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  1.  25
    How Privacy Rights Engender Direct Doxastic Duties.Lauritz Aastrup Munch - forthcoming - Journal of Value Inquiry:1-16.
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  2.  41
    The Right to Privacy, Control Over Self‐Presentation, and Subsequent Harm.Lauritz Aastrup Munch - 2020 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 37 (1):141-154.
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  3.  88
    Privacy rights and ‘naked’ statistical evidence.Lauritz Aastrup Munch - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (11):3777-3795.
    Do privacy rights restrict what is permissible to infer about others based on statistical evidence? This paper replies affirmatively by defending the following symmetry: there is not necessarily a morally relevant difference between directly appropriating people’s private information—say, by using an X-ray device on their private safes—and using predictive technologies to infer the same content, at least in cases where the evidence has a roughly similar probative value. This conclusion is of theoretical interest because a comprehensive justification of the thought (...)
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  4.  13
    Why ‘Negative Control’ is a Dead End: A Reply to Mainz and Uhrenfeldt.Lauritz Aastrup Munch - 2021 - Res Publica 27 (4):661-667.
    Mainz and Uhrenfeldt have recently claimed that a violation of the right to privacy can be defined successfully under reliance on the notion of ‘Negative Control’. In this reply, I show that ‘Negative Control’ is unrelated to privacy right violations. It follows that control theorists have yet to put forth a successful normative account of privacy.
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  5.  20
    Digital Self-Defence: Why you Ought to Preserve Your Privacy for the Sake of Wrongdoers.Lauritz Aastrup Munch - 2022 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 25 (2):233-248.
    Most studies on the ethics of privacy focus on what others ought to do to accommodate our interest in privacy. I focus on a related but distinct question that has attracted less attention in the literature: When, if ever, does morality require us to safeguard our own privacy? While we often have prudential reasons for safeguarding our privacy, we are also, at least sometimes, morally required to do so. I argue that we, sometimes, ought to safeguard our privacy for the (...)
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    Correction to: Privacy rights and ‘naked’ statistical evidence.Lauritz Aastrup Munch - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (11):3797-3797.
    A correction to this paper has been published: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-021-01640-1.
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