La nueva concepción de la Ley en la Constitución venezolana de 1999 The new conception of law in the 1999 Venezuelan Constitution González R., Javier La justicia, ¿Una virtud necesaria? The justice, A necessary virtue? Guarisma Mérida, Aidalíz Derechos humanos, interculturalidad y racionalidad de resistencia Human rights and rationality of resistance Herrera Flores, Joaquín El estado de apertura y la esencia del lenguaje The state of disclosure and the essence of language Hocevar, Drina El problema de la libertad The problem (...) of freedom Jáuregui, Ramón M. De la violencia a la retórica en la construcción de la civilidad From violence to rhetoric in civility construction Pino de Casanova, Malin ¿Historia universal o local? Una cuestión de especial trascendencia en el campo de la jurisprudencia Universal or local history? A matter of special transcendence in the field of jurisprudence Puy Muñoz, Francisco Contra la democracia Against democracy López Corredoira, Martín Un punto de vista práctico sobre el derecho A practical point of view about law Otero Parga, Milagros El derecho en Antígona ¿Natural o positivo? Law in Antigone. Natural or positive law? Parodi Remón, Carlos Por la democracia For democracy Suzzarini, Andrés La ciencia según Hegel Science according Hegel Vásquez, Eduardo Responsabilidad civil y responsabilidad moral. Hacia una responsabilidad civil más objetiva Civil responsibility and moral responsibility. Towards a more objective civil responsibility Vielma Mendoza, Yoleida Recensiones Finnis, John: El autor y su obra Reseñado por: Hoèevar, Mayda Aguayo, Enrique: Introducción al pensamiento jurídico-filosófico de Eduardo García Máynez Reseñado por: González R., Javier. (shrink)

La nueva concepción de la Ley en la Constitución venezolana de 1999 The new conception of law in the 1999 Venezuelan Constitution González R., Javier La justicia, ¿Una virtud necesaria? The justice, A necessary virtue? Guarisma Mérida, Aidalíz Derechos humanos, interculturalidad y racionalidad de resistencia Human rights and rationality of resistance Herrera Flores, Joaquín El estado de apertura y la esencia del lenguaje The state of disclosure and the essence of language Hocevar, Drina El problema de la libertad The problem (...) of freedom Jáuregui, Ramón M. De la violencia a la retórica en la construcción de la civilidad From violence to rhetoric in civility construction Pino de Casanova, Malin ¿Historia universal o local? Una cuestión de especial trascendencia en el campo de la jurisprudencia Universal or local history? A matter of special transcendence in the field of jurisprudence Puy Muñoz, Francisco Contra la democracia Against democracy López Corredoira, Martín Un punto de vista práctico sobre el derecho A practical point of view about law Otero Parga, Milagros El derecho en Antígona ¿Natural o positivo? Law in Antigone. Natural or positive law? Parodi Remón, Carlos Por la democracia For democracy Suzzarini, Andrés La ciencia según Hegel Science according Hegel Vásquez, Eduardo Responsabilidad civil y responsabilidad moral. Hacia una responsabilidad civil más objetiva Civil responsibility and moral responsibility. Towards a more objective civil responsibility Vielma Mendoza, Yoleida Recensiones Finnis, John: El autor y su obra Reseñado por: Hoèevar, Mayda Aguayo, Enrique: Introducción al pensamiento jurídico-filosófico de Eduardo García Máynez Reseñado por: González R., Javier. (shrink)

La nueva concepción de la Ley en la Constitución venezolana de 1999 The new conception of law in the 1999 Venezuelan Constitution González R., Javier La justicia, ¿Una virtud necesaria? The justice, A necessary virtue? Guarisma Mérida, Aidalíz Derechos humanos, interculturalidad y racionalidad de resistencia Human rights and rationality of resistance Herrera Flores, Joaquín El estado de apertura y la esencia del lenguaje The state of disclosure and the essence of language Hocevar, Drina El problema de la libertad The problem (...) of freedom Jáuregui, Ramón M. De la violencia a la retórica en la construcción de la civilidad From violence to rhetoric in civility construction Pino de Casanova, Malin ¿Historia universal o local? Una cuestión de especial trascendencia en el campo de la jurisprudencia Universal or local history? A matter of special transcendence in the field of jurisprudence Puy Muñoz, Francisco Contra la democracia Against democracy López Corredoira, Martín Un punto de vista práctico sobre el derecho A practical point of view about law Otero Parga, Milagros El derecho en Antígona ¿Natural o positivo? Law in Antigone. Natural or positive law? Parodi Remón, Carlos Por la democracia For democracy Suzzarini, Andrés La ciencia según Hegel Science according Hegel Vásquez, Eduardo Responsabilidad civil y responsabilidad moral. Hacia una responsabilidad civil más objetiva Civil responsibility and moral responsibility. (shrink)

La nueva concepción de la Ley en la Constitución venezolana de 1999 The new conception of law in the 1999 Venezuelan Constitution González R., Javier La justicia, ¿Una virtud necesaria? The justice, A necessary virtue? Guarisma Mérida, Aidalíz Derechos humanos, interculturalidad y racionalidad de resistencia Human rights and rationality of resistance Herrera Flores, Joaquín El estado de apertura y la esencia del lenguaje The state of disclosure and the essence of language Hocevar, Drina El problema de la libertad The problem (...) of freedom Jáuregui, Ramón M. De la violencia a la retórica en la construcción de la civilidad From violence to rhetoric in civility construction Pino de Casanova, Malin ¿Historia universal o local? Una cuestión de especial trascendencia en el campo de la jurisprudencia Universal or local history? A matter of special transcendence in the field of jurisprudence Puy Muñoz, Francisco Contra la democracia Against democracy López Corredoira, Martín Un punto de vista práctico sobre el derecho A practical point of view about law Otero Parga, Milagros El derecho en Antígona ¿Natural o positivo? Law in Antigone. Natural or positive law? Parodi Remón, Carlos Por la democracia For democracy Suzzarini, Andrés La ciencia según Hegel Science according Hegel Vásquez, Eduardo Responsabilidad civil y responsabilidad moral. Hacia una responsabilidad civil más objetiva Civil responsibility and moral responsibility. Towards a more objective civil responsibility Vielma Mendoza, Yoleida Recensiones Finnis, John: El autor y su obra Reseñado por: Hoèevar, Mayda Aguayo, Enrique: Introducción al pensamiento jurídico-filosófico de Eduardo García Máynez Reseñado por: González R., Javier. (shrink)

La nueva concepción de la Ley en la Constitución venezolana de 1999 The new conception of law in the 1999 Venezuelan Constitution González R., Javier La justicia, ¿Una virtud necesaria? The justice, A necessary virtue? Guarisma Mérida, Aidalíz Derechos humanos, interculturalidad y racionalidad de resistencia Human rights and rationality of resistance Herrera Flores, Joaquín El estado de apertura y la esencia del lenguaje The state of disclosure and the essence of language Hocevar, Drina El problema de la libertad The problem (...) of freedom Jáuregui, Ramón M. De la violencia a la retórica en la construcción de la civilidad From violence to rhetoric in civility construction Pino de Casanova, Malin ¿Historia universal o local? Una cuestión de especial trascendencia en el campo de la jurisprudencia Universal or local history? A matter of special transcendence in the field of jurisprudence Puy Muñoz, Francisco Contra la democracia Against democracy López Corredoira, Martín Un punto de vista práctico sobre el derecho A practical point of view about law Otero Parga, Milagros El derecho en Antígona ¿Natural o positivo? Law in Antigone. Natural or positive law? Parodi Remón, Carlos Por la democracia For democracy Suzzarini, Andrés La ciencia según Hegel Science according Hegel Vásquez, Eduardo Responsabilidad civil y responsabilidad moral. Hacia una responsabilidad civil más objetiva Civil responsibility and moral responsibility. Towards a more objective civil responsibility Vielma Mendoza, Yoleida Recensiones Finnis, John: El autor y su obra Reseñado por: Hoèevar, Mayda Aguayo, Enrique: Introducción al pensamiento jurídico-filosófico de Eduardo García Máynez Reseñado por: González R., Javier. (shrink)

Quality of Life Reach in Medical Care Alcance da qualidade de vida no atendimento médico The term quality of life has increasingly widespread use in biomedical practice, especially in end-of-life situations. Experience shows that the expression is often used with very different —and sometimes conflicting— scopes. The present article presents the results of a literature review that show diverse positions, while delimitating the subject. The analysis compares the terms “quality of life,” “human dignity,” and “value of human life.” Para citar (...) este artículo / To reference this article / Para citar este artigo Páez G, López-Gabeiras MP, Moreno-D’Anna M. Alcance de la “calidad de vida” en atención médica. Pers Bioet. 2020;24:14-27. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5294/pebi.2020.24.1.2 Recibido: 06/11/2019 Aceptado: 04/03/2020 Publicado: 07/05/2020. (shrink)

El presente artículo analiza la asimilación en la obra de Tomás de Aquino de los principios fundamentales del necesitarismo físico aristotélico así como la introducción, desde el punto de vista de la cosmología cristiana, dos tipos de fenómenos ajenos a la filosofía de la naturaleza de Aristóteles: las operaciones ocultas de la naturaleza y los milagros. Se estudia la postura del Aquinate en torno al magnetismo, las mareas, las propiedades terapéuticas de los compuestos y el origen de los poderes (...) de las figuras nigrománticas y reliquias. -/- . (shrink)

In this article, the author compares two Spanish translations of Virginia Woolf’s A Room of One’s Own. Taking into account that Spanish is a language in which words referring to human beings have a feminine and a masculine form, and grammatical gender corresponds to sex, all translators must interrogate the sex of the referent in order to translate gendered words. They are thus compelled to assign sex to genderless forms in the source text. Patriarchal translation has a long tradition of (...) devaluing and excluding the feminine in this process, as the author demonstrates here by revealing how Jorge Luis Borges translated the pronouns you and we in Woolf’s essay. In contrast, in her feminist translation of the essay, María Milagros Rivera-Garretas not only chooses the gender which most accurately represents the likely intended meaning of the source text, but recovers its message and legacy. (shrink)

Según Williamson, saber y creer son estados mentales, pero creer algo verdadero y creer justificadamente algo verdadero no lo son. Ese tratamiento discriminatorio es relevante para la epistemología de Williamson. Su principal tesis epistemológica negativa y su principal tesis epistemológica positiva están en peligro si su teoría metafísica sobre lo mental es incorrecta. Presento aquí un problema para dicha teoría: impone limitaciones implausibles a los posibles usos de conceptos y expresiones lingüísticas. Describiré algunas opciones que tendría Williamson para evitar el (...) problema; pero sostendré que acarrean cierta dosis de arbitrariedad. (shrink)

I present an epistemological puzzle about perceptual knowledge and its relation to the evaluation of probabilities. It involves cases, concerning a given subject S and a proposition P in a determinate context, where apparently: S has perceptual knowledge of P; the epistemic justification S has for believing Not-P is much greater than her epistemic justification for believing P. If those two theses were true, the following very plausible epistemological principle would fail: If S knows P, then the epistemic justification S (...) has for believing Not-P is not greater than her epistemic justification for believing P. I offer a solution to the puzzle, which is compatible with basic intuitions and theses of orthodox Bayesianism. (shrink)

E. Machery and some collaborators have used survey data to criticize Kripke’s anti-descriptivism about proper names. I highlight a number of drawbacks in the tests of Machery et al. Some of my objections concern their ambiguity. In particular, the responses that–according to them–reveal descriptivist intuitions can be interpreted as anti-descriptivist responses. Furthermore, their vignettes are inconsistent. I also discuss other issues related to the role of intuitions in philosophy; Machery et al.’s theses depends on an unjustified assumption: there is not (...) expertise regarding intuitions. (shrink)

Desarrollo varias hipótesis sobre los propósitos de la argumentación racional, parcialmente inspiradas en el análisis de Jackson sobre el concepto de petitio principii. Destaco como especialmente relevante entre tales propósitos la referencia a los potenciales destinatarios de una argumentación. Ilustro la discusión con un caso concreto: el argumento elaborado por Putnam para demostrar que no somos cerebros en una cubeta. Presento una versión de ese argumento y lo defiendo frente a una posible crítica que lo acusa de prejuzgar la cuestión.I (...) work out some hypothesis on the purposes of rational arguing, partly inspired by Jackson’s analysis of the concept of petitio principii. It is especially relevant among such purposes the reference to the potential intended addressee of an argument. The discussion is illustrated with a concrete example: Putnam’s proofthat we are not brains in a vat. I present a version of Putnam’s proof and defend it from a possible criticism which accuses it of begging the question. (shrink)

En este artículo discuto el supuesto compromiso de la lógica modal cuantificada con el esencialismo. Entre otros argumentos, Quine, el más emblemático de los críticos de la modalidad, ha objetado a la lógica modal cuantificada que ésta se compromete con una doctrina filosófica usualmente considerada sospechosa, el esencialismo: la concepción que distingue, de entre los atributos de una cosa, aquellos que le son esenciales de otros poseidos sólo contingentemente. Examino en qué medida Quine puede tener razón sobre ese punto explorando (...) una analogía entre la lógica modal y la logica clásica de primer orden. Con ello se pretende proporcionar una visión clarificadora sobre el estatus de la lógica modal y su relación con la lógica en general.In this paper I discuss the alleged commitment of quantified modal logic to philosophical essentialism. Besides some other more or less related arguments against quantified modal logic, Quine objects to it by claiming its commitment to a philosophical doctrine usually regarded as suspicious, essentialism: the view that some of the attributes of a thing are essential to it, and others are accidental. I study to what extent Quine can be right about this specific issue. I defend some of his views by exploring an analogy between modal logic and standard first order logic. That serves to get a better understanding of the status of modal logic and its relation with logic in general. (shrink)

I deal here with one of Boghossian’s arguments against content externalism, related to our inferential rationality . According to his reasoning, the apriority of our logical abilities is inconsistent with certain externalist assumptions. Nevertheless, the problem constitutes an important challenge for any theory of content, not just for externalism. Furthermore, when we examine what internalists may propose to solve the problem, we see that externalists have at their disposal a more promising repertoire of possible replies than internalists. In that sense, (...) insofar as Boghossian’s scenario is relevant to the debate externalism/internalism, it can be seen as providing additional evidence for content externalism. (shrink)

Kripke argued for the existence of necessary a posteriori truths, and tried to explain why some of them seem to be contingent. His main explanation motivated two philosophical proposals: the attempt - linked to some interpretations of two-dimensionalism - to analyse the epistemic concept of a priori truth using metaphysical modal concepts; the argument for psychophysical dualism worked out by Kripke relying on his explanation of the appearances of contingency. I point out several difficulties for, and argue that can oe (...) blocked because of the existence of alternative accounts of the phenomenon. (shrink)

Los conflictos y reivindicaciones de los movimientos sociales, políticamente representables, durante la transición democrática de los 80, entran en crisis con el modelo de acumulación y concentración de riqueza, inaugurado por la dominación neoliberal durante los 90, dando lugar al ciclo de movilizaciones de protesta, que agravan la crisis de todo el sistema de representación política (elecciones, partidos, congreso), el que degenera en un fenómeno nuevo: el representativismo político. El imperativo de “gobernabilidad” de la protesta, la acumulación y concentración de (...) poderes ejecutivos, para un mejor gobierno económico de la política, reforzaron los poderes del hiperpresidencialismo y la formación de una democracia caudillista, que en Ecuador adoptó una orientación contra-neoliberal. (shrink)

Manuel Castells: un elogio emocional e inofensivo de las movilizaciones de protestaCuatro observaciones preliminares sirven para enmarcar una lectura crítica de la obra reciente de Manuel Castells, Redes de indignación y esperanza. En primer lugar este género de elogio exaltado e inofensivo de las movilizaciones de protesta actuales en el mundo ha dado lugar en muy poco tiempo a una amplia literatura, pero también ha suscitado no pocas críticas, ya que se trata por general de estudios y traba..

Los milagros no violan las leyes naturales.

A common view about Moore’s Proof of an External World is that the argument fails because anyone who had doubts about its conclusion could not use the argument to rationally overcome those doubts. I agree that Moore’s Proof is—in that sense—dialectically ineffective at convincing an opponent or a doubter, but I defend that the argument (even when individuated taking into consideration the purpose of Moore’s arguing and, consequently, the preferred addressee of the Proof) does not fail. The key to my (...) defence is to conceive the Proof as addressed to subjects with a different epistemic condition. To sustain this view I formulate some hypothesis about the common general purpose of arguing and I defend that it can be fulfilled even when the addressee of an argument is not someone who disbelieves or doubts its conclusion. (shrink)

Hume argued that inductive inferences do not have rational justification. My aim is to reject Hume’s argument. The discussion is partly motivated by an analogy with Carroll’s Paradox, which concerns deductive inferences. A first radically externalist reply to Hume (defended by Dauer and Van Cleve) is that justified inductive inferences do not require the subject to know that nature is uniform, though the uniformity of nature is a necessary condition for having the justification. But then the subject does not have (...) reasons for believing what she believes. I defend a moderate externalist account that seeks to partly accommodate that objection to the radical externalist proposal. It is based on an extension of Peacocke’s theory of concepts: possession conditions for predicative concepts standing for natural properties include (fallible) dispositions to project them to new cases in accordance with inductive inferential patterns. (shrink)

Hume argued that inductive inferences do not have rational justification. My aim is to reject Hume's argument. The discussion is partly motivated by an analogy with Carroll's Paradox, which concerns deductive inferences. A first radically externalist reply to Hume is that justified inductive inferences do not require the subject to know that nature is uniform, though the uniformity of nature is necessary condition for having the justification. But then the subject does not have reasons for believing what she believes. I (...) defend a moderate externalist account that seeks to partly accommodate that objection to the radical externalist proposal. It is based on an extension of Peacocke's theory of concepts: possession conditions for predicative concepts standing for natural properties include dispositions to project them to new cases in accordance with inductive inferential patterns. (shrink)

The main goal of this paper is to contribute to the clarification of the dialectics between compatibilists and incompatibilists on free action. I describe a new incompatibilist position that has been neglected in the literature. I also provide a proper rationale for such a position. First, I present a justification for incompatibilism that is composed of an old idea and a new one. The old idea is the FRAP principle: freedom requires alternative possibilities. Compatibilists and incompatibilists alike usually share a (...) Key Assumption about how the open alternative possibilities allowed by indeterminism are supposed to support the libertarian case: the existence of alternative possibilities should make a metaphysically relevant difference concerning the control and/or the authorship of the agent over the action. The other component in the justification for incompatibilism is the rejection of the Key Assumption. Why to preserve FRAP when the Key Assumption is dropped? The answer has three parts: we have a strong pre-theoretical intuition in favour of FRAP; a crucial anti-libertarian argument, known as the Luck Argument, can be interpreted as showing that FRAP and the Key Assumption cannot both be true; the Luck Argument doesn't work when directed against FRAP itself. (shrink)

Tanto la Fórmula Barcan como la postulación de possibilia contradicen los juicios intuitivos preteóricos de la mayoría de los sujetos, favorables al actualismo sobre la naturaleza de los mundos posibles. En este artículo discuto y rechazo dos argumentos que pretenderían contrarrestar tales juicios, y que conciben erróneamente la relación entre la semántica de mundos posibles y nuestros lenguajes naturales modales. El argumento más importante asume que el dominio de todas las entidades es idéntico al dominio de @. Desarrollo una interpretación (...) de la SMP conforme a la cual esa tesis no está suficientemente justificada. /// Barcan Formula and the postulation of possibilia contradict the pretheoretical intuitive judgments of most people, which favour actualism about possible worlds. In this paper I discuss and reject two arguments against such judgments, both of which conceive wrongly the relation between possible worlds semantics and modal natural languages. The more important argument assumes that the domain of the actual world is identical to the domain of @. I develop an interpretation of PWS which elucidates why that thesis is unwarranted. (shrink)

Timothy Williamson has defended the claim that any philosophically satisfying conception of modality that encompasses possible worlds semantics (PWS) commits us to the Barcan Formula. His argument depends on the assumption that the domain of what there is (the domain of the actual world) has to be identified with the domain D(@), where @ is the index or possible world that in PWS represents , or stands for , the actual world. I work out an interpretation of the relation between (...) PWS and possible worlds terminology that makes it plausible to reject that assumption. (shrink)

Kripke formula cuatro objeciones en contra de una solución disposicionalista simple al enigma wittgensteiniano sobre seguir una regla. En este trabajo presento dos propuestas parcialmente disposicionalistas diferentes a la teoría disposicionalista simple que Kripke discute y defiendo que aquellas cuatro objeciones no les afectan. Una de esas dos propuestas puede atribuirse, con cierta precaución, al propio Wittgenstein. La otra, que me parece preferible, invoca una noción teleológica de disposición. Ambas propuestas apelan al concepto de simplicidad, o —alternativamente— al concepto de (...) similitud natural. Rechazo también ciertas críticas que Kripke hace del uso de tales conceptos para solucionar el enigma sobre seguir una regla. (shrink)

Let G be a definably compact group in an o-minimal expansion of a real closed field. We prove that if dim(G\X) < dim G for some definable ${X \subseteq G}$ then X contains a torsion point of G. Along the way we develop a general theory for the so-called G-linear sets, and investigate definable sets which contain abstract subgroups of G.