Reply to Nagasawa on the Inconsistency Objection to the Knowledge Argument

Erkenntnis 76 (1):137-145 (2012)
Abstract
Yujin Nagasawa has recently defended Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument from the “inconsistency objection.” The objection claims that the premises of the knowledge argument are inconsistent with qualia epiphenomenalism. Nagasawa defends Jackson by showing that the objection mistakenly assumes a causal theory of phenomenal knowledge. I argue that although this defense might succeed against two versions of the inconsistency objection, mine is unaffected by Nagasawa’s argument, in which case the inconsistency in the knowledge argument remains
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    Frank Jackson (1986). What Mary Didn't Know. Journal of Philosophy 83 (May):291-5.

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