following construction, starting from a field $K: K_0 = K, K_{\alpha + 1} = K_\alpha ((X_\alpha)), K_\alpha = \bigcup K_\beta$ if $\alpha$ is limit and asked when two fields $k_\alpha$ and $K_\beta$ are equivalent. We give a complete answer in the case of a field $K$ of characteristic 0.

We consider first-order theories of topological fields admitting a model-completion and their expansion to differential fields . We give a criterion under which the expansion still admits a model-completion which we axiomatize. It generalizes previous results due to M. Singer for ordered differential fields and of C. Michaux for valued differential fields. As a corollary, we show a transfer result for the NIP property. We also give a geometrical axiomatization of that model-completion. Then, for certain differential valued fields, we extend (...) the positive answer of Hilbert’s seventeenth problem and we prove an Ax–Kochen–Ershov theorem. Similarly, we consider first-order theories of topological fields admitting a model-companion and their expansion to differential fields, and under a similar criterion as before, we show that the expansion still admits a model-companion. This last result can be compared with those of M. Tressl: on one hand we are only dealing with a single derivation whereas he is dealing with several, on the other hand we are not restricting ourselves to definable expansions of the ring language, taking advantage of our topological context. We apply our results to fields endowed with several valuations. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that Conway and Kochen’s Free Will Theorem (1,2) to the conclusion that quantum mechanics and relativity entail freedom for the particles, does not change the situation in favor of a libertarian position as they would like. In fact, the theorem more or less implicitly assumes that people are free, and thus it begs the question. Moreover, it does not prove neither that if people are free, so are particles, nor that the property (...) people possess when they are said to be free is the same as the one particles possess when they are claimed to be free. I then analyze the Free State Theorem (2), which generalizes the Free Will Theorem without the assumption that people are free, and I show that it does not prove anything about free will, since the notion of freedom for particles is either inconsistent, or it does not concern our common understanding of freedom. In both cases, the Free Will Theorem and the Free State Theorem do not provide any enlightenment on the constraints physics can pose on free will. (shrink)

If the concept of “free will” is reduced to that of “choice” all physical world shares the latter quality. Anyway the “free will” can be distinguished from the “choice”: The “free will” involves implicitly a certain goal, and the choice is only the mean, by which the aim can be achieved or not by the one who determines the target. Thus, for example, an electron has always a choice but not free will unlike a human possessing both. Consequently, and paradoxically, (...) the determinism of classical physics is more subjective and more anthropomorphic than the indeterminism of quantum mechanics for the former presupposes certain deterministic goal implicitly following the model of human freewill behavior. Quantum mechanics introduces the choice in the fundament of physical world involving a generalized case of choice, which can be called “subjectless”: There is certain choice, which originates from the transition of the future into the past. Thus that kind of choice is shared of all existing and does not need any subject: It can be considered as a low of nature. There are a few theorems in quantum mechanics directly relevant to the topic: two of them are called “free will theorems” by their authors (Conway and Kochen 2006; 2009). Any quantum system either a human or an electron or whatever else has always a choice: Its behavior is not predetermined by its past. This is a physical law. It implies that a form of information, the quantum information underlies all existing for the unit of the quantity of information is an elementary choice: either a bit or a quantum bit (qubit). (shrink)

This essay considers and evaluates recent results and arguments from classical chaotic systems theory and non-relativistic quantum mechanics that pertain to the question of whether our world is deterministic or indeterministic. While the classical results are inconclusive, quantum mechanics is often assumed to establish indeterminism insofar as the measurement process involves an ineliminable stochastic element, even though the dynamics between two measurements is considered fully deterministic. While this latter claim concerning the Schrödinger evolution must be qualified, the former fully depends (...) on a resolution of the measurement problem. Two alleged proofs that nature is indeterministic, relying, in turn, on Gleason's theorem and Conway and Kochen's recent 'free will theorem', are shown to be wanting qua proofs of indeterminism. We are thus left with the conclusion that the determinism question remains open. (shrink)

The centerpiece of Jeffrey Bub's book Interpreting the Quantum World is a theorem (Bub and Clifton 1996) which correlates each member of a large class of no-collapse interpretations with some 'privileged observable'. In particular, the Bub-Clifton theorem determines the unique maximal sublattice L(R,e) of propositions such that (a) elements of L(R,e) can be simultaneously determinate in state e, (b) L(R,e) contains the spectral projections of the privileged observable R, and (c) L(R,e) is picked out by R and e (...) alone. In this paper, we explore the issue of maximal determinate sets of observables using the tools provided by the algebraic approach to quantum theory; and we call the resulting algebras of determinate observables, "maximal *beable* subalgebras". The capstone of our exploration is a generalized version of Bub and Clifton's theorem that applies to arbitrary (i.e., both mixed and pure) quantum states, to Hilbert spaces of arbitrary (i.e., both finite and infinite) dimension, and to arbitrary observables (including those with a continuous spectrum). Moreover, in the special case covered by the original Bub-Clifton theorem, our theorem reproduces their result under strictly weaker assumptions. This added level of generality permits us to treat several topics that were beyond the reach of the original Bub-Clifton result. In particular: (a) We show explicitly that a (non-dynamical) version of the Bohm theory can be obtained by granting privileged status to the position observable. (b) We show that Clifton's (1995) characterization of the Kochen-Dieks modal interpretation is a corollary of our theorem in the special case when the density operator is taken as the privileged observable. (c) We show that the 'uniqueness' demonstrated by Bub and Clifton is only guaranteed in certain special cases -- viz., when the quantum state is pure, or if the privileged observable is compatible with the density operator. We also use our results to articulate a solid mathematical foundation for certain tenets of the orthodox Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory. For example, the uncertainty principle asserts that there are strict limits on the precision with which we can know, simultaneously, the position and momentum of a quantum-mechanical particle. However, the Copenhagen interpretation of this fact is not simply that a precision momentum measurement necessarily and uncontrollably disturbs the value of position, and vice-versa; but that position and momentum can never in reality be thought of as simultaneously determinate. We provide warrant for this stronger 'indeterminacy principle' by showing that there is no quantum state that assigns a sharp value to both position and momentum; and, a fortiori, that it is mathematically impossible to construct a beable algebra that contains both the position observable and the momentum observable. We also prove a generalized version of the Bub-Clifton theorem that applies to "singular" states (i.e., states that arise from non-countably-additive probability measures, such as Dirac delta functions). This result allows us to provide a mathematically rigorous reconstruction of Bohr's response to the original EPR argument -- which makes use of a singular state. In particular, we show that if the position of the first particle is privileged (e.g., as Bohr would do in a position measuring context), the position of the second particle acquires a definite value by virtue of lying in the corresponding maximal beable subalgebra. But then (by the indeterminacy principle) the momentum of the second particle is not a beable; and EPR's argument for the simultaneous reality of both position and momentum is undercut. (shrink)

We review several no-go theorems attributed to Gisin and Hardy, Conway and Kochen purporting the impossibility of Lorentz-invariant deterministic hidden-variable model for explaining quantum nonlocality. Those theorems claim that the only known solution to escape the conclusions is either to accept a preferred reference frame or to abandon the hidden-variable program altogether. Here we present a different alternative based on a foliation dependent framework adapted to deterministic hidden variables. We analyse the impact of such an approach on Bohmian mechanics (...) and show that retrocausation necessarily comes out without time-loop paradox. (shrink)

I describe recent developments of Conway and Kochen on the physical meaning of freewill and their theorem that the assertion of freewill for human beings, in their specific sense, implies the same for elementary particles. This description is given in simplified metaphorical terms that nonetheless address the key physical axioms and essential analytic content of their argument. I then give points of contact of our metaphor with the full technical analysis of the cited authors and conclude with some (...) associated metaphysical speculations. These include the implications of the freewill theorem for dual aspect theories and, in particular, for process metaphysics. (shrink)