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Mark Thomas Walker
University of Birmingham
  1.  45
    The Voluntariness of Judgment.Mark Thomas Walker - 1996 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 39 (1):97 – 119.
    While various items closely associated with belief, such as speech?acts of assertion, or what have recently been termed acts of ?acceptance?, can clearly be voluntary, it is commonly supposed that belief itself, being intrinsically truth?directed, is essentially passive. I argue that while this may be true of belief proper, understood as a kind of disposition, it is not true of acts of assent or ?judgment?. Judgments, I contend, must be deemed voluntary precisely because of their truth?aimedness, for in their case (...)
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  2.  53
    The Real Reason Why the Prisoner’s Dilemma is Not a Newcomb Problem.Mark Thomas Walker - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (3):841-859.
    It is commonly thought, in line with the position defended in an influential paper by David Lewis, that the decision problems faced in the prisoner’s dilemma and the Newcomb situation are essentially the same problem. José Luis Bermúdez has recently attacked the case Lewis makes for this claim. While I think the claim is false, I contend that Bermúdez’s reason for rejecting Lewis’s argument is inadequate, and then outline what I take to be a better reason for doing so.
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  3.  39
    Williams, Truth-Aimedness and the Voluntariness of Judgement.Mark Thomas Walker - 2001 - Ratio 14 (1):68–83.
    I contend that while at least one of the arguments advanced by Bernard Williams in his paper ‘Deciding To Believe’ does establish that beliefs, or more precisely, judgements cannot be decided upon ‘at will’, the notion of truth‐aimedness presupposed by that argument also, ironically, provides the key to understanding why judgements are necessarily voluntary.
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  4.  4
    Williams, Truth‐Aimedness and the Voluntariness of Judgement.Mark Thomas Walker - 2001 - Ratio 14 (1):68-83.
    I contend that while at least one of the arguments advanced by Bernard Williams in his paper ‘Deciding To Believe’ does establish that beliefs, or more precisely, judgements cannot be decided upon ‘at will’, the notion of truth‐aimedness presupposed by that argument also, ironically, provides the key to understanding why judgements are necessarily voluntary.
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  5.  15
    Against One Form of Judgment-Determinism.Mark Thomas Walker - 2001 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 9 (2):199 – 227.
    Taking 'rationalized judgments' to be those formed by inference from other judgments, I argue against 'Extreme Determinism': the thesis that theoretical rationalization just is a kind of predetermination of 'conclusion-judgments' by 'premise-judgments'. The argument rests upon two key lemmas: firstly, that a deliberator - in this case, his/her assent to some proposition - to be predetermined (I call this the 'Openness Requirement'): secondly, that a subject's logical insight into his/her premise-judgments must enter into the explanation of any judgment s/he forms (...)
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  6.  47
    A Problem for Causal Theories of Action.Mark Thomas Walker - 2003 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (1):84–108.
    Philosophical accounts of "action" standardly take an action to be a doing which _satisfies some description that is semantically related to the content of a propositional attitude of the subject's which _explains why that doing occurred. Causal theories of action require that the explanation in question must involve the causation of action-doings by propositional attitudes (typically intentions, volitions, or combinations of belief and desire). I argue that there are actions whose status, as such, cannot be acknowledged by any causal theory, (...)
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  7.  24
    Nietzsche: His Philosophy of Contradictions and the Contradictions of His Philosophy.Mark Thomas Walker - 2000 - International Philosophical Quarterly 40 (4):509-510.
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  8.  25
    The Freedom of Judgment.Mark Thomas Walker - 2003 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 11 (1):63-92.
    This is the sequel to my paper 'Against One Form of Judgment-Determinism' ( IJPS , May 2001), wherein I argued that theoretical rationalization, that is, the forming of judgments by way of inference from other judgments, cannot simply be identified with any kind of predetermination of conclusion-judgments by premise-judgments. Taking 'free' to mean 'neither mechanistically explicable nor random' (where something is mechanistically explicable if and only if it is either predetermined or probabilified in a certain way, and is random if (...)
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  9.  23
    Punishment - a Tale of Two Islands.Mark Thomas Walker - 1993 - Ratio 6 (1):63-71.
  10.  16
    Philosophy Of Language.Mark Thomas Walker - 2004 - Philosophical Books 45 (3):241-245.
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  11.  6
    Kant'S Compatibilism.Mark Thomas Walker - 1996 - Philosophical Books 37 (4):256-258.
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  12. Kant, Schopenhauer and Morality: Recovering the Categorical Imperative.Mark Thomas Walker - 2012 - Palgrave-Macmillan.
    Introduction : a great reversal? -- Justifying morality -- Groundwork 3 : an enigmatic text -- The second critique -- Groundwork 2 : rational nature as an end-in-itself? -- From rational agency to freedom -- From freedom to non-phenomenal -- From non-phenomenality to universality -- The identity of persons -- Recovering the categorical imperative.
     
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