The indexical nature of sensory concepts
Philosophical Papers 32 (2):169-181 (2002)
| Abstract | This paper advances the thesis that sensory concepts have as a semantic component the first person indexical. | |||||||||
| Keywords | Concept Indexicality Metaphysics Scepticism Sensation | |||||||||
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