The indexical nature of sensory concepts

Philosophical Papers 32 (2):169-181 (2002)
Abstract
This paper advances the thesis that sensory concepts have as a semantic component the first person indexical.
Keywords Concept  Indexicality  Metaphysics  Scepticism  Sensation
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Bernard Molyneux (2011). On The Infinitely Hard Problem Of Consciousness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):211 - 228.
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