This paper develops an analysis of the relationship between politics and suffering in the writings of Friedrich Hölderlin (1770-1843) and Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900). Both thinkers uphold the tragic idea of suffering as a crucible in which the uniquely human powers of self-creation - having reached, apparently, their lowest point - are revealed in all of their grand majesty. Yet they diverge dramatically when it comes to working out the political implications of this idea. Whereas Hölderlin deploys the tragic revaluation of (...) suffering on behalf of democracy, Nietzsche deploys this same revaluation against democracy. My argument suggests that the differences between Hölderlin and Nietzsche refer more to their different points in the development of the modern age than to any substantive difference in the structure of their thinking, and that unearthing Nietzsche's origins in Hölderlin enables us to retrieve the wider compass of the idea of suffering on which Nietzsche relies in developing his critique of modern democratic politics, and so also a wider compass for settling some of the debates that have arisen around his political thought. Key Words: democracy • Hölderlin • Nietzsche • suffering • tragedy. (shrink)

Oneanaphora (e.g.,this is a good one) has been used as a key diagnostic in syntactic analyses of the English noun phrase, and “one‐replacement” has also figured prominently in debates about the learnability of language. However, much of this work has been based on faulty premises, as a few perceptive researchers, including Ray Jackendoff, have made clear. Abandoning the view of anaphoricone(a‐one) as a form of syntactic replacement allows us to take a fresh look at various uses of the wordone. In (...) the present work, we investigate its use as a cardinal number (1‐one) in order to better understand its anaphoric use. Like all cardinal numbers, 1‐onecan only quantify an individuated entity and provides an indefinite reading by default. Owing to unique combinatoric properties, cardinal numbers defy consistent classification as determiners, quantifiers, adjectives, or nouns. Once the semantics and distribution of cardinal numbers, including 1‐one, are appreciated, many properties ofa‐onefollow with minimal stipulation. We claim that 1‐oneanda‐oneare distinct but very closely related lexemes. When 1‐oneappears without a noun (e.g.,Takeone), it is nearly indistinguishable froma‐one(e.g.,takeone)—the only differences being interpretive (1‐oneforegrounds its cardinality whilea‐onedoes not) and prosodic (presence versus absence of primary accent). While we ultimately argue that a family of constructions is required to describe the full range of syntactic contexts in whichoneappears, the proposed network accounts for properties ofa‐oneby allowing it to inherit most of its syntactic and interpretive constraints from its historical predecessor, 1‐one. (shrink)

This article explores the conceptual commitments underlying Luxemburg’s repudiation of the discourse of disappointment which had overtaken the European socialist movement during the First World War. My analysis brushes against the grain of the traditional interpretation of Luxemburg’s admonitions ‘to be cheerful despite everything and anything’ as arising from her allegiance to a Marxist philosophy of history which decrees that socialism must inevitably prevail and so refuses to give way to disappointment or despair. The philosophy of history which Luxemburg absorbed (...) from Marx, notably through the Eighteenth Brumaire, prophesies the ultimate victory of socialism but ordains that the actual events and experiences through which this victory is prepared will consist in catastrophes rather than conquests. In Luxemburg, I suggest, we can see more clearly how the experience of failure could make the realization of socialism more rather than less certain, and in terms that refer more directly to the inner situation of the socialist activist than the abstract assurances on which Marx relied: failure occasions the opportunity for deeper learning but, more importantly, it is in the experience of failure that the commitment on which the realization of socialism depends is tested and, in Luxemburg’s hands at least, forged. (shrink)

This paper develops an account of the political theory of Friedrich Holderlin through an analysis of the concept of fate in his epistolary novel, Hyperion, or the Hermit in Greece. Contrary to a longstanding interpretive tradition which understands Hyperion as the culmination of an intellectual development over the 1790s in which Holderlin, disillusioned with the French Revolution, rejects politics in favour of poetic union with nature, the paper concludes that the political vision of Hyperion is inspired by the possibility of (...) overcoming this very conflict between nature and politics. Such a possibility arises unexpectedly in the encounter with fate at precisely that moment when all hope for the fulfilment of Hyperion's political ambitions has been lost. (shrink)