Examines the role played by the Aristotelian logic in Neoplatonic philosophers. To start with, it is remarked that Aristotelian Organon was regarded not only as a corpus of logical texts but also as an introduction to philosophy. Focuses on several Neoplatonic Aristotelian commentators, from Alexander of Aphrodisias to Byzantine thinkers, presenting both the characteristics of their works and their lack of interest in discussing their own philosophical view. Finally, it is observed that, although not original, these commentaries provide a rather (...) reliable and correct investigation of Aristotle. (shrink)

In contrast with the different views of some recent scholars, Ch. 7 constitutes an important attempt to point out the importance played by non‐discursive thought in Plotinus and Proclus in several ways. Firstly, the differences between the doctrines of Plotinus and Proclus are investigated. Secondly, it is considered the role of the ‘Loving Intellect’ in both Plotinus’ and Proclus’ philosophy. Thirdly, it is indicated how the One plays a crucial role in the mystical experience and how this kind of experience (...) may be an evidence of the activity of the One. Finally, it is shown how some problems and difficulties of Plotinus’ philosophy may be explained through reference to the mystical experience. (shrink)

Devoted to the key Neoplatonic concepts of procession and emanation. The two terms are taken to express the same idea, although procession is preferred as more neutral. Points out how procession can be explained in Aristotelian terms. More specifically, it is demonstrated how Plotinus’ notion of procession uses the Aristotelian theory of the actualization of an activity by a potency in order to explain how a higher activity can actualize a lower one. Finally, considers the doctrine of Proclus who expresses (...) the procession, involving the theory of causal relation, in a way opposite to Plotinus. (shrink)

Focuses on Porphyry's semantic and more specifically on his theory of ‘imposition of names’, i.e. how names are related to things. Examines Porphyry's treatment of genus and species and also of individual, singular, and general terms to emphasize his peculiarity in Neoplatonic philosophy. Infers that Porphyry's attitude is not to develop a metaphysical and a logical semantics, but only a metaphysical one. Finally, considers how Porphyry's metaphysical approach towards semantics was maintained by eleventh and twelfth century Byzantine Neoplatonists.

The core of the third chapter is the study of the P‐series. This theory is presented after a detailed discussion of the relationship of individuals to species and genus. A P‐series is a sequence of terms classified according to priority and posteriority starting from the most universal one. This theory is the result of the evolution of the Aristotelian doctrine of pros en done in order to fit with the not strictly Aristotelian notion of ‘genus’ of some Neoplatonic philosophers.

The purpose of Ch. 6 is to outline the role played by the P‐series theory in Neoplatonic epistemology. To start with, it is explained that knowledge of a P‐series consists in an order of priority and posteriority of the terms: intellect, scientific knowledge, belief, presentation, and perception. In second place, some peculiar Neoplatonic epistemological issues, e.g. how can the divine possibly know temporal truths, are carefully examined. To conclude, some particular Neoplatonic rules, which allow higher entities to have knowledge of (...) lower ones, are investigated. (shrink)

Investigates how, given their ontological status between the One and animals, men can either ascend to the intellectual life or fall into the inferior kinds of life. Different issues involved in the doctrine of the rise to the intellectual life are considered. Firstly, the restriction to men of the possibility of an intellectual life is explained through the reference to Neoplatonists’ own personal experiences. Secondly, the experience of the ascent is defined by the term ‘inclination’ rather than the too broad (...) ‘reversion’ used by most of the scholars. The former term, indeed, seems to fit better in the case of men. Finally, the experience of inclination is explained in terms of logical necessity. (shrink)

A. C. Lloyd; XIV—Non-Discursive Thought—An Enigma of Greek Philosophy, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 70, Issue 1, 1 June 1970, Pages 261–274.

The author takes anderson to task for resting his argument on an "appeal to english usage," without analyzing that usage in relation to his point that subjunctive and counterfactual conditionals belong in one class. (staff).

There are many passages in Plato which look as if they alluded to well-worn practices, discussions, or lessons in the Academy. As is natural with allusions, they are often marked by a puzzling brevity or oddity of expression. One need not assume that they are always conscious allusions; for every writer has moments of obscurity which are due not so much to his conclusions as to his reaching them along lines that have long been familiar to Mm. To appreciate his (...) whole meaning the reader has then to infer as best he can the writer's train of thought. I wish to suggest that the language in which Dialectic is described in the later Dialogues presupposes a particular and probably familiar method of illustrating it. This was a geometrical illustration of the rules of Division by means of a divided line. By failing to notice it readers have not been led into any important misunderstanding of the Academy's rules. But I hope it will appear that the recognition of it makes Plato's manner of describing Division intelligible to an extent that is otherwise difficult. It is only a tentative suggestion, and would perhaps not have been worth making but for the possibility that some points of interest might at the same time emerge for those who were unconvinced by it. (shrink)

There are many passages in Plato which look as if they alluded to well-worn practices, discussions, or lessons in the Academy. As is natural with allusions, they are often marked by a puzzling brevity or oddity of expression. One need not assume that they are always conscious allusions; for every writer has moments of obscurity which are due not so much to his conclusions as to his reaching them along lines that have long been familiar to Mm. To appreciate his (...) whole meaning the reader has then to infer as best he can the writer's train of thought. I wish to suggest that the language in which Dialectic is described in the later Dialogues presupposes a particular and probably familiar method of illustrating it. This was a geometrical illustration of the rules of Division by means of a divided line. By failing to notice it readers have not been led into any important misunderstanding of the Academy's rules. But I hope it will appear that the recognition of it makes Plato's manner of describing Division intelligible to an extent that is otherwise difficult. It is only a tentative suggestion, and would perhaps not have been worth making but for the possibility that some points of interest might at the same time emerge for those who were unconvinced by it. (shrink)