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Profile: Rory Madden (University College London)
  1.  84
    The Naive Topology of the Conscious Subject.Rory Madden - 2015 - Noûs 49 (1):55-70.
    What does our naïve conception of a conscious subject demand of the nature of conscious beings? In a series of recent papers David Barnett has argued that a range of powerful intuitions in the philosophy of mind are best explained by the hypothesis that our naïve conception imposes a requirement of mereological simplicity on the nature of conscious beings. It is argued here that there is a much more plausible explanation of the intuitions in question. Our naïve conception of a (...)
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  2.  12
    Animal Self-Awareness.Rory Madden - 2017 - Philosophy, Theory, and Practice in Biology 9 (9).
    Part of the philosophical interest of the topic of organic individuals is that it promises to shed light on a basic and perennial question of philosophical self-understanding, the question what are we? The class of organic individuals seems to be a good place to look for candidates to be the things that we are. However there are, in principle, different ways of locating ourselves within the class of organic individuals; organic individuals occur at both higher and lower mereological levels than (...)
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  3.  26
    Human Persistence.Rory Madden - 2016 - Philosophers' Imprint 16 (17).
    Both advocates and opponents of the animalist view that we are fundamentally biological organisms have typically assumed that animalism is incompatible with intuitive verdicts about cerebrum isolation and transplantation. It is argued here that this assumption is a mistake. Animalism, developed in a natural way, in fact strongly supports these intuitive verdicts. The availability of this attractive resolution of a central puzzle in the personal identity debate has been obscured by a range of factors, including the prevalence in contemporary metaphysics (...)
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  4.  89
    Intention and the Self.Rory Madden - 2011 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (3pt3):325-351.
    Does intention presuppose personal identity, and what relevance does the issue have for the contemporary personal identity debate? I distinguish three ways in which intention might be said to presuppose personal identity, focusing mainly on causal presupposition and content presupposition. I argue that intention often causally presupposes personal identity. I argue that intention does not content-presuppose personal identity. The former result is a potential basis for a Butlerian circularity objection to Lockean theories of personal identity. The latter result undercuts a (...)
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  5. Could a Brain in a Vat Self‐Refer?Rory Madden - 2010 - European Journal of Philosophy 21 (1):74-93.
    : Radical sceptical possibilities challenge the anti-realist view that truth consists in ideal rational acceptability. Putnam, as part of his defence of an anti-realist view, subjected the case of the brain in a vat to a semantic externalist treatment, which aimed to maintain the desired connection between truth and ideal rational acceptability. It is argued here that self-consciousness poses special problems for this externalist strategy. It is shown how, on a standard model of first-person reference, Putnam's brain in a vat (...)
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  6.  35
    The Place of The Self in Contemporary Metaphysics.Rory Madden - 2015 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 76:77-95.
    I explain why the compositionalist conception of ordinary objects prevalent in contemporary metaphysics places the manifest image of the human self in a precarious position: the two theoretically simplest views of the existence of composites each jeopardize some central element of the manifest image. I present an alternative, nomological conception of ordinary objects, which secures the manifest image of the human self without the arbitrariness that afflicts compositionalist attempts to do the same. I close by sketching the consequences of the (...)
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  7. Externalism and Brain Transplants.Rory Madden - 2011 - In Karen Bennett & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Volume 6. Oxford University Press.
     
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  8.  27
    On Myself, and Other, Less Important Subjects, by Caspar Hare.Rory Madden - 2015 - Mind 124 (495):914-919.
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  9. The Persistence of Animate Organisms.Rory Madden - manuscript
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  10.  8
    The Limits of Realism, by Tim Button. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, 288 Pp. ISBN 978-0-19-967217-2 Hb £45.00. [REVIEW]Rory Madden - 2014 - European Journal of Philosophy 22 (S3):e4-e8.
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  11. Thinking Parts.Rory Madden - forthcoming - In Stephan Blatti & Paul F. Snowdon (eds.), Essays on Animalism. Oxford University Press.
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  12. XI-Intention and the Self.Rory Madden - 2011 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (3pt3):325-351.
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