Intention, cognitive commitment, and planning

Synthese 86 (3):361 - 378 (1991)
This paper defends a cognitive-motivational account of intending against recent criticism by J. Garcia, connects intending with a number of other concepts important in the theory of action — including decison, volition, and planning — and explores some principles of intention transfer construed as counterparts of epistemic principles governing closure for belief and justification. Several routes to intention formation are described; the role of intentions in planning is examined; and a holistic conception of intention formation and change is stressed. The proposed conception of intending as embodying at once a cognitive and a motivational commitment to action is thus shown to help in understanding both the explanation of action and the rationality of agents.
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References found in this work BETA
Robert Audi (1973). Intending. Journal of Philosophy 70 (13):387-403.
Michael Bratman (1987/1999). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Center for the Study of Language and Information.
Andrew Brennan & Bruce Aune (1980). Reason and Action. Philosophical Quarterly 30 (121):372.

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