David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In Pablo Muchnick (ed.), Rethinking Kant, vol. 2. Cambridge Scholars Publishers (2010)
Kant's writings on logic illustrate the comparison argument about truth, which goes as follows. A truth-bearer p is true if and only if it corresponds, or it agrees, with a portion of reality: the object(s), state(s) of affairs, or event(s) p is about. In order to know whether p agrees with that portion of reality, one must check if that portion of reality is as p states. Using the terms of the comparison argument, one must compare p with that portion of reality. This is impossible, because the only knowledge of reality we can have is in the form propositions, beliefs, or judgments, whose agreement with reality is as much in need of justification as the agreement of p with reality. Therefore, it is impossible to know which truth-bearers are true. This paper reconstructs Kant's version of the comparison argument. It is argued that, according to Kant, the argument is sound only under the assumption of transcendental realism. Transcendental idealism avoids the sceptical consequences of the comparison argument.
|Keywords||truth scepticism Kant|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Lucy Allais (2010). Kant's Argument for Transcendental Idealism in the Transcendental Aesthetic. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (1):47-75.
Alberto Vanzo (2010). Kant on the Nominal Definition of Truth. Kant-Studien 101 (2):147-166.
Lucy Allais (2003). Kant's Transcendental Idealism and Contemporary Anti-Realism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 11 (4):369 – 392.
Toni Kannisto (2010). Three Problems in Westphal's Transcendental Proof of Realism. Kant-Studien 101 (2):227-246.
Robert Merrihew Adams (2000). God, Possibility, and Kant. Faith and Philosophy 17 (4):425-440.
Alberto Vanzo (2012). Kant on Truth-Aptness. History and Philosophy of Logic 33 (2):109-126.
Timothy Rosenkoetter (2009). Truth Criteria and the Very Project of a Transcendental Logic. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 91 (2):193-236.
Edward Blatnik (1994). Kant's Refutation of Anti-Realism. Journal of Philosophical Research 19:127-146.
Eric Wilson (2010). The Ontological Argument Revisited: A Reply to Rowe. Forum Philosophicum: International Journal for Philosophy 15 (1):37 - 44.
Baron Reed (2009). A New Argument for Skepticism. Philosophical Studies 142 (1):91 - 104.
Corey W. Dyck (2011). Kant's Transcendental Deduction and the Ghosts of Descartes and Hume. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 19 (3):473-496.
Leslie Stevenson (2011). Objects of Representation. Diametros 27:4-24.
Oded Balaban & Asnat Avshalom (1990). The Ontological Argument Reconsidered. Journal of Philosophical Research 15:279-310.
Jerzy Szymura (2006). Kłopoty z pojęciem korespondencji. Filozofia Nauki 2.
Alberto Vanzo (2008). A Correspondence Theory of Objects? On Kant's Notions of Truth, Object, and Actuality. History of Philosophy Quarterly 25 (3):259-275.
Added to index2010-10-25
Total downloads113 ( #32,772 of 1,793,092 )
Recent downloads (6 months)44 ( #19,488 of 1,793,092 )
How can I increase my downloads?