Keeping track of the Gettier problem

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2):127-152 (2011)
This paper argues that for someone to know proposition p inferentially it is not enough that his belief in p and his justification for believing p covary with the truth of p through a sphere of possibilities. A further condition on inferential knowledge is that p's truth-maker is identical with, or causally related to, the state of affairs the justification is grounded in. This position is dubbed ‘identificationism.’
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2011.01389.x
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Sandy Goldberg (2015). Epistemic Entitlement and Luck. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2):273-302.

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